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"An outstanding feature of this criterion [of Practicality] is the 
restraint it imposes on zealous aspirations to achieve near perfect 
conformity with other criteria. Compromises, often quite crude, are 
forced frequently because dogged Practicality must be heeded."1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
. Since the early 1970s, a taxpayer has been required to capitalize 
costs of, and transaction costs2 incurred in connection with, the 
acquisition of a separate tangible asset under the origin of the claim 
doctrine of Woodward v. Commissioner3 and United States v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp.4 These cases stand for the proposition that mismatching 
the character of a claimed ordinary deduction when the related income 
is tax preferenced by either capital gains treatment or complete 
nonrecognition distorts the taxpayer's income. Moreover, such 
mismatching would violate section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(Code), which requires that a taxpayer's method of tax accounting 
(which may include the tax treatment of an item's cost as a capital 
expenditure or a current expense) must clearly reflect the taxpayer's 
income.5 In Commissioner v. Idaho Power,6 Justice Blackmun 
1 Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 
567, 573 (1965). 
The two macro-criteria which rank highest are Practicality and Equity. Of 
the two, Practicality frequently must be granted more weight than Equity. 
At the second echelon are ranked Free Market Compatibility and concerns 
subsumed under the heading of Political Order. Between the two the 
former often outranks the latter. Finally, the criteria of Reduced Economic 
Inequality and Stability, in that order, appear. in the hierarchy. 
!d. at 601-02. 
2 Treasury Regulations 1.197-2(c)(12) (as amended in 2001) and 1.338-
6(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2001) use the term "transaction costs" in the same context 
as this article but do not define it. Some use it to mean costs that arise or are incurred 
"in connection with" a transaction. See, e.g., 1995 FSA LEXIS 395 (Jan. 24, 1995); 
1995 FSA LEXIS 233 (Mar. 22, 1995). 
3 397 U.S. 572 (1970) (stating that legal, accounting, and appraisal expenses 
incurred in purchasing minority stock interest are capital expenditures); see infra 
notes 188-214 and accompanying text. See generally John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy, 
Capital Expenditures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 
(1981). 
4 397 U.S. 580 (1970) (stating that consulting, legal, and other professional fees 
incurred by acquiring firm in minority stock appraisal proceeding are capital 
expenditures). 
5 See I.R.C. § 446(c); infra notes 185-92, 197-209 and accompanying text. 
6 418 U.S. 1 (1974) (stating that equipment depreciation allocable to 
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extended the capitalization requirement to inside transaction costs of 
creating a tangible with substantial future benefits in order to prevent 
(1) a timing of income mismatch in violation of section 446(b), and (2) 
a violation of the judicial rule of tax parity under which inside and 
outside transaction costs should be treated the same. For example, 
the capitalization requirement would avoid providing a tax advantage 
to inside costs over identical outside costs of constructing or acquiring 
a tangible asset with future benefits.7 . Capitalization of transaction 
costs as to an intangible asset usually yields a far less elegant result, 
since the intangible asset can be depreciated only under section 167 
and only if its useful life can be determined with certainty.8 Taxpayers 
are seldom able to determine the useful life of an intangible asset, 
particularly with respect to business expansion and start-up costs.9 To 
avoid the distortion of income of capitalization of such costs without 
depreciation, many, but not all, judicial and administrative authorities 
from the early 1970s through 1992 allowed a current deduction for 
expenditures yielding current and future intangible benefits. These 
expenditures included recurring business expansion costs, based on 
the erroneous reasoning that such costs were deductible if they did not 
create a separate asset. 10 This line of reasoning was, in turn, based on 
construction of capital facilities is to be capitalized; otherwise, taxpayer constructing 
own capital assets is tax advantaged over taxpayer purchasing similar assets). 
7 See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text 
8 See infra note 197. 
9 John W. Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: Will Snow Fall?, 27 
TAX LAW. 381,411-12 (1974) [hereinafter Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses]. 
10 John W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A 
Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform and a Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAX REV. 1, 
17-26, 52-7 (1986) [hereinafter Lee, Start-Up Costs]. While I can take pride in the fact 
that my definition of "investigatory" and "start-up costs" was followed in section 
195's legislative history, compare Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses, supra note 9, at 384-
85, with S. REP. No. 96-1036 (1980), I must also confess that I stated that 
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971), rejected the 
future benefits test. Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses, supra note 9, at 390 n.53. I now 
know that was not so, but in any event came to see that the no separate asset reading 
was questionable. Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 477 n.29. Daniel Halperin had it 
right in a letter to me back then that Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses, was too much of a 
brief. I was trying too hard to get the Supreme Court to reject the start-up gloss on 
section 162 and, in particular, the holding one's self out as providing goods or services 
definition of a trade or business. Of course, I succeeded then only in Snow v. 
Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974), holding that sections 174 and 162 were different 
(a Supreme Court clerk and former classmate wrote me at the time asking for a copy 
of Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses), but adopting for section 174 a regular and 
continuous profit-motivated activities test, which I had advocated. John W. Lee, A 
Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 TAX L. REV. 347, 
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a misreading of Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n. 11 
Underneath this mistaken no separate asset doctrine, however, lay 
factual patterns which would have supported application of one or 
another of the rough justice current deduction factors discussed in 
Part IV of this article. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in National Starch and 
Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner12 to resolve the conflict between the 
two lines of cases. Justice Blackmun, the author of Lincoln Savings 
and Idaho Power, explained in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner13 
that Lincoln Savings merely held that the cost of creating or 
enhancing a separate asset usually had to be capitalized - not that the 
absence of such a tangible asset precluded capitalization 
notwithstanding more than incidental future benefits.14 In this sense, 
future benefits were a strong, but not irrefutable, indicator of a capital 
expenditure. 
Part II recounts how, over the last decade, expensing versus 
capitalizing of costs with present and future, often intangible benefits 
became the most significant federal income tax issue in audits of big 
businesses, which report the bulk of both the corporate sector income 
and additional tax revenues raised by tax audits and collections.15 An 
indicator of this phenomenon was the action of the Internal Revenue 
Service (Service) in directing team tax auditors of the largest 1500 or 
so corporations16 in the aftermath of INDOPCO to examine specific 
expensing/capitalizing issues, particularly those with future benefits 
flavor. This practice generated a flood of Technical Advice 
Memoranda (TAM) which . often manifested conflicts between the 
Examination Division of the Service and the Office of Chief Counsel. 
In addition, this trend produced a few digest, published revenue 
rulings;17 and a stream of reported judicial decisions that are 
449-51 (1974); Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses, supra note 9, at 403. In Commissioner v. 
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987), the Court adopted this test for section 162 as well. 
None of these cases cited me but that's my story and I'm sticking to it. 
11 403 u.s. 345 (1971). 
12 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990). 
13 503 U.S. 79 (1992). See generally, John W. Lee, Doping Out the Capitalization 
Rules after INDOPCO, 57 TAX NOTES 669 (Nov. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Lee, 
Capitalization Rules]. 
14 INDOPCO, 503 U.S at 86-87. 
15 See infra notes 71, 77 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 73, 94-95 and accompanying text. 
17 John W. Lee eta!., Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for 
Rough Justice Regulations (pt. 1), 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 631, 657 n.89 (1997) 
[hereinafter Lee eta!., Rough Justice I]. 
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impossible to reconcile.18 
Between 25% and 40% of the audit and litigation resources of the 
Large and Mid-Size Business unit (LMSB) of the Service are devoted 
to INDOPCO issues. 19 After a wave of initial Service victories in the 
Tax Court, circuit courts are beginning to reverse these decisions, 
particularly where everyday or nondepreciable expenditures are at 
issue.20 At the same time, corporate audit rates have rapidly declined 
over the past five years,21 and widespread abuse of corporate tax 
shelters has occurred in the pool of the largest businesses in LMSB.22 
The media and others have drawn a connection between the decline in 
corporate audit rates and the use of corporate tax shelters,23 which are 
viewed by many· in the Treasury Department as the biggest tax 
problem at this time.24 
Against this backdrop, the Service and the Treasury Department 
have provided in an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures25 
18 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002). 
19 See infra notes 175-77,182 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 446-48,455,475-78, 529-31 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 128-33, 154-58 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 120, 124-26, 128 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
25 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3461 (Jan. 24, 2002); see Professor Submits Paper on Capitalization Rules, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (May 7, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1996 TNT 
101-20). We then polished and published such a response in a symposium dedicated 
to Boris Bittker (who early propounded a rule of reason here, see infra note 584) in 
Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, and John W. Lee et al., Restating 
Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations (pt. 2), 23 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1484 (1997) [hereinafter Lee, et al., Rough Justice II]. For our 
recommendations on these points, see Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 665 
(advising discussion draft), 684 (advising global regulations), and 691 (advising global 
regulations). For our other recommendations adopted or considered in the Advance 
Notice, see infra notes 244-45 (balancing test), 258 (not more than a twelve-month 
safe harbor), 266 (de minimis rule), 306 (regularly recurring) and accompanying text. 
See generally, Thomas L. Evans & Gregory W. Gallagher, INDOPCO- The Treasury 
Finally Acts, 80 TAXES 47, 48-52 (Mar. 2002). I heartily commend the Treasury 
Department and the Service for the format of an Advance Notice and for the 
prospect of global regulations, both of which my students and I recommended in 
response to Service Notice 96-7, 1996-2 C.B. 9 ("invites public comment on 
approaches the Service should consider to address issues raised under §§ 162 and 263 
of the Internal Revenue Code particularly in light of INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992)"). 
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(Advance Notice), a conceptual framework for proposing rules with 
respect to "expenditures that create or enhance intangible assets or 
benefits."26 These expenditures include various business capital 
transactions such as the acquisition, creation, restructuring, or 
reorganization of a business entity or a business assets acquisition 
subject to section 1060.27 The Treasury Department and the Service 
correctly concluded that: 
[b]ecause courts focus on particular facts before them, the 
results reached by the courts are often difficult to reconcile 
and, particularly in recent years, have contributed to 
substantial uncertainty and controversy. The IRS and 
Treasury Department are concerned that the current level of 
uncertainty and controversy is neither fair to taxpayers nor 
consistent with sound and efficient tax administration. 
Recently, much of the uncertainty and controversy in the 
capitalization area has related to expenditures that create or 
enhance intangible assets or benefits.28 
Accordingly, the Treasury Department and the Service 
contemplate proposing several rough justice safe harbors permitting 
current deduction of expenditures with future benefits where the 
burdens of capitalization outweigh its benefits.29 They also have in 
mind a proposed rule which would "require a taxpayer to capitalize 
certain transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer's acquisition, 
creation, or enhancement of intangible assets or benefits. "30 Payments 
for outside services for such facilitating transaction costs would have 
to be capitalized as in INDOPCO, subject to a de minimis, one-year 
rule for rough justice current deduction exceptions.31 In sharp 
26 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. at 3462. 
27 Id. at 3464; I.R.C. § 1060(c). 
28 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. at 3462. 
!d. 
29 [T]he forthcoming notice of proposed rulemaking will recognize that 
many expenditures that create or enhance intangible assets or benefits do 
not create the type of future benefits for which .capitalization under section 
263(a) is appropriate, particularly when the administrative and record 
keeping costs associated with capitalization are weighed against the 
potential distortion of income. 
30 ld. at 3464. 
31 ld. Examples given include payments, subject to the de minimis rule, made to 
outside attorneys for services in drafting a three-year covenant not to compete or in 
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contrast, the Advance Notice states that the Treasury Department 
and the Service expect that the proposed .regulations would exclude 
the following in-house or inside transaction costs: (1) "employee 
compensation" (except for bonuses and commissions that are paid 
with respect to the transaction), (2) fixed overhead, or (3) de minimis 
costs not exceeding a specified dollar amount, such as $5000,32 from 
the rule calling for capitalization of costs facilitating a transaction. 
Inside and outside recurring transaction costs incurred in connection 
with, but not facilitating, acquisition, creation, or enhancement of 
intangible assets, including acquisition of a business, would be 
currently deductible.33 
These contemplated self-created transaction costs rules will 
violate the rule of tax parity by favoring inside creation of intangibles 
over outside purchase.34 The only principled basis for these rules is 
that administrative burdens of capitalization could outweigh the 
benefits of a more rigorous matching and adherence to tax parity or 
horizontal equity.35 Accordingly, the proposed regulations should 
explicitly justify such rules both in the preamble and in the body of the 
regulations on the basis of a balancing of the burdens and benefits of 
capitalization.36 Further, burdens to the Service should also be taken 
into account in such a balancing test,37 due to the hazards of litigating 
the capitalization issues of customarily deducted everyday expenses 
even where conceptual rigor would require capitalization, and in 
order to allow reallocation of compliance resources from 
capitalization issues to the "immoral and unethical"38 corporate tax 
defending a trademark. 
32 Id.; see infra notes 436, 439 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra note 434. 
34 Fed. Bar Ass'n, Transcript of Sixth Invitational Biennial Conference on Tax 
Legislative Process, Day Two, TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 17, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX 
lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 160-17, <JI<J1569-79) (comments of Joseph Mikrut) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two]. For a 
discussion of the rule of tax parity, see infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
35 Lawrence Lokken, Capitalization: Complexity in Simplicity, 91 TAX NOTES 
1357, 1359, 1364-65, 1369 (May 28, 2001) (currently deduct where administrative 
burden outweighs more accurate matching); Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 55 
(administrative burdens of capitalization outweigh lack of tax parity). 
36 See infra note 609 and accompanying text. 
37 See Miscellaneous Revenue Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select 
Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong. 1687 (1993) 
[hereinafter 1993 House Hearings] (statement of John W. Lee) ("our real concern is 
avoiding litigation costs on both sides"). 
38 Sydney P. Freedberg, Now He's the One Making the Tax Rules, ST. 
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The contemplated proposed regulations' limiting of capitalization 
of transaction costs to those "facilitating" the acquisition, creation, or 
enhancement of intangibles40 appears to be based on various recent 
appellate decisions, as well as one Tax Court decision. Part IV asserts 
that these decisions are incorrect in their reasoning when measured 
against (1) the origin of the claim/acquisition cost doctrine of 
Woodward v. Commissioner41 and United States v. Hilton Hotels 
Corp.,42 and (2) the matching of expense and future benefits or income 
and the rule of tax parity of Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.43 Part 
VI maintains, however, that most of the results reached in these post-
INDOPCO decisions could be justified under a burdens and benefits 
of capitalization balancing test for determining minimal distortion of 
income by the taxpayer's tax accounting method for transaction costs. 
The proposed regulations should further tie the inside transaction cost 
rules into these cases but should be explicit in the preamble and body 
of the proposed regulations to justify the rules on a balancing of 
burdens and benefits of capitalization. Part IV analyzes such a 
balancing test, on which the Guidance explicitly based the proposed 
"safe harbors," allowing current deduction of certain future benefit 
expenses to intangibles (less than a twelve-month benefit, de minimis, 
and possibly recurring).44 
The contemplated proposed regulations can be said to have a pro-
taxpayer bias favoring self-construction in permitting current 
deduction of recurring future benefit expenses.45 Yet this is precisely 
what Congress attempted to effect with exceptions in the legislative 
histories to sections 195, 263A, and 197, for the costs of creating 
intangibles by an existing business. Congress thus intentionally left 
simplification of this area of capitalization to existing law,46 which 
Committee member Sen. Charles Grassley). 
39 See infra notes 181, 577 and accompanying text. 
40 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002). 
41 397 U.S. 572 (1970) (legal, accounting, and appraisal expenses incurred in 
purchasing minority stock interest are capital expenditures). 
42 397 U.S. 580 (1970) (consulting, legal, and other professional fees incurred by 
acquiring firm in minority stock appraisal proceeding are capital expenditures). 
43 418 U.S. 1 (1974) (equipment depreciation allocable to construction of capital 
facilities is to be capitalized; otherwise, taxpayer constructing own capital assets is tax 
advantaged over taxpayer purchasing similar assets). 
44 67 Fed. Reg. at 3462. 
45 See Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 54-55. 
46 ,E, See in1 ra notes 581-84 and accompanying text. 
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Congress believed allowed a current deduction.47 In fact, Congress 
once explicitly pointed to Lincoln Savings 48 as the source of such a 
deduction, (i.e., the no separate asset rule). Due to the pay go 
Congressional budget rules that require any tax revision reducing 
baseline revenues to be offset by new revenue-raising provisions or by 
a reduction in spending,49 and the peculiarities of revenue scoring 
rules, Congress cannot explicitly provide a current deduction for such 
self-created intangibles that most taxpayers apparently deduct without 
paying for the revenue losses from the hypothetical baseline. In short, 
the contemplated proposed regulations would take the administrable 
rough justiCe approach that Congress would likely have taken but for 
paygo.5° Further, President George W. Bush has approved of the 
Advance Notice.51 Consequently, such regulations would seem the 
ideal candidate for ex post facto Congressional ratification. 
47 SeeS. REP. No. 96-1036, at 10-12 (1990) ("In the case of an existing business, 
eligible startup expenditures do not include deductible ordinary and necessary 
business expenses paid or incurred in connection with an expansion of the business. 
As under present law, these expenditures will continue to be currently deductible."). 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 legislative history to section 197 
simply states that "[i]t is also believed that there is no need at this time to change the 
Federal income tax treatment of self-created intangible assets, such as goodwill that is 
created through advertising and other similar expenditures." H.R. REP. No. 103-111, 
at 760 (1993). 
48 See infra note 582. 
49 See infra note 516. 
50 See supra notes 46-48. 
51 See Pam Olson, Remarks Made at the University of Virginia School of Law 
Tax Study Group Meeting (Mar. 22, 2002); see also Nancy Ognanovich, President 
Proposes New Tax Breaks Aimed at Helping Small Business Owners, 53 BNA DAILY 
TAX REP., Mar. 19, 2002, at G-10 ("The White House also said Bush has directed 
Treasury to finalize the proposed rules on the capitalization of intangible assets as 
soon as possible. The change, it said, will allow small businesses to focus their 
resources on customers and not the Internal Revenue Service."); Jo Mannies & 
Christopher Carey, In Stop Here, President Pushes Proposals for Small Business; But 
the Big Issue in Every Speech Is Defeat of Terrorism; He Helps Raise Money for 
Talent, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 19, 2002, at A1 ("Bush plans to offer more 
details today of his program to help small businesses. He wants to reduce taxation 
and regulation, allow small businesses to take bigger deductions for capital 
investments and help them hold down the cost of health insurance by pooling risks."). 
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II. JNDOPCO ISSUES AND ADMINISTRATION OF TAX AUDITS OF 
LARGE AND MID-SIZE BUSINESSES 
A. Service Units of the Internal Revenue Service 
Section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Service Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 199852 (Reform and Restructuring Act) 
mandates "reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service," 
eliminating or substantially modifying the then-existing three-tiered 
(nation/region/district) structure of the Service "with an 
organizational structure that features operating units serving 
particular groups of taxpayers with similar needs. " 53 One reason for 
this restructuring was to break up perceived "stovepipes" or 
unconnected functions in the Service.54 Accordingly, the Service was 
reorganized into four taxpayer service units: (1) individual wage and 
investment only individuals (W&I taxpayers), (2) small businesses and 
self-employed (SB/SE), (3) large businesses (Large and Mid-Size 
Business, or LMSB), and (4) the tax-exempt sector (employee plans, 
exempt organizations and state and local governments).55 Although 
Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti asked his restructuring consultants 
to consider the appropriateness of the above four service units, his 
proposed groupings appear to have been carved in stone.56 
52 Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
53 144 CONG. REC. H5100, H5149 (daily ed. June 24, 1998) (Conf. Explanatory 
Statement). At least the principal Senate sponsors of this legislation viewed 
subsection 1001(a)(3) as merely codifying Commissioner Rossotti's then "current" 
identification of "four different groups of taxpayers with similar needs." 144 CONG. 
REC. S7631 (daily ed. July 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kerrey); id. at S7644 (statement 
of Sen. Baucus). 
54 See Report of the National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue 
Service, A Vision for a New IRS, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 26, 1997) (LEXIS, 
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 97 TNT 123-15) ("In a stovepipe operation, 
functional units such as taxpayer services, exam, collection, appeals, and counsel set 
and implement their own priorities and objectives, which often are disconnected from 
the other functions and the organization as a whole."). The National Commission 
superficially considered reorganization of the Service along categories of taxpayers 
lines. 
55 S. REP. No. 105-174 (1998); IRS 0RG. BLUEPRINT 2000, Doc. No. 11052, at 
1-14 to 1-15 fig.1-4 (revised Apr. 2000) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT 2000]. 
56 See Hearing before Sen. Fin. Comm. on IRS Restructuring, 105th Cong. 77 
(1998) (colloquy between Sen. Kerrey and former Commissioner Alexander); see also 
144 CONG. REC. S4406 (daily ed. May 6, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Minority Floor 
Manager of H.R. 2676, Sen. Kerrey, Co-Director of the National Commission on 
Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service); id. at S4417; 144 CONG. REC. S7631 
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Prior to restructuring, the Service concentrated its income tax 
audits57 on (1) large corporations, including those with more than $250 
million in assets and, to a significantly lesser extent, those with $10 
million to $250 million in assets; (2) small businesses, including small 
C corporations and sole proprietorships58 but largely ignoring S 
corporations and partnerships; and (3) high income individuals.59 
(daily ed. July 8, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Kerrey). With an Oversight Board, 
whatever plan the IRS comes up with and the Commissioner comes up 
with ... the Congress will support that plan ... taxpayers are going to say 
that it is an awful lot easier now that the Commissioner has organized the 
IRS by individual taxpayers, corporate taxpayers small, corporate taxpayers 
big, and by non-profits. 
!d.; S. REP. No.105-174 (1998). 
57 See, e.g., Hearings Before a House Comm. on Appropriations Subcomm. on 
Treasury, Postal Serv., and Gen. Gov't Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992, 102d 
Cong. 775-76, 800-02, 833, 918, 968-70 (1991) (statement of Commissioner Fred T. 
Goldberg, Jr.). 
58 The audit rate for small business is higher than for taxpayers in general and 
two-thirds of such audits result in recommended assessments. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: TAX REQUIREMENTS OF SMALL 
BUSINESSES 2, 14 (1999). The Service's data showed that about 2.3% of the income 
tax returns filed by small businesses in 1997 were audited (prior to the substantial 
post-1998 drop off of audits in general), generally through audits conducted by the 
Service's district offices. ld. By contrast, the Service audited 1.3% of all returns filed 
in 1997. The audit rate for sole proprietors (individuals filing Schedule C) was 3.2%, 
compared to 1.2% for individuals not filing Schedule C. Small business taxpayers 
tend to have more compliance problems than other taxpayers, e.g., employment tax 
compliance due to working capital shortages. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: IRS FACES SEVERAL CHALLENGES AS IT ATTEMPTS TO BETTER 
SERVE SMALL BUSINESSES 6 (2000). Self-employed persons (sole proprietors and 
partners) and supplemental income earners (individuals with rental or royalty 
income) made up almost 40% of individual examination and collections cases. !d. 
Historically, most of the individual audits involved sole proprietors. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS CAN BETTER PURSUE 
NONCOMPLIANT SOLE PROPRIETORS 2, 5 (1994) (sole proprietors made up just 13% of 
all individual taxpayers but 40% of individual noncompliance, filed more complex 
returns, were intentionally noncompliant more often, and tended to be better-off 
financially than individuals in general. Sole proprietors accounted for 36% of the 
1992 estimated tax gap and accounted for 15% of assessed taxes owed by individuals 
in 1993); accord GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: TAX 
COMPLIANCE OF NONWAGE EARNERS 1-2, 7, 11 (1996) (74% of taxes owed by 
individuals was attributable to nonwage income of which self-employment income 
made up the largest portion). 
59 Historically, individual audits concentrated on upper-income filers for "they 
have more to hide from the government and better opportunities for hiding it." 
William Kates, IRS Audits Poor More than Rich: Report, CHI. SuN TIMES, Apr. 16, 
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Because both INDOPCO issue audits and corporate tax shelters are 
concentrated in the LMSB taxpayers, this article will concentrate on 
that service unit while briefly noting some parallels and discontinuities 
with other service units. 
B. LMSB Service Unit 
As discussed below, audits of INDOPCO issues are concentrated 
in the LMSB service unit which covers firms, C corporations, S 
corporations, and partnerships, including limited liability companies 
(LLCs), initially with assets60 of $5 million61 or more (now $10 million 
2000, at 41 (in the early 1990s, taxpayers with incomes of $100,000 or more were 
audited at five times those earning less than $25,000). In 1999, however, audits of 
individual taxpayers with less than $25,000 in income exceeded for the first time ever 
the audit rate for upper-income taxpayers, generating much media attention. David 
Cay Johnston, I.R.S. More Likely to Audit the Poor and Not the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 16, 2000, at A1 (drop in audit rate of corporations and self-employed, although 
more likely to cheat than the poor; and smallest self-employed more likely to be 
audited than larger self-employed). This was not the case for face-to-face audits, 
reflecting that many Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) audits consisted of inquiries 
as to identification numbers for children. 
60 The basis for an asset criterion is that existing corporate and partnership data 
from the Service are categorized by size of assets. Preliminary IRS Modernization 
Conference Transcript: Small Business/Self-Employed, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 4, 
2000) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000 TNT 24-67, 'lJ 33) [hereinafter 
SB/SE Hearing Transcript] (statement of SB/SE TEC Director Songy). This 
categorization, however, only roughly corresponds with income. John W. Lee, A 
Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey the Stars 
Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do", 78 TEx. L. REV. 885, 904 nn.115 & 119 (2000) 
[hereinafter Lee, Business Tax Entities]. The Service expects that some business 
taxpayers with small assets are more like a large multi-national firm, e.g., big service 
entities, and some with more than $5 million in assets are really more like small 
businesses. SB/SE Hearing Transcript, supra, 91 33 (statement of SB/SE TEC Director 
Songy). 
61 Prior to restructuring, the Service divided corporations along a $10-million-in-
assets line. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON 
LARGE CoRPORATIONS 1 (1995). Large corporations were further divided into those 
1500 to 1700 largest corporations subject to the Coordinated Examination Program 
(CEP) and about 40,000 other large corporations. ld. The Service established CEP in 
1966 to audit corporations with $250 million in assets and above due to the growth of 
such corporations in the 1950s and 1960s and to the realization that "one case, one 
agent" was no longer effective. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS 
NEED IMPROVEMENT 16 (1994). The CEPhas been renamed Coordinated Industry 
Cases (CIC). Sheryl Stratton, IRS Issues First Report on Prefiling Agreements, 91 TAX 
NOTES 198 (2001). 
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or more).62 The LMSB service unit was first estimated to cover 
approximately 210,000 taxpayers, of which 9300 were large firms and 
the remaining 200,700 were mid-size firms. 63 As of April 2001, the 
Service had already received 240,000 LMSB returns, return volume 
running 9% ahead of 2000.64 As of 2000, the total income tax liability 
of filers in the LMSB service unit was $466 billion and they paid $712 
billion to the Service including employee wage taxes.65 The average 
tax liability per filer was $2,231,274.66 
Without fanfare, the Service raised the dividing line · between 
LMSB and SB/SE to $10 million,67 thereby lowering the number of 
taxpayers in the LMSB service unit to 149,000, of which 60% are 
corporations.68 It is likely that this reduction had little effect on 
LMSB's share of corporate income taxes and employee wage taxes 
given the concentration of such items at the $250 million or more 
assets level and, to a lesser degree, at the $100 to $250 million in assets 
level as discussed immediately below.69 The average tax liability per 
corporate taxpayer, however, should nearly double since the number 
of corporations in LMSB has almost halved. 
62 In the restructuring of the Service after 1997, the floor for the LMSB service 
unit was lowered to $5 million in assets, increasing the group to 170,000 taxpayers; by 
2001, the group increased to 248,000 taxpayers. Compare IRS Announces New 
Headquarters Locations, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 25, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 99 TNT 15-15), with BLUEPRINT 2000, supra note 55, at 4-1 and 
4-19 to 4-23; Preliminary Transcript of Modernization Conference Now Available, 
TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 14, 2000) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000 
TNT 24-63 at <J1230) (statement of Larry Langdon, LMSB Commissioner). 
63 See BLUEPRINT 2000, supra note 54, at 4-1, 4-19 to 4-23; The New IRS Stands 
Up Transcript, supra note 62, <JI 230 (statement of Larry Langdon). 
64 John E. Hembera, Head of Retailers Industry Segment Reports on 
Developments, 91 TAX NOTES 219 (2001). 
65 BLUEPRINT 2000, supra note 55, at 1-13 fig.1-4. 
66 /d. at 1-13 fig.l-4. 
67 See Rev. Proc. 2002-1, 2002-1 I.R.B. 1, 7 (Jan 7, 2002). Indeed, there was so 
little publicity that the Joint Committee reporting in May 2002 on the restructuring of 
the Service still used the $5 million benchmark. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS 
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 44 (Joint 
Comm. Print 2002). 
68 Unofficial Transcript of Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Shelters, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Mar. 27, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 
59-31, <jJ 194) [hereinafter Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters] 
(statement of Larry Langdon, Commissioner of Large and Medium Business 
Division, Internal Revenue Service). 
69 See infra notes 71-72, 77, 94-95 and accompanying text. 
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SB/SE Commissioner Joe Kehoe's explanation of the rationale 
for such change, which he had announced at the Virginia Annual 
Federal Income Tax Conference held at the University of Virginia on 
June 8, 2001, was that both LMSB and SB/SE planned to concentrate 
audit resources on higher income taxpayers in their service units; 
therefore, the $5 to $10 million category of business firms would 
receive more audit coverage in SB/SE than in LMSB. This is a sound 
move, given my belief that the appropriate floor on mid-size 
businesses should be $50 to $100 million in assets based on reported 
earnings.70 Generally, more than 80% of corporate sector income is 
reported by the largest 6000 or so publicly-traded corporations with 
$100 million or more in assets by adjusted basis, which is usually less 
than fair market value (75% is reported by the 3000 with such assets 
over $250 million, encompassing the CEP corporations).71 The 40,000 
or so mid-size, mostly closely-owned corporations generally reporting 
average annual income of $2 million historically reported another 
10% or so of corporate sector income.72 
C. Historic Audit Patterns of Large Corporations 
Historically, the Service selected roughly 1500 corporations for 
CEP status based on criteria such as size ($250 million and greater in 
assets) and complexity.73 The Service conducted CEP audits with 
teams of more experienced revenue agents and technical specialists.74 
70 John W. Lee, Sleeper Stigmatisms in "A Vision for a New IRS" Reorganized 
"Along Customer Lines", Address Before the William & Mary Law School Alumni 6, 
51,58-62 (April23, 1999) (copy on file with the Virginia Tax Review). 
71 Lee, Business Tax Entities, supra note 60, at 904. 
72 Id. at 921-22. 
73 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON 
LARGE CORPORATIONS 2 (1995). 
74 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FACTORS 
AFFECTING RESULTS FROM AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS 11, 12 (1997) (eight-
and-a-half years versus eighteen years CEP; also move every six years to another 
industry rule). In contrast to CEP large corporation team audits increasingly directed 
by Industry Specialization Programs (ISPs), the remaining large corporations (mostly 
$10 million to $250 million in assets) previously were audited by a single revenue 
agent or "auditor" using his or her judgment to select taxpayers to audit and issues to 
raise. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON 
LARGE CORPORATIONS 2 (1995). CEP auditors were directed through ISBs as to the 
issues to raise in audits of CEP corporations. The Service used mathematical 
formulas (discriminant function, or DIP) for scoring individual returns and small 
corporation returns on the likelihood of significant noncompliance. See GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL AUDIT: EXAMINATION OF IRS' FISCAL YEAR 1993 
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The General Accounting Office reports that "[c]ontrary to IRS 
testimony, IRS did not audit every CEP taxpayer every year. Using 
IRS' method of calculating audit coverage for other groups of 
taxpayers, we found that CEP audit coverage ranged from 66 percent 
in 1987 to 77 percent in 1991."75 Part of the discrepancy may be 
attributable to the fact that the Service generally does not audit CEP 
returns with little or no revenue potential insofar as they report net 
operating losses.76 CEP audits accounted for 65% of all increases in 
income taxes recommended for all Service audits of individuals and 
corporations in 1992.77 Historically, CEP audits used 20% of the 
Service's examination resources.78 CEP and income tax audits of 
larger corporations, or those having $100 million or more in assets, 
have long been the major component of the Service's audit program.79 
The percentage of resources allocated to capitalization issues in 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 15 (1994); see 
also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS' RETURN 
SELECTION PROCESS 1, 2 (1999) (59% of audited tax returns for 1992-94 selected by 
DIF for which all individual returns are automatically scored). See generally, Jim 
Gallagher, What Makes Audit Computers Tick, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1996, at C-3. 
75 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE 
MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 23 (1994); 
see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS EFFORTS TO 
IMPROVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2 (1992) (69% for 1990; 77% for 1991); 
Compliance Official's Statement at IRS Commission Taxpayer Rights Meeting, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Feb. 27, 1997) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 97 TNT 39-
61) (statement of James E. Donelson, Chief Taxpayer Service/Acting Chief 
Compliance Officer Internal Revenue Service; audit rate for CEP taxpayers is about 
85%). More recently, the number of annual CEP audits has fallen to the 450 to 575 
range. See infra note 113. 
76 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CORPORATE TAXES, MANY BENEFITS 
AND FEW COSTS TO REPORTING NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYOVER 13 (1993) ("IRS 
generally did not audit CEP returns that had little or no revenue potential, such as 
those reporting NOLS."). 
77 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE 
MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 16 (1994); 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON LARGE 
CORPORATIONS 31 (1995) ($1,318 million for assets of $100 million and more versus 
$698 million for assets from $10 million to $100 million for 1988 through 1994). 
78 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE 
MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 2 (1994); 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPROVING 
OPERATIONS OF FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 124 (1998). 
79 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY, VALUE-ADDED TAX: 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS VARY WITH COMPLEXITY AND NUMBER OF BUSINESSES 123 
(1993) (in 1990, the Service allocated 40% of all staff years devoted directly to 
corporate audits to CEP audits). 
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LMSB has increased with the overall decrease in corporate audits in 
2000 (down 13% from a 1999 record low80), while business audit 
resources remain concentrated on CEP audits.81 Indeed, a Service 
official recently stated that capitalization issues alone accounted for as 
much as 25% of audit resources,82 and capitalization is 
overwhelmingly an LMSB issue.83 
The LMSB Commissioner pointed out two major problems with 
the Service's pre-restructuring large and mid-size corporations 
compliance activities: (1) audit of CEP corporations "is a flawed 
process in that both sides basically play Russian roulette with regard 
to both facts and the law";84 and (2) compliance coverage as to the 
80 David Cay Johnston, Rate of All I.R.S. Audits Falls; Poor Face Intense 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at Al. 
81 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS 
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998 app. (Joint 
Comm. Print 2001) (letter from Tax Executives Institute, Inc., to Lindy Paull, Chief of 
Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation 2 (Apr. 12, 2001)). 
82 Alison Bennet & Brant Goldwyn, Olson Calls for Broad Business Cost Rules, 
Signals Doubt on Future Value of Intangibles, 152 BNA DAILY TAX REP., Aug. 8, 
2001, at G-2; TEl Urges Careful Consideration of INDOPCO Coalition's 
Capitalization Proposals, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 9, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 218-35) ("IRS's Large and Mid-Size Business Division 
has reported that more than 25 percent of its audit resources are devoted to 
capitalization issues in some industries."); Treasury Proposals to Curb Abusive Tax 
Avoidance Transactions, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 21, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 55-25) (noting that research and experimental (R&E) 
credit and capitalization issues account for 40% of audit resources); Fiscal Year 2003 
Budget's Analytical Perspective on Bush Administration's Tax Simplification 
Proposals, 25 BNA DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 6, 2002, at L-2 ("The present uncertain 
legal environment has elevated capitalization to the top of the list of contested audit 
issues for businesses."). 
83 See Lee et a!., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 643. 
84 Preliminary IRS Modernization Conference Transcript: Afternoon, January 13, 
TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 4, 2000) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000 
TNT 24-64, 'l[46) (statement of LMSB Commissioner Langdon). 
[T]here [are] a number of years open at the examination cycle, ... a number 
of cycles open at the appeals level, and perhaps some cycles in litigation. 
Sometimes that spans nine, fifteen years. 
It's a very costly process for all of us. It's a very frustrating process for us 
to manage- with our resources- manage all of those open years. 
Preliminary IRS Modernization Conference Transcript: Large and Mid-Sized Business 
(Feb. 4, 2000) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000 TNT 24-66, 'l[ 365-66) 
[hereinafter LMSB Hearing Transcript] (statement of Richard Goelz, Director of 
Field Operations for Retailers, Food and Pharmaceuticals Industry Group). 
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nearly 250,000 non-CEP corporations with $5 million and more in 
assets, is "not optimal."85 In fact, the audit rate for non-CEP large 
corporations declined only 50% from 1998 to 2000.86 
CEP teams generally began auditing returns five to six years after 
filing and took two to three years to complete them.87 Thus, on 
average, a CEP audit of a given tax year was ten years old,88 and any 
litigation often occurred twelve or more years after the filing year, 
resulting in an "archeological dig" aspect.89 Moreover, the Service 
devoted 95% of its corporate filer audit resources to post-filing 
activities.90 There were too many layers from auditing agent in field to 
manager with authority over exam and collections.91 Additionally, 
poor coordination between the Office of Chief Counsel and the 
Examination division resulted in delays in the completion of audits, 
85 !d. 'lJ 56 (statement of LMSB Commissioner Langdon). 
86 See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
87 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE 
MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 2 (1994) 
("[T]he 1,700 audit staff years devoted to the program are modest compared to the 
formidable task of the auditing the 1,700 largest, most complex corporations. Given 
this task, CEP audits may not start for several years after the return is filed and take 
several more years to be completed."). 
88 !d. at 18. 
89 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS 
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998 app. (Joint 
Comm. Print 2001) (letter from Tax Executives Institute, Inc., to Lindy Paull, Chief of 
Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation 2 (April 12, 2001)); GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE 
CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 39 (noting that as of 1992 one case still in audit 
since 1961). 
90 TEl Asks: Who's Controlling the Audit in the New IRS?, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Mar. 25, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1999 TNT 57-2). 
91 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS 
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 11-12 n.36 
(Joint Comm. Print 1999). 
The [IRS] Deputy Commissioner [for modernization] said that a territory 
manager will have authority over joint collection and exam issues and that 
the five layers of management will be eliminated. An issue will go from an 
agent to the group manager to the territory manager, who controls both 
exam and collection functions. 
Id.; accord ABA Tax Section: New IRS Will Have 'Territories,' 'Areas', TAX NOTES 
TODAY (May 3, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1999 TNT 84-2). 
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which typically resulted in rejections of capitalization treatment.92 
Such poor coordination is, of course, a manifestation of the stovepipe 
93 phenomenon. 
With respect to 1994 tax returns, the Service's audits of the 
returns of the 1700 CEP corporations and of 45,000 additional large 
corporations (those with assets from $10 to $250 million in assets) 
generated about two-thirds of the additional taxes recommended for 
all income tax audits of that tax year.94 In 2000, corporations with 
$250 million or more in assets accounted for 64.5% of all additional 
income taxes and penalties recommended by the Service's agents, 
while amounting to only 0.5% of audited income tax returns.95 CEP 
large corporations protested almost 80% to 90% of the proposed 
additional income taxes,96 prevailing most of the time,97 with the end 
result that only 20% or so of the proposed increases were sustained in 
administrative appeals.98 As of 1997, almost all (97%) of such 
assessed taxes for the 1992 tax year had been paid by CEP large 
92 See Christopher Bergin, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Rossotti Says Chief 
Counsel Is Becoming Integral Part of IRS Management, 91 TAX NOTES 1213 (May 21, 
2001) (pointing out that Commissioner Rossotti stated that, traditionally, "Counsel 
was viewed as an organization that said 'no,' and took too long to say it."). I suspect 
that this attitude reflects at least in part the conflict between Chief Counsel and 
Examination on INDOPCO issues where a large number of Chief Counsel TAMs 
reversed Examination's call for capitalization. See also Lee et al., Rough Justice I, 
supra note 17, at 657-80,657 n.90. 
93 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
94 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON 
LARGE CORPORATIONS 1 (1995). 
95 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., IRS District, 
Service Center and International Audits and IRS Auditor Findings of Additional Taxes 
and Penalties Owed, Federal Income Tax Returns of Individuals and Corporations 
Fiscal Year 2000, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/nationaUaudDollars (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2003) (noting that the same 65% portion existed over a decade); GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON LARGE 
CORPORATIONS 2, 16 (65% for 1992); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: IRS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 23 (1992) 
(commenting that CEP taxpayers accounted for 90% of all recommended increases in 
corporate income taxes for 1991). 
96 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON 
LARGE CORPORATIONS 19. 
97 Id. at 41-42. 
98 Id. at 42 (citing a 19.72% assessment rate for corporations with $250 million 
and more in assets); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MEASURES COULD 
PROVIDE A MORE BALANCED PICTURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS 10 (1998); id. 
at 3 (noting that "historically, IRS has actually collected 22 percent of the additional 
taxes that IRS revenue agents have recommended in CEP audits."). 
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corporatiOns. 
On an administrative level, the Service prevailed more often when 
the adjusted basis assets of business taxpayers tended to be lower, but 
it was less often able to collect these assessments.100 In the end, the 
Service collected from $1 for every $5 dollars recommended in audit 
to $1 for every $3 recommended. The Service estimated that in 2000, 
individuals paid 83% of the income taxes that they owed voluntarily 
with enforcement bringing in another 3%.101 While this 3% is actually 
the amount of additional taxes recommended in audit, only 1% was 
actually collected. Moreover, the estimate of 83% is based on 
representative, exhaustive audits of classes of taxpayers last permitted 
by Congress to be conducted in 1988.102 
99 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A MORE 
BALANCED PICfURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS 10; GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON LARGE CORPORATIONS 41-42. 
100 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A MORE 
BALANCED PICfURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS 10 (commenting that the 
assessment rate as of 1997 for the non-CEP large corporations ($10 million or more in 
assets) was 33%, but only 73% of that was collected, which resulted in a net of 24% of 
the additional taxes recommended in audit); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT 
TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON LARGE CORPORATIONS 43; GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FACTORS AFFECTING RESULTS FROM AUDITS OF 
LARGE CORPORATIONS 3 (1997) (noting that for 1988-94, 27% of recommended taxes 
as to large corporations assessed); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS 
NEED IMPROVEMENT 5, 29-30 (1994). In contrast to non-CEP large corporations, 
however, in 2000, small and mid-size corporations accounted for 4% of audits and 
10% of additional taxes and penalties recommended by the Service's agents. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE MEASURES 
AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 25-29, app.2 tbls.II.1-
11.5; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A 
MORE BALANCED PICTURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS 25 (noting that collection 
rates for smaller corporations, those with less than $10 million in assets, were lower 
than for CEP and mid-sized corporations, and that the Service assessed 52% of the 
recommended additional taxes, but collected only 58% of the amounts assessed, 
resulting in a net collection of 30% of the additional recommended taxes). 
101 Janet Novack, Are You a Chump, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122. 
102 /d.; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: INFORMATION ON 
IRS' TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 3 n.4 (1995); see also 
Transcript of Hearing of the Senate Finance Committee on Schemes, Scams and Cons, 
Part II, the IRS Strikes Back, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (Apr. 11, 2002) (Commissioner 
Rossotti stating that the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) was 
too intrusive, and that the Service is initiating a far more acceptable "National 
Research Program"); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT 
RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM 
AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 34 (Joint Comm. Print 2002). See generally, 
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D. Decline in Audit Rates of LMSB Corporations 
For the 1994 tax year, the Service audited 77% of the 1700 CEP 
returns103 and about 24% of the returns of the other 45,000 large 
corporations.104 Declines in audit rates commenced in 1968, but 
"accelerated in 1995, after Congress, by then controlled by 
Republicans, cut [the Service's] spending sharply and required the 
agency to devote more resources to customer service."105 Congress 
also directed the Service to devote more audit resources to EITC 
issues largely for political reasons.106 The audit rates for all taxpayers 
O'Neill Statement on National Research Program, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 17, 2002) 
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 12-41); Kathleen David, 
Compliance Survey, Retooled Audit Process Focus of SBISE Efforts, Kehoe Tells 
Attorneys, 93 BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 14, 2002, at G-2. 
103 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON 
LARGE CORPORATIONS 2. 
104 /d. at 1 n.4. 
105 David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Figures Show Drop in Tax Audits for Big 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at Al. 
106 Targeting the Poor, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 24, 2000, at B-2 ("Much of the 
blame lies with a Republican Congress. First, Republicans - miffed that Democrats 
wouldn't let them gut the earned income taX credit - mandated that the IRS give 
greater scrutiny to the program."); David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. More Likely to Audit 
the Poor and Not the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at A1 (noting a drop in the 
audit rate of corporations and self-employed, despite the increased propensity with 
which they cheat on taxes relative to the poor, and citing a negative correlation 
between the likelihood of a tax audit and the size of a self-employed individual's 
business); A Weakened I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at D-14; Auditing the Poor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at A14; Albert B. Crenshaw, A Kinder IRS Raises New 
Worries as Audits Plummet, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2000, at H1 (commenting that 
Newt Gingrich actually proposed in 1995 to gut the EITC program and Clinton 
countered with a plan to bolster audits); Misdirected IRS Eyeball, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
18, 2000, at A14 (pointing out that EITC audits and nonfiler audits account for 
greater audits of the poor, that EITC noncompliance often involves confusion and 
misunderstanding rather than criminal intent, and that it often involves disputes over 
which taxpayer is entitled to the dependency exemption for a child of divorced or 
separated parents); Liz Pulliam Weston, Low Incomes More Prone to Audits by IRS, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at A1, A42 (noting that 20% to 25% of EITC filings 
contain errors or are fraudulent); O'Neill's Refreshing Candor, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS (Denver), Apr. 19, 2002, at 49A. 
In a fit of pettiness, the Republican Congress ordered the Internal Revenue 
Service to step up audits of taxpayers claiming the earned income tax credit, 
a refundable tax credit aimed at helping the working poor. O'Neill's way of 
putting it was that the IRS must "examine the devil out of" those receiving 
the tax credit, which, to be frank, is a form of welfare. The tax has a high 
error rate, maybe due to fraud, maybe due to confusion. A number of 
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have continued to decline year after year since 1995. Thus, of the 
largest 8500 firms, slightly more than one in three were audited in 
1998, down from two in three in 1988, and hours spent on corporate 
audits declined 12% from 1992 levels.107 This trend continued in 1999 
with 35% of the largest asset corporations (those with $250 million or 
more in assets) being audited as contrasted with 55% in 1992.108 In 
2000, the audit rate for these largest asset corporations further 
declined to 31%/09 while "[t]he number of hours devoted to such 
audits fell by just 9 percent [from 1992] suggesting that the search for 
major corporate tax-evasion schemes is consuming a big share of the 
[Service's] dwindling ... capacity to audit such businesses."110 
/d. 
Republicans suspect fraud. The result has been that one out of 50 low-
income taxpayers gets audited by the IRS, three times the rate for taxpayers 
earning over $100,000. "You think I like that?" O'Neill asked a House 
Appropriations subcommittee. "I hate it." 
O'Neill observed correctly that all this auditing firepower recovered very 
little money for the government because people claiming the tax credit pay 
little or no income taxes. In any case, most Americans, and all low-income 
taxpayers, pay more in payroll taxes than they do in income taxes. 
While fraud may be widespread in the tax credit, there's a good 
argument to be made for confusion. O'Neill said the IRS has 54 pages of 
instructions for claiming the tax "for the lowest-income people who struggle 
to make a living. We've given them an impossible tax code to interact with 
and then we ridicule them" for not following it. 
107 David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Figures Show Drop in Tax Audits for Big 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at A1; Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., Corporate Federal Income Tax Returns with Assets 
$250 Million and. More, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/national/largeCorp (last 
visited May 23, 2001). 
108 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., Corporate 
Federal Income Tax Returns with Assets $250 Million and More, at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/nationalllargeCorp (last visited May 23, 2001 ); see 
Albert B. Crenshaw & Stephen Barr, A Kinder IRS Raises New Worries as Audits 
Plummet, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2000, at H1 (noting that Commissioner Rossotti said 
that the Service continues to audit the largest 1500 corporations regularly "because 
that is where the biggest money and legal issues are at stake."). 
109 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., Corporate 
Federal Income Tax Returns with Assets $250 Million and More, at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/ findings/nationaUaudpctcompare-corp {last visited Apr. 15, 
2002) [hereinafter Tracirs/largeCorp ]. 
110 David Cay Johnston, Income-Tax Enforcement Is Broadly Declining, New 
U.S. Data Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, at C2; Tracirs/largeCorp, supra note 109; 
David Cay Johnston, Rate of All I.R.S. Audits Falls; Poor Face Particular Scrutiny, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at Al. 
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In summary, the General Accounting Office reported in April 
2001 that since 1997, the Service's audits of large corporations 
decreased by 60%, audits of partnerships decreased by 40%, and 
audits of individuals decreased by 62%.111 Contemporaneously, 
Commissioner Rossetti expressed concern in a letter to the Chair of 
the Senate Finance Committee that "[w]hile the IRS continues to 
audit the 1,100 largest corporations every year, the audit rate for all 
other corporations has declined from 3.0% in 1992 to 1.1% today."112 
In fact, there was less than half the number of CEP audits claimed by 
Commissioner Rossotti.113 Interestingly, the amounts of 
Audits of corporations also fell, by nearly 13 percent from the record low 
in 1999. The I.R.S. did not release data on audits of the largest 
corporations, with more than $250 million of assets, which pay more than 80 
percent of corporate income taxes. 
Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti, disclosing the new figures yesterday, 
attributed the decline in audit rates to the shrinking of the I.R.S. auditing 
staff even as the number of tax returns grew, and to the diversion of I.R.S. 
employees to other functions as required by several new laws aimed at 
protecting taxpayers from abuses. 
[Rossotti] said the number of auditors, which fell to 12,550 last year from 
13,061 in 1999 and nearly 16,000 in 1996, may grow slightly in the coming 
year. 
/d. This, however, proved not to be the case as the number of auditors fell further to 
11,598 in 2001. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT 
RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM 
AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2002). 
"' GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: INFORMATION ON 
SELECTED IRS TAX ENFORCEMENT AND COLLECTION EFFORTS 4, 7 (2001). 
112 Grassley Responds to Rossotti's Letter on IRS Audit, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Mar. 29, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 61-21, en 11). 
This statistic, however, misleadingly includes small corporations. The audit rate for 
mid-size corporations is much higher than 1.1 %. In 2000, the audit rates were: 6.84% 
of mid-size corporations with assets from $5 million to less than $10 million, down 
from 18.78% in 1992; 11.57% of mid-size corporations with assets from $10 million to 
less than $50 million, down from 23.20% in 1992; 14.27% of mid-size corporations 
with assets from $50 million to less than $100 million, down from 28.48% in 1992; and 
17.20% of mid-size corporations with assets from $100 million to less than $250 
million were audited, down from 31.31% in 1992. Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., IRS District Audits of Federal Income Tax Returns 
Filed by Corporations, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/nationaUaudpctcompare-
corp (last visited May 23, 2001). 
113 TIGTA Releases Audit Report on Prefiling Agreement Pilot Project, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 5, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 
172-16, en 4) ("The LMSB Division annually examines 20,000 returns, including 450 to 
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recommended taxes and penalties dropped by about 25% for the 
largest corporations and by around 50% for mid-size corporations 
from 1998 to 2000.114 The audit rate for small S corporations and 
partnerships is 0.39%,115 or virtually nonexistent as practitioners 
always assumed was the case, except perhaps for traditional individual 
tax shelter limited partnerships during their heyday. David Cay 
Johnston, a Pulitzer prize winning journalist for the New York Times, 
reported this 2000 tax year data in the form of the odds of a taxpayer 
being audited, which varied greatly by market segment: CEP 
corporation, one in three; small sole proprietor ($25,000 or less in 
gross receipts), one in thirty-seven; working poor (EITC applicants), 
one in forty-seven; smaller corporations ($1 to $5 million in assets), 
one in forty-nine; larger sole proprietorships ($100,000 or more in 
gross revenue), one in eighty-three; high income individuals ($100,000 
or more in adjusted gross income (AGI)), one in 145; Subchapter S 
corporations, one in 233; partnerships, one in 400; middle-income 
individuals ($50,000 to $100,000 AGI), one in 435; and lower-income 
individuals ($25,000 to $50,000 AGI), one in 455.116 
E. Decline in Audit Levels and Corporate Tax Shelters 
A number of factors contributed to these declines in large and 
mid-size corporation audits. Returns from corporations with $250 
575 of the nation's largest corporations."). 
114 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., IRS District 
Audits of Federal Income Tax Returns Filed by Corporations, at http://trac.syr.edu/ 
tracirs/findings/ national /taxpen-corp (last visited May 23, 2001). 
115 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., JOINT REVIEW OF THE 
STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 16 (Joint 
Comm. Print 2001). 
A particular source of concern is the growing number of entities, such as 
partnerships, trusts and S-corporations, which pay no income tax at the 
business level, but pass on their net income to their shareholders or 
partners. 
In 2000, these "passthrough" entities filed 7.4 million returns, reported 
$5 trillion of gross revenues and $680 billion of income. However, the IRS 
audited only 29,057 of them, or only one of every 256 returns - the 
equivalent of .39 percent. 
Id. at 16. This 0.39% audit rate for passthrough entities continued in fiscal 2001. 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT RELATING TO THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND 
RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2002). 
116 David Cay Johnston, Affluent Avoid Scrutiny on Taxes Even as I.R.S. Warns 
of Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at Al. 
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million or more m assets doubled from 1988 to 2000 while the 
permanent Service staff has been cut by almost one-third.117 
Moreover, after the Restructuring and Reform Act, the Service 
shifted the equivalent of approximately 1200 full-time employees from 
Examination and Collection duties to Customer Service to meet filing 
season workload peaks in the new customer service Toll-Free 
Telephone and Walk-In Assistance Programs.118 The Service hopes to 
"reduce by 50 percent the Customer Service reliance on short-term 
details of compliance staff. By reducing the diversion of· revenue 
agents, tax auditors and revenue officers from enforcement casework, 
audit coverage and collection effectiveness are expected to 
117 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., TraciRS, 
New Findings, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/aboutiRS/KeyFindings (last visited 
May 23, 2001); Tracirs/largeCorp, supra note 109; Christopher Bergin, ABA Section 
Meeting - Rossotti Says Chief Counsel Is Integral Part of IRS Management, 91 TAX 
NOTES 1213 (May 21, 2001) (noting that Commissioner Rossotti said the decline in 
audit rates was attributable to declining resources and Restructuring and Reform Act 
impediments to appropriate and timely compliance); Albert B: Crenshaw, Reform 
Could Prove Overtaxing for IRS, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1999, at H1 (noting the shift of 
2400 workers from compliance to customer service; some officials and members of 
Congress say the pendulum swung too far); David Cay Johnston, Inquiries Find Little 
Abuse by Tax Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15 2000, at Cl. 
Representative Lloyd Doggett, a Texas Democrat who sits on the House 
Ways and Means Committee, said that while he voted for the law because 
he heard evidence of I.R.S. abuses, he thinks Congress has gone too far in 
restricting the agency. 
Mr. Doggett said he now thought the 1998 law was "another example of 
the Republican priority of demonizing the I.R.S. and limiting its resources 
to fulfill its responsibilities, which I believe is all aimed at trying to end 
income taxation." 
Id.; David Cay Johnston, Job Fears Push I.R.S. Workers to Relax Effort, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 18, 1999, at A1 (noting that seizures of property are down 98% primarily due to 
Service workers' job fears of violating ten "deadly sins"; with Congressional freezes in 
budget, funds for modernization and retraining come in part from scaling back audits 
and collections); David Cay Johnston, Tax Professionals See Pitfalls in New I.R.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1999, at A1; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., 
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS 
REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 5, 30 (Joint Comm. Print 2002) 
(commenting that levies tripled in 2001 from 2000, liens increased 50%, and seizures 
increased from 74 to 274; all are, however, still much lower than their respective levels 
in 1997 of 19%, 79%, and 2%, respectively). 
118 Rossotti Testimony at House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing on IRS 
Budget, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 3, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 
2001 TNT 86-74, <J[ 53). 
298 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 22:273 
. ,119 
mcrease. 
A critical question is whether the decline in corporate audits for 
CEP and large corporations (i.e., LMSB taxpayers) has resulted in 
greater noncompliance.12° Commissioner Rossotti, seeking to obtain 
more funding for additional revenue agents and to move corporate tax 
auditors from deployment to customer service during tax season and 
then back to corporate audits, testified in May 2001 that while the 
workforce declined 17% (due to Congressional budget cuts), the 
number of returns filed increased 13%.121 Consequently, the number 
of audits declined.122 Commissioner Rossotti further testified: 
The IRS is also deeply concerned about the continued 
drop in audit and collection activity. Clearly, the declines we 
have witnessed in the past few years must stop or the fairness 
and effectiveness of our tax system will be undermined. The 
risks of these declines are not simply the dollar value of the 
taxes left uncollected. The greatest risk is that the average 
taxpayer who honestly pays taxes loses confidence if the IRS 
fails to act effectively and efficiently to collect from those who 
123 do not pay what they owe. 
The media widely reported the drop in the tax audit rate for large 
firms, 124 growth in use of tax shelters by such firms as audit scrutiny 
119 !d. '1!54. 
120 David R. Francis, Audits Drop, Fraud Concern Rises, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Apr. 16, 2001, at 1 (noting that "experts are concerned that the laxer 
enforcement will increase the ranks of those who don't [honestly pay their taxes,]" 
and may induce wealthier and more sophisticated taxpayers to take more risks with 
respect to paying the proper amount of taxes); see also The Cost of Ignoring Tax 
Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at A18; Amy Feldman, Please, IRS: Stop Playing 
Nice Guy, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2001, at A15; Rick Montgomery, Decline in IRS 
Audits Tests Taxpayer Honesty; IRS Worries About Integrity of System, KANSAS CITY 
STAR, Apr. 15, 2001, at A1; David Cay Johnston, Wealthiest Pay Declining Share of 
Their Incomes in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at C2 (commenting that the top 
1% had a 28.9% effective tax rate in 1996, a 27.9% effective tax rate in 1997, and a 
27.1% effective tax rate in 1998). 
121 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., JOINT REVIEW OF THE 
STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 14 (Joint 
Comm. Print 2001). 
122 !d. (Commissioner Rossotti noting other factors include a need to assign 
compliance staff to customer service). 
123 !d. at 13, 14. 
124 A Weakened I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at D14; David Cay Johnston, 
I.R.S. Figures Show a Drop in Tax Audits for Big Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1999, at Al. ("The decline in audit rates began in 1968 but accelerated in 1995, after 
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faded/ 25 and decline in reported taxable income while book earnings 
soared.126 At the same time, the corporate share of individual and 
corporate income taxes declined from 21% in 1996 to 14% in 2001.127 
The General Accounting Office shares concerns "expressed in 
Congress and by tax practitioners that these declines in audits, 
Congress, by then controlled by Republicans, cut I.R.S. spending sharply and 
required the agency to devote more resources to customer service."); see also 
Montgomery, supra note 120; Amy Feldman & Joan Caplin, Should You Cheat on 
Your Taxes?, MONEY, Apr. 2001, at 108; Novak, supra note 101, at 122. 
125 See David Cay Johnston, Tax Magicians/A Special Report; Sham Shelters for 
Business Flourish as Scrutiny Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A1 [hereinafter 
Johnston, Sham Shelters] ("[T]he recent weakness of I.R.S. because of budget cuts 
and new restraints imposed by Congress has only emboldened corporations .... The 
Treasury Department has identified corporate tax evasion as the nation's biggest tax 
enforcement problem, and ... shelters are at the core of it."); see also Francis, supra 
note 120, at 1. 
126 See generally Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax 
Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43,45 n.2 (2001); David 
Cay Johnston, Corporations' Taxes are Falling Even as Individuals' Burden Rises, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at A1 (pointing out that stock options are one factor in 
drop in corporate effective rate, but the "most troubling factor is the rapid spread of 
tax shelters, especially among large corporations" and what particularly alarms the 
Service and the Treasury Department is the "growing willingness by prominent 
companies ... to engage in the kind of tax avoidance tactics more characteristic of the 
most disreputable companies." It should also be noted that while corporate profits 
are 252% higher for 1997 than for 1990, tax revenues have increased just 191%. 
Moreover, less than 70% of profits reported to shareholders are reported as taxable 
income for 1997 as contrasted with 91% for 1990. "The tax department is viewed 
more as a profit center and a place that has more of an obligation to more or less 
aggressively reduce the tax burden."); Martin A. Sullivan, News Analysis: Shelter 
Fallout? Corporate Taxes Down, Profits Up, 84 TAX NOTES 653 (Aug. 2, 1999) (noting 
that corporate taxes, as a share of corporate profits, are at their lowest level since 
President Ronald Reagan's massive 1981 corporate tax cut indicating "that the efforts 
of corporate tax advisers to shelter their clients' profits from tax have had more than a 
marginal effect"); Martin A. Sullivan, News Analysis - Despite September Surge, 
Corporate Tax Receipts Fall Short, 85 TAX NOTES 565 (Nov. 1, 1999); David Cay 
Johnston, Study Finds That Many Large Companies Pay No Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 2000, at C2 (according to Citizens for Tax Justice, "[c]orporate taxes are not rising 
with profits because companies have found all sorts of ways to get around the [Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.]" Congress has given a lot of help in gutting the minimum tax 
rules, "in many cases because of the growing use of stock options, which are an 
expense for tax purposes but do not count against profits reported to shareholders."). 
127 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., Federal 
Income Tax for Corporations and Individuals, I910-1000, at http://trac.syr.edu/tnicirs/ 
findings/national/incomeTax1910_presG.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); see also 
Robert S. Mcintyre, The Taxonomist, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 24, 2000, at 14 (17% in 
2000). 
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enforcement actions, and collections may increase incentives for 
taxpayers either to not report or to underreport their tax 
obligations."128 Moreover, tax avoidance at the high-income 
individual level has also soared.129 Leading practitioners have called 
for tougher penalties to deter corporate tax shelters,130 which are of 
grave concern to both the Treasury Department and the Service.131 
128 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MODERNIZATION: CONTINUED 
IMPROVEMENT IN MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY NEEDED TO SUPPORT LONG-TERM 
TRANSFORMATION 2 (2001); see also id. at 8; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: PROGRESS CONTINUES BUT SERIOUS MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGES REMAIN 29 (2001). 
129 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: 
ENHANCED EFFORTS TO COMBAT ABUSIVE TAX SCHEMES- CHALLENGES REMAIN 1 
(2002). 
As of February 2002, IRS estimated that in tax year 2000 about 740,000 
[individual] taxpayers had used abusive schemes. IRS caught about $5 
billion in improper tax avoidance or tax credit and refund claims, but 
estimated that another $20 billion to $40 billion had not been identified and 
addressed. Recent developments suggest that the number of individuals 
involved in one type of abusive tax scheme involving offshore accounts may 
be greater than what IRS estimated just 2 months ago, and thus, potential 
lost revenues may be higher. 
Id. at 1; Transcript of Hearing of the Senate Finance Committee on Schemes, Scams 
and Cons, Part II, the IRS Strikes Back, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (Apr. 11, 2002) 
(statement of Commissioner Rossotti) (the largest category of promoted schemes is 
the "use of devices such as trusts· and offshore bank accounts to hide income, and 
these are used mostly by upper income individuals"; offshore schemes may involve as 
many as 505,000 taxpayers with tax losses ranging from $20 to $40 billion); John D. 
McKinnon, IRS Data Show More Taxpayers Are Using Scams, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 
2002, at A6 (commenting that 700,000 or more individuals are underpaying taxes by 
tens of billions of dollars); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., 
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS 
REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 29 (Joint Comm. Print 2002) (noting 
that the "IRS estimates losses in the tens of billions of dollars."). 
130 See David Cay Johnston, Top Tax Expert Calls for Tougher Penalties to Deter 
Corporate Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at C2. See generally, Peter C. Canellos, 
A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in 
Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47 (2001); 
LMSB Hearing Transcript, supra note 84, 9I'Il 259-62 (statement of Sax, Chair of ABA 
Section of Taxation). 
131 See LMSB Hearing Transcript, supra note 84, <JI<JI 242-44 (statement of LMSB 
Commissioner Langdon). 
[I]nvestment bankers would come in with the various typical, quite 
appropriate tax reorganization proposals; and then they would say, "And 
we also have products whereby you don't have to pay the capital gains tax 
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Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Sommers is reported to 
have warned in February 2000 that "illegal corporate tax shelters were 
costing taxpayers at least $10 billion a year." He further said that 
illegal corporate tax avoidance "may be the most serious compliance 
issue threatening the American tax system today."132 In 2000, the 
Treasury Department contended that 
a growing number of corporate executives, under intense 
pressure from shareholders and Wall Street to boost earnings, 
are using complex tax-evasion schemes to cheat Uncle Sam 
out of billions of dollars every year . . . . As evidence, the 
Treasury points to a widening gap between profits large 
companies report to their shareholders and profits subject to 
taxes that they report to the IRS. The gap in 1997 was $122 
billion, nearly twice as big as in 1995.133 
Likewise, Enron appears destined to become a poster child for 
. ~ h ill this phenomenon, althoug WorldCom/MCI more closely 
on that transaction, and if your tax department doesn't know about how to 
avoid capital gains tax, they're out of date." ... Of course, they would make 
these presentations through [tax unsophisticated] corporate development 
people ... and so in effect, tax departments are constantly in the mode of 
dealing with ... people coming in with proposals ... that frankly are not 
sound, that won't be sustained by the courts, and are areas of material 
concern. 
!d. 9l'll 242-44; accord Johnston, Sham Shelters, supra note 125. 
132 David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Offers Amnesty to Companies that Admit Tax 
Indiscretions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at Cl [hereinafter Johnston, Amnesty] 
(waiver worth as much as $2.9 billion to the ninety-five companies disclosing for 
2001). The amnesty is from penalties for abusive shelters, not the taxes owed, and 
brought in fifty-two more disclosures in addition to 325 prior disclosures. See also 
Glenn Kessler, Tax Shelter Disclosure Falls Short, IRS Says; Agency Seeking to Halt 
Corporate Abuses, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2002, at E1 [hereinafter Kessler, Tax Shelter 
Disclosure Falls Short]; David S. Hilzenrath, Accountants' Tax Services Draw Fire, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2002, at E1 ("The Internal Revenue Service has estimated that 
abusive tax shelters cost the U.S. Treasury about $10 billion a year."). 
133 Owen Ullmann, IRS Hunts Corporate Schemes, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2000, 
at A1 ("Despite record profits, corporations paid 2% less in federal taxes last year 
than in 1998. And the share of all federal taxes paid by corporations has been 
shrinking since 1997, while individuals have been shouldering a steadily rising 
burden."). 
134 See Kessler, Tax Shelter Disclosure Falls Short, supra note 132. 
The burgeoning business of corporate tax shelters has received added 
scrutiny since the collapse of Enron ... [which] aggressively used tax 
shelters peddled by Wall Street and accounting firms ... [and that t]he 
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resembles a situation involving capitalization versus expensing. 
Section 6111 requires the promoter of a tax shelter to register it 
with the Secretary of the Treasury.136 Professor Michael Graetz, past 
master of tax administration, policy, and reform, and especially le mot 
juste, once defined a tax shelter as "a deal done by very smart people 
that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid."137 The Wall 
Senate Finance Committee is nearing an agreement to obtain access to 
Enron's tax filings to learn more about the transactions. 
!d.; David Cay Johnston, Enron Avoided Income Taxes in 4 of 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 17,2002, at A1; Bill Ghent, Gimme Shelter, 34 NAT'LJ. 547 (Feb. 23, 2002) ("It is 
a sin to say it, but 'thank God for Enron,' [Senator] Grassley recently told reporters, 
'because we are going to do something about these corporate tax shelters."'). 
135 Peter J. Howe, 2 Charged with WorldCom Fraud Former Officials Surrender 
to FBI in Telecom Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2002, at E2 ("An internal 
WorldCom auditing memo filed with court papers yesterday gave some details of how 
Sullivan and Myers shifted operating expenses known as 'line costs' over to capital 
accounts where they could be written off over years, improving WorldCom's reported 
cash flow."). Glenn Walberg maintains that capitalization for tax purposes is often 
more concerned about timing issues (when costs are recognized for tax accounting 
purposes) so that as long as taxpayers are taking legitimate positions on their tax 
returns, capitalization is not an abusive transaction. In WorldCom, the financial 
accounting treatment of the line costs does not appear to me to have been legitimate. 
136 See I.R.C. § 6111. See generally, STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH 
CONG., BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LAW RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS 2 (Joint 
Comm. Print 2002). 
137 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND 
PRESENT LAW RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS 2 n.2. The report provides the following 
example of a transaction without economic substance: 
Both the Tax Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
transaction [in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 
1998), affd 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 
(1999)] lacked economic substance. The Third Circuit held that "both the 
objective analysis of the actual economic consequences of ACM's 
transactions and the subjective analysis of their intended purposes support 
the Tax Court's conclusion that ACM's transactions did not have sufficient 
economic substance to be respected for tax purposes." The court observed 
that the economic substance doctrine can apply equally to "shams in 
substance" as "shams in fact" and that even if the purported activity in the 
transaction actually occurs, the transaction may be disregarded when (other 
than tax consequences) the transaction results in "no net change in the 
taxpayer's economic position." In other words, as an objective matter, to be 
respected for tax purposes, a transaction must have practical economic 
effects other than the creation of tax losses. The court found that there was 
"a lack of objective economic consequences arising from ACM's offsetting 
acquisition and virtually immediate disposition of the floating-rate notes .... 
We find that these transactions had only nominal, incidental effects on 
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Street Journal reported Graetz's definition,138 and the Joint Committee 
Staff139 and Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus140 repeated 
it, while ranking minority member Senator Charles E. Grassley 
paraphrased it as the "street" definition.141 Section 6111, on the other 
hand, provides one definition aimed at traditional tax shelters,142 and 
another aimed at corporate tax shelters that ·have the purpose of 
avoiding federal income tax plus confidentiality and promoter fees in 
excess of $100,000.143 Assistant Secretary of Treasury Mark 
Weinberger testified at the hearing that 
[w]hile well-intentioned, you had to trigger two of five criteria 
to determine whether you had to actually come within the 
requirements of filing. Then once you triggered those, there 
were three very subjective exceptions to the rules that you 
could rely on to get out of having to disclose. So, I think a lot 
of taxpayers were reading the rules broadly for the 
exceptions, narrowly for the requirements .... 144 
The Joint Committee Report on Tax Shelters provides both a 
handy list of Code provisions that may apply to tax shelters and an 
outstanding glossary of tax doctrines145 used to battle corporate tax 
shelters in the courts. This effort initially met with universal victory in 
that arena, but has recently suffered several circuit court losses146 that 
ACM's net economic position." 
Id. at 12. 
138 Tom Herman, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at Al. 
139 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND 
PRESENT LAW RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS 2 n.2 (Joint Comm. Print 2002). 
140 See Transcript of2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 91 10. 
141 !d. 91 160 ("Perhaps the most illuminating definition of a shelter comes from 
the street, as I have tried to indicate. It is a bad deal done by a lot of smart people 
who would not do it but for the tax benefits."). 
142 A mechanical ceiling of 2:1 "tax shelter ratio," i.e., the ratio that deductions 
(and translated credits) bear to the investment base cash and adjusted basis (like the 
"amount at risk" under section 465); substantial investment (at least $250,000); and at 
least five investors. I.R.C. § 6111(c)(2); I.R.C. § 6111(d). 
143 I.R.C. § 6111( d)(1 ). 
144 Transcript of Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 9191 199-200 
(statement of Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Mark Weinberger). 
145 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND 
PRESENTLAWRELATINGTOTAX SHELTERS 7-28 (Joint Comm. Print 2002). 
146 Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 9191 418 
(Chief Counsel John Williams, former Tax Court judge, stated that generalist judges 
have more of a sense that tax avoidance is a legitimate business objective than Tax 
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seem to be in line with the view of the House GOP leadership toward 
the end of the Clinton Administration, which did "not consider 
corporate tax shelters a threat to the tax system."147 Those GOP 
leaders, of course, bitterly opposed the "progressive" federal income 
tax and even expressed the desire "to tear it out by the roots."148 
Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus and Chief Counsel 
John Williams discussed in the 2002 Senate Finance Hearings on Tax 
Shelters the difference in results in the tax shelter cases at the Tax 
Court Level and in some circuit courts. At the same time, Senator 
Baucus averred that Tax Court judges had a better understanding of 
corporate tax shelters than some circuit courts. In response to this 
comment, Chief Counsel Williams said, "the generalist judges have 
more of a sense that tax avoidance is a legitimate business objective 
than tax court judges do. "149 
Court judges). Chair Baucus less diplomatically put it that Tax Court judges tend to 
understand these cases relatively well while appellate judges do not. !d. Cj['l[ 410-11. 
147 Ryan J. Donmoyer, GOP Leadership: Shelter Problem, What Shelter 
Problem?, 86 TAX NOTES 1039 (Feb. 21, 2000) ("House Majority Leader Richard K. 
Armey, R-Texas, made it clear last week that the GOP leadership does not consider 
corporate tax shelters a threat to the tax system."); Ryan J. Donmoyer, TEl 
Conference - Archer Tells Administration No on Shelters and Be Careful with FSCs, 
86 TAX NOTES 1815, 1816 (Mar. 27, 2000) (Archer "made it final that Congress will 
not pursue broad legislation anytime soon to crack down on the proliferation of 
corporate tax shelters .... He even endorsed the use of low-tax domiciles like 
Bermuda by insurance companies that want to reduce their tax liability legally. 
'That's legitimate,' he said."). 
148 International Trade Commission to Endorse Consumption Tax, TAX NOTES 
TODAY (July 20, 1998) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 98 TNT 138-2) 
("Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer, R-Texas, has said he wants to 'tear 
the income tax out by its roots' and replace it with a consumption tax."); accord 
Taxwriters Exchange Pleasantries, Draw Lines on IRS Reform Conference, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (June 11, 1998) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 98 TNT 
112-3); Howard Gleckman, Tax Reform Is Coming, Sure. But What Kind?, Bus. WK., 
June 12, 1995, at 84; Rostenkowski Criticizes Congress Tax Cut Plan; Ex-Lawmaker 
Lauds Bush for 1990 Hike, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, at N5; David Cay Johnston, A 
Tax Cut Your Lawyer Will Love, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997, at A26; cf Treasury 
Secretary O'Neill's Statement on OECD Tax Haven Initiative, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(May 11, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 92-39) (Bush 
administration would not support an overly broad effort to impose sanctions on tax 
havens); David Cay Johnston, Former I.R.S. Chiefs Back Tax Haven Crackdown, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2001, at C1 ("Seven former commissioners of the Internal Revenue 
Service urged Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill yesterday to withdraw his 
opposition to a proposed crackdown [by Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] on Caribbean nations and others that are considered tax havens."). 
149 Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 'l[Cj[ 410-11, 
417-19. See Alexandra M. Walsh, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax 
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When the Treasury Department and the Service determine that a 
transaction has a substantial tax avoidance purpose, the Service issues 
a "Notice"150 informing taxpayers of the details of the transaction.151 A 
series of penalties is applicable to tax shelter users, as well as tax 
return preparers and promoters who fail to register tax shelters.152 
Compliance with these registration rules, however, is in the words of 
Senator Baucus, "to put it bluntly, a joke."153 Even so, the ninety-nine 
reporting big corporations revealed staggering revenue losses from 
such tax shelters, sixty-four of which were "listed" transactions. 154 
These transactions generated $14.7 billion in deductions and losses for 
2000. 155 On December 21, 2001, the Service issued Announcement 
2002-2,156 which provides a 120-day opportunity for taxpayers 
Shelters, Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541 (2001), for 
an academic discussion of this phenomenon. See also David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits, 
Tax Administration, and Legislative Intent, 53 TAX LAw. 579 (2000); George K. Yin, 
Business Purpose, Economic.Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters: Getting Serious 
About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209 
(2001) (considers history of tax shelter activity in the 1970s and 1980s and applies 
lessons from response to that problem to current corporate tax shelters and argues for 
a change to an adjusted book income tax base for public corporations). 
150 See Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 301.6111-2T(b)(2) (2002). 
151 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND 
AND PRESENTLAWRELATINGTOTAXSHELTERS 33 (Joint Comm. Print 2002). 
152 See id. at 31-37. 
153 Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 'll'll 19, 191 
(for 2001, there were 272 disclosures from ninety-nine taxpayers, with sixty-four listed 
transactions and 208 reportable transactions). These transactions resulted in tax 
savings, or often tax avoidance, of $14.9 billion. See infra note 155. 
154 Section 6662(d)(2)(D) of the Code authorizes the Treasury Department to list 
positions for which it believes there is no substantial authority in the Federal Register. 
155 See Kessler, Tax Shelter Disclosure Falls Short, supra note 132. David Harris, 
manager of the Service's office of tax shelter analysis, said: 
the 272 transactions disclosed by 99 companies in 2001 resulted in total tax 
savings of $14.9 billion, while the 52 additional disclosures under the 
amnesty resulted in more than $1.2 billion in claimed losses or deductions. 
Not all the transactions are considered by the IRS to be abusive. But ... a 
preliminary analysis of the 2001 filings suggests that 200 of the deals have 
been listed as abusive tax shelters or appear to raise concerns. 
ld. While this article implies that "tax savings" equals the amount of tax reduction, a 
subsequent announcement by the Service shows that "tax savings" must mean tax 
deductions and losses. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
156 See I.R.S. Announcement 2002-2, 2002-2 I.R.B. 304 (Dec. 21, 2001) (Service 
will waive the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 for underpayments due to 
negligence and the penalty for underpayments due to substantial understatements of 
income tax, and substantial valuation misstatements, provided that the taxpayer 
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voluntarily to disclose tax shelters and other questionable items 
reported on their tax returns so they may obtain a waiver of accuracy 
penalties. As of two weeks before the end of such period, the Service 
had received disclosures from more than 250 taxpayers involving 458 
tax shelter transactions with reported deductions and losses of more 
than $8.5 billion.157 Senator Baucus questioned LMSB Commissioner 
Langdon as to the size of the pool of potential purchasers at a recent 
Senate Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Shelters; he responded 
that there were 90,000 to 100,000 large corporations in LMSB.158 
Thus, the ninety-nine reporting taxpayers are probably just the tip of 
the iceberg. 
For a rough idea of the potential magnitude of the corporate tax 
shelter problem, this $14.7 billion in lost revenue may be contrasted 
with the $358 billion in taxable income reported for 1998 by the bigger 
LMSB regular corporation taxpayers. While two million regular 
corporations reported $477 billion in taxable income for 1998 (the 
latest year for which data is available), 159 based on historical trends, 
more than 75% of this was probably reported by the largest 
corporations with $250 million or more in assets/60 or roughly $358 
billion in total. Thus the ninety-nine reporting large corporations 
accounted for revenue losses equal to around 4% of the taxable 
income reported by such large corporations.161 The Treasury 
Department thought that many more of the large LMSB corporations 
would report, 162 so the revenue loss could easily approach half of the 
discloses tax shelters and other questionable transactions before the earlier of April 
23, 2002, or the transaction is raised during an examination); Tim Reason, Tax 
Shelters- Of Beans and Carrots, CFO, Feb. 1, 2002, at 16 ("Companies that spill the 
beans about a tax shelter . . . can avoid the 20% penalty on any resulting 
understatement of tax."). 
157 IRS Reminds Taxpayers of Deadline for Voluntary Tax Shelter Disclosure, 
TAX NOTES TODAY (April10, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 
TNT 69-38). 
158 See Transcript of Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 9191 194-96. 
159 See Patrice Treubert & William P. Jauquet, Corporation Income Tax Returns, 
1998, 21 STAT. INCOME BULL. 66,67 (2001). 
160 See supra note 71. 
161 $477 x 0.75 = $358, and $14.7 I $358 = 4.1 %. 
162 See Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 9191 36, 
168 (Mark Weinberger, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, stated, "The results are in. 
We have now received and reviewed the first year of filings and disclosures. We are 
disappointed in the number and types of transactions that have been disclosed."). 
The tax shelter penalty waiver initiative, however, exceeded expectations. Brant 
Goldwyn, Langdon Says Shelter Disclosures Have Exceeded Service's Expectations, 92 
BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 13, 2002, at G-2. Most of the 1000 taxpayers so 
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income reported by large LMSB corporations.163 On the other hand, 
Tax Notes Economic Correspondent Martin A. Sullivan reported that 
the corporate effective rate has been "remarkably steady," from 
25.4% to 22.4%, over the past fifteen years.164 Thus, he concluded 
that there is no evidence from the data "to indicate that the much 
ballyhooed increase in corporate shelter activity has had a significant 
impact on corporate tax receipts."165 Yet the corporate effective rate 
after wider swings from 1987 through 1997 has steadily declined from 
1998 to 2003, the last five years of this period.166 Moreover, Sullivan 
pointed out that in the first quarter of fiscal 2002, the 24% decline in 
corporate profits from the preceding fiscal year while the decline in 
corporate tax payments was only 40% from "an already weak year in 
2001 is still a dramatic change and well worth keeping an eye on. "167 
In any event, as discussed immediately below, agents have been 
tied up with capitalization issues instead of examining these troubling, 
unpatriotic168 corporate tax shelters, which are also spreading to high-
income individuals.169 The negative effect on taxpayer confidence in 
the tax system of such shelters has been widely noted.170 Less obvious 
disclosing were individuals (fifty to 100 recent corporate disclosures, id.), which may 
well reflect "IRS's John Doe summonses on credit card companies for the names of 
offshore account holders." Amy Hamilton, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Has IRS 
Found Way to Detect Unreported Income?, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 13, 2002) 
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 92-13); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 30 
(Joint Comm. Print 2002); Treasury Statement on Offshore Credit Card Schemes, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Mar. 26, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 
58-21). 
163 1000 = 10 times the number reporting. 10 x $14.4 = $144 billion. $144 billion I 
$358 billion= 40.2%. 
164 Martin A. Sullivan, Corporate Tax Revenues: Up, Down, and All Around, 95 
TAX NOTES 25 (Apr.1, 2002). 
165 I d. at 28. 
166 Id. at 27 fig.2B. 
167 Id. at 28. 
168 Cf Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, CJICJI 7-8 
(marketer of "inversion deals" said that some companies conclude that "the 
improvement on earnings is powerful enough that maybe the patriotism issue needs 
to take a back seat." This was very troubling to the Chair, "especially now as we all 
try to pull together, most particularly since September 11, as a Nation and work 
together to help our people meet the problems that we are facing."). 
169 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
170 Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, CJi 9 
(statement of the Chairman, Senator Baucus) ("These tax shelters could do serious 
harm. They undermine public confidence in the tax system, clearly. They make 
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may be their effect on baby boomer investors' confidence in the stock 
market itself.171 Such a lack of confidence could have a strong 
• 
172 d 1· . I f II 173 economic an po ttlca a out. 
F. LMSB Audits and Capitalization Issues 
Historically for large corporations, an additional recommended 
income tax "typically [arose] from different interpretations of an 
ambiguous and complex tax code. Upon audit, IRS auditors may 
interpret the tax provisions differently and, as a result, recommend 
adjustments to the corporation's tax liability."174 INDOPCO issues 
are the poster child of this process. In the wake of 1NDOPCO, 
expensing versus capitalizing costs with present and future, often 
intangible, benefits became the most significant federal income tax 
average taxpayers feel like chumps; we have to pay more because the big guys are 
paying less."). 
171 A recent article suggested that baby boomers might lose confidence in the 
market when they became aware of the widespread use of corporate tax shelters (and 
the back taxes and penalties hopefully triggered by the media publicity fueled by the 
Enron scandal). See Marcia Vickers et al., The Betrayed Investor, FORBES, Feb. 25, 
2002, at 104; Steven Pearlstein, Andersen: One Player in Big Drama, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 15, 2002, at E1 (explaining that lack of confidence of baby boomers in stock 
market and corporate financial statements exemplified by the Enron scandal may 
exaggerate bust in market); John Lancaster, Senate Democrats Set an Agenda on 
Enron, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at All ("According to a Senate leadership aide, 
they were 'trying to give people, both sophisticated and ordinary investors, the 
confidence that there's going to be corrective action."'). 
172 Transcript of2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, <Jill. 
Abusive corporate shelters create a tax benefit without any corresponding 
economic benefit. No new product, no technological innovation, just a tax 
break. This could have a perverse effect, forcing perfectly honest 
companies to consider setting up a shelter of their own to avoid being 
placed at a competitive disadvantage. That, in a nutshell, is the problem. 
/d. (statement of the Chairman, Senator Baucus); cf Kenneth R. Gosselin, Market 
Risk Finally Hitting Home; Unfamiliar with Long Downturns, Some Take Financial, 
Psychological Hits, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 18, 2002, at A1 (explaining that 
boomers may withdraw from stock market due to recent downturn after eighteen 
years of growth). 
173 Vickers et al., supra note 171 (new investors, mostly baby boomers, have lost 
30% of the value of stock investments in the past two years; "Never before have the 
politicians faced the wrath of so many disaffected investors."); cf Marianne Means, 
Privatize Social Security? Hal, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 17,2002, at 15A. 
174 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: ANALYZING THE 
NATURE OF INCOME TAX GAP 4 (1997). 
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issue by far in audits of big businesses.175 In large part, this 
phenomenon reflected the Service's directing its CEP auditors, 
through many Industry Specialization Programs (ISPs),176 to look in 
the aftermath of INDOPCO for specific deduction versus 
capitalization issues, particularly with future benefits flavor, in various 
market segments at the CEP level applicable to the largest 2000 or so 
corporations.177 The administrative responses to expensing and 
capitalization issues often manifested conflicts between the 
Examination division and the Office of Chief Counsel.178 Such 
regulation by audit and litigation contradicts the vaunted shift by the 
Service to rising voluntary compliance,179 a goal of its recent 
restructuring. Moreover, the propensity of the Service's auditing 
agents and litigators once again to capitalize transaction costs to 
intangibles with no depreciation, or to tangibles with a longer 
recovery period than the future benefit of the expenditure, 
predictably led to courts allowing current deductions under 
questionable reasoning.180 At the same time, corporate audit rates 
have rapidly declined and been disproportionately directed to these 
175 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: RECURRING ISSUES 
IN TAX DISPUTES OVER BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS 2 (1995) (reporting that of 
117 Service Office of Appeals cases filed by large corporations, capital expenditure 
issues comprised 42% of the total number and $1.1 billion of the $1.9 billion in 
proposed tax adjustments, or 58%); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: RECURRING TAX ISSUES TRACKED BY IRS' OFFICE OF APPEALS 5-
6, 14, 22-23 (1993). 
176 ISP papers provide guidance to the Service's agents auditing large corporate 
taxpayers in the CEP. See Marion Marshall et al., The Changing Landscape of IRS 
Guidance: A Downward Slope, 90 TAX NOTES 673,679 (Jan. 29, 2001); IRS Publishes 
List of ISP Guidelines, December 31, 1996, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 7, 1997) (LEXIS, 
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 97 TNT 26-32) (citing a number of 
capitalization/amortization issues, some predating INDOPCO). See generally, Lee et 
al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 655-56. Glenn Carrington points out that all of 
the publicity over capitalization versus expensing after INDOPCO may have alerted 
some taxpayers to the possibility of deducting costs that they otherwise might have 
capitalized. 
177 See supra note 176. 
178 Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 655-58. 
179 Sheryl Stratton, Tackling the Tax Gap on Tip Income, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Apr. 18, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 75-3). 
180 Having thought for some time about a world without the no separate asset 
doctrine and about the tendency of government auditors and litigators to argue for 
capitalization without depreciation, I cautioned that "the lesson is clear: unjust rules, 
capitalization without adequate amortization, will cause some (but not all) courts to 
seek other solutions promoting uncertainty. The Treasury/IRS goal of 'rough justice' 
is welcome and to be celebrated." Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 677. 
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losing capitalization issues181 while widespread abuse of corporate tax 
shelters has continued unchecked. 
"Resolution of issues such as capitalization and the R & E credit, 
which the IRS has indicated consumes nearly 40% of the audit 
resources in the IRS Large & Mid-Size Business Division, will free up 
resources for better use - such as targeting abusive tax avoidance 
schemes."182 As former Chief Counsel and Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Policy Ken Gideon stated: 
If the current level of INDOPCO disputes at the audit level 
continues, we are going to be spending enormous resources 
on questions of capitalization. It strikes me, given the other 
problems of the income tax, that that's a bad call. The much 
better call would be to write some rough justice rules and say, 
okay, these are the rules.183 
The new Chief Counsel, and former Tax Court Judge, B. John 
Williams, has wisely decided on the course of "using litigation as an 
enforcement tool rather than to establish novel legal interpretations; 
181 Only 20% of the proposed increases in CEP audits are sustained in 
administrative appeals and assessed as additional taxes. Almost all (97%) of the so-
assessed taxes are paid by CEP large corporations. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A MORE BALANCED PICTURE OF AUDIT RESULTS 
AND COSTS 3-4 (1998). 
182 Treasury Proposals to Curb Abusive Tax Avoidance Transactions, TAX NOTES 
TODAY (Mar. 21, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 55-25); 
IRS Memo Provides Guidelines for Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 9, 2002) 
(LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 90-8, !jJ 6) (explaining that the 
Service's examination resources are better utilized on other high-risk compliance 
areas rather than capitalization issues described in the Advance Notice). For the 
contrary argument that the Service should allocate more resources to fixing up the tax 
accounting rules, see Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Tax Shelter Opponents Turn 
Practical, 95 TAX NOTES 1111, 1112 (May 20, 2002). 
Tax accounting is where the rubber meets the road. The tax administrator 
should reallocate resources to devote the necessary brainpower to fixing up 
tax accounting rules that affect all taxpayers. That, of course, includes the 
capitalization rules, where the Bush Treasury is showing an inclination to 
reverse the presumption of capitalization. At least if businesses emerge not 
paying tax because they are allowed to deduct all of their costs, they should 
be incurring those costs for something more productive than tax shelter 
promoters' fees. 
/d. at 1111-12. 
183 Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two, supra note 34, !JI 586. 
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and identifying and shutting down tax shelters faster." 184 
Ill. ACQUISITION COSTS UNDER WOODWARD/HILTON HOTELS AND 
IDAHO POWER 
An ordinary business or investment expense is currently 
deductible under section 162 in the tax year incurred or paid. An 
expenditure capitalized under section 263, in contrast, may be 
deducted from ordinary income only through (1) amortization or 
depreciation under section 168 over the statutory "recovery period" 
(or under section 167, usually ratably, over the useful life of the asset 
acquired, created, or improved by the expenditure); or (2) upon 
destruction, other realization, or abandonment prior to the end of 
such life as a loss under section 165.185 Thus, sections 162 and 263 are 
designed to calculate net income more accuratell86 by generally 
matching expenses with revenue in the taxable periods in which the 
184 Sheryl Stratton, Federal Bar Association - Williams Sketches Agenda for 
Office of Chief Counsel, 94 TAX NOTES 1430, 1430 (Mar. 18, 2002); accord Lee A. 
Sheppard, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Chief Counsel Talks About Shelter Litigation, 
TAX NOTES TODAY (May 10, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 
TNT 92-4) ('"Litigation is not a proper tool for making tax policy. It is an 
extraordinarily ineffective way to do it,' he said. 'Litigation is an enforcement tool."'); 
Brant Goldwyn, Simplification, Improving Guidance Process Are Top Priorities for 
Treasury, Olson Says, 47 BNA DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 11, 2002, at G-2 ("Treasury and 
IRS believe taxpayers should be provided clear guidance through the rulemaking 
process, Olson said, rather than through litigation." Litigation should be used to 
enforce existing guidance). 
185 See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at 9-10. Most taxpayers, of course, 
would prefer a current deduction because it is worth more on a present value basis 
than the same amount capitalized and then amortized or depreciated over the current 
and a fixed number of future tax years. Fishman v. Commissioner, 837 F.2d 309, 312 
(7th Cir. 1988) ("Because of the time value of money - real riskless rates are 
positive- a deduction taken today is worth more than one taken a year from now."); 
see also Kevin J. Coenen, Note, Capital or Ordinary Expense? The Proper Tax 
Treatment of a Target Corporation's Expenditures in an Acquisitive Reorganization, 58 
OHIO ST. L.J. 583, 586 (1997). 
186 Taxing net annual income is a fundamental policy of the Code. See 50 CONG. 
REc. (Part 4) 3849 (Aug. 28, 1913) (remarks of Sen. John S. Williams, D-Miss.). 
Today the keystone is section 446's mandate that a taxpayer's method of income tax 
accounting must clearly reflect income. See I.R.C. § 446(b). A taxpayer's practice of 
expensing or capitalizing an expenditure has been held such a method of accounting. 
See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8; Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,328 (Jan. 23, 1985). It should be noted that Glenn Walberg suggests that 
permanent capitalization of costs might not constitute a method of tax accounting 
because it arguably does not involve a timing element. 
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expenses actually generate that revenue.187 
A. Woodward/Hilton Hotels and Origin of the Claim/Acquisition Cost 
Doctrine 
The origin of the claim doctrine holds that the transaction out of 
which an expenditure arises, rather than its consequences or the 
taxpayer's purpose for expenditure, controls its characterization for 
tax purposes.188 The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a taxpayer 
from distorting income by mismatching timing and/or character of 
income and expenses, lest the tax treatment of an expenditure or 
method of tax accounting for that item violate the clear reflection of 
income mandate of section 446.189 The courts often speak of 
preventing "double deductions."190 In the context of a capital 
transaction, income distortion would arise if a capital gain, 
preferenced as to individuals from 1942 until fifteen years ago by a 
50% to 60% deduction (and now by a rate ceiling for individual 
capital gains roughly equivalent at many, but not all, brackets to a 
50% deduction191), were coupled with an ordinary deduction for an 
187 See generally Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax 
Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1984). 
188 See, e.g., Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 484-99; Timothy A. Rodgers, Note, 
The Transaction Approach to the Origin of the Claim Doctrine: A Proposed Cure for 
Chronic Inconsistency, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 905 (1989) (citing Lee & Murphy, supra 
note 3); Edward J. Schnee & Nancy J. Stara, The Origin of the Claim Test: A Search 
for Objectivity, 13 AKRON TAX J. 97 (1997); Robert Willens, "Origin of the Claim" 
Doctrine Determines Whether an Expense May Be Deducted, 145 BNA DAILY TAX 
REP., Jul. 30,2001, at J-1. 
189 Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967); I.R.C. 
§ 446(b). 
m & 0 Lee Murphy, supra note 3, at 5 7, 525; John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader, 
Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative 
Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of Income, 12 J. CoRP. L. 137, 207 n.439 (1987). 
191 Examples of rough equivalency or better in 2002 are 10% capital gains rate 
versus 25% individual income tax bracket; 18% capital gains rate versus 35% 
individual income tax bracket; the parallel disappears at the 18% capital gains rate 
versus 27%, 31%, and 38.5% income tax brackets, and especially the 8% capital gains 
rate versus the 10% individual income tax bracket, where there are almost no capital 
gains realized anyway. The complexity here is incredible. II STAFF OF JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., RECOMMENDATIONS TO SIMPLIFY THE FEDERAL TAX 
SYSTEM 103 (Joint Comm. Print 2001) ("Adopt a uniform percentage deduction for 
capital gains in lieu of multiple tax rates"); NYSBA Tax Section Sends Tax 
Simplification Report, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 20, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 54-48). 
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expenditure related to its acquisition or disposition.192 Prevention of 
such distortion is accomplished by ensuring that the taxpayer does not 
deduct against ordinary income expenses that arise from a capital 
transaction, but instead adds such costs to the basis of the capital asset 
acquired or subtracts such costs from the amount realized to reduce 
the proceeds of the disposition of the capital asset. 
The Supreme Court first fashioned the origin of the claim 
doctrine to deal with attempted character of loss distortion, or treating 
a loss as income-seeking rather than personal in origin, in United 
States v. Gilmore. 193 In Gilmore, the taxpayer deducted attorney's fees 
related to a divorce, arguing that the expenses were currently 
deductible under section 212 since the taxpayer's purpose was to 
"conserve" as much of his estate as he could from his ex-spouse's 
marital claims.194 The Court in Gilmore sustained the Service's 
contention that deductibility turned on the origin and nature of the 
claim giving rise to the legal expense, here the personal marital 
relationship, such that the attorney's fees in a divorce contest were not 
deductible due to section 262, notwithstanding such preservation 
purpose or consequence. 
In Woodward v. Commissioner195 and United States v. Hilton 
Hotels/96 the Supreme Court extended in sound common law fashion 
the origin of claim doctrine from such business versus personal 
situations to transactions where the context or purpose of the 
expenditure clearly was business or profit motivated, but where the 
character of the expenditure still was at issue. Now the issue was 
whether the expenditure constituted a current deduction or a capital 
expenditure, presumably amortizable over a number of years.197 In 
the case of an expenditure incurred in connection with a business 
capital transaction, allowance of an ordinary deduction for the 
expenditure, although income from the transaction would constitute 
capital gains, would distort the taxpayer's income possibly as to timing 
192 Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 474,484,489, 503. 
193 372 u.s. 39 (1963). 
194 I d. at 43. 
195 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970). 
196 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970). 
197 h In t e case of a cost incurred in connection with the acquisition of an 
intangible, depreciation is available only if the life of such intangible was 
determinable with certainty. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2000). This was 
often not the case resulting in "perpetual capitalization." See infra note 254 and 
accompanying text. 
314 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 22:273 
and certainly as to character.198 Such mismatching of a current 
ordinary deduction and future capital gains has the practical effect of 
a forbidden "double deduction,"199 and underlies seemingly disparate 
doctrines or rules. These rules include the origin of the claim doctrine 
as articulated in Arrowsmith v. Commissione/00 and United States v. 
Skelly Oil Co. 201 Other rules under this rubric are the tax benefit rule, 
the year two deduction under the claim of right doctrine, and the 
cancellation of indebtedness doctrine.202 Justice Marshall correctly 
explained in Skelly Oit03 that prevention of the equivalent of double 
deduction was the conceptual or policy basis of the Court's prior 
decision in Arrowsmith.204 "The rationale for the Arrowsmith rule is 
easy to see; if money was taxed at a special lower rate when received, 
the taxpayer would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments 
were generally deductible from receipts taxable at the higher rate 
applicable to ordinary income. "205 
198 Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 484, 488-89. 
199 Charles Ilfield Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934) (Consolidated Return 
Regulations are not to be construed as permitting the practical equivalent of a double 
deduction of the same losses, first as subsidiary company losses in consolidated 
returns for earlier years, and again in the eventual loss to the parent company from its 
investment in the subsidiary); see United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 685 
(1969) ("[I]f money was taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer 
would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally deductible 
from receipts taxable at the higher rate applicable to ordinary income."); Crane v. 
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating that exclusion of allowable 
deprecation deductions from consideration in computing gain would result, in effect, 
in a double deduction on the same loss of assets); Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 207 
n.439. 
200 344 u.s. 6 (1952). 
201 394 U.S. at 685; see supra note 198. 
202 Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 205-25; Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 475, 
503-04, 507-09, 525, 544-46. 
203 394 U.S. at 684-85; Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 169-70 nn.211-20. 
204 Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952) (explaining that annual 
accounting principle is not breached by examining year one transaction to determine 
character of year two transaction). Arrowsmith really constitutes the characterization 
component of the year two deduction for a repayment of an amount reported as 
income under a claim of right in year one. Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 169 
nn.213-14; Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 506-09; cf Deborah H. Schenk, 
Arrowsmith and Its Progeny: Tax Characterization by Reference to Past Events, 33 
RUTGERS L. REV. 317, 338-41 (1981). 
205 Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 685. Joel Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transaction 
on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. 
REV. 85, 87-94, 102-04, 127-30 (1972), erred in looking for a literal constructive sale or 
exchange in year two instead of conceptualizing the year two transaction as a 
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The Woodward and Hilton Hotels decisions capitalized a 
corporation's transaction costs relating to buy-outs of dissenting 
shareholders expressly in order to prevent just such distortion of 
income. The Court explicitly rejected the taxpayers' argument that 
their "primary purpose" in paying for an appraisal of the shares of 
minority shareholders who did not agree to a perpetual extension of 
the corporation's charter was to allow its business to continue.206 The 
Court reasoned that the argument "would encourage resort to 
formalisms and artificial distinctions. "207 Instead, the Court in both 
Woodward and Hilton Hotels applied the Gilmore origin of the claim 
standard to the capital versus ordinary deduction issue.208 Since 
establishing the price of the dissenters' shares was a crucial part of the 
purchase of the capital assets - in this case, their shares of stock - the 
appraisal costs were characterized as part of the cost of the stock 
acquired and not a deductible expense.209 As discussed below,210 A.E. 
Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner211 effectively revived a 
primary purpose test with its intent to facilitate or hinder a capital 
transaction test. 212 
The Fifth Circuit and the Claims Court extended the origin of the 
claim analysis to business expansion costs at least where a separate 
location or a separate license is required.213 Moreover, the Court cited 
Gilmore with approval in INDOPC0. 214 The proper issue is whether 
the "asset" in such expansion and similar cases is the business as a 
whole, the license/branch, or a separate "freestanding," amortizable 
balancing entry. Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 212-13 n.468; see also Myron C. 
Grauer, The Supreme Court's Approach to Annual and Transactional Accounting for 
Income Taxes: A Common Law Malfunction in a Statutory System?, 21 GA. L. REV. 
329, 338, 357-58,362-67, 369-70 (1986). 
206 Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 487,523. 
207 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970). 
208 In the companion case of United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 585 
(1970), involving the cost of an appraisal arising from dissenters' rights in a merger~ 
the taxpayer unsuccessfully sought to distinguish Woodward on the grounds that title 
to the dissenters' stock passed prior to a value being determined. 
209 Woodward, 397 U.S. at 578-79. 
210 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
211 ( ) 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'g and remanding 105 T.C. 166 1995 . 
212 See id. at 488. 
213 Cent. Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 
1984); accord Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 225, 229 
(1985). 
214 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1992). 
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. "bl 215 mtang1 e. 
B. Idaho Power and Indirect Transaction Costs 
The Court began to base capitalization of costs relating to the 
acquisition of a long-lived asset solely on the anti-timing distortion leg 
of the clear reflection of income mandate in Commissioner v. Idaho 
Power Co. 216 There, the Court faced the issue of "whether the 
construction-related depreciation is to be amortized and deducted 
over the shorter life of the equipment [used in the construction 
process] or, instead, is to be amortized and deducted over the longer 
life of the capital facilities constructed."217 Justice Blackmun set forth 
in Idaho Power the now-classic timing matching of income and 
expense rationale for the capitalization of indirect self-production 
costs of a tangible asset.218 The matching of a current year's expenses 
that benefit future years with such future years' income (by 
capitalization and basis recovery) is necessary in order to prevent 
distortion of income under the section 446 requirement that a 
taxpayer's method of tax accounting clearly reflect income. Under 
this rationale, the addition of capitalized transaction costs to the basis 
of a tangible asset would more closely match those costs to future 
income. Specifically, this would result from the depreciation of the 
cost of such tangible asset over its useful life under section 167 or a 
subsequently enacted statutory recovery period under section 168. 
Justice Blackmun also based his decision in Idaho Power on the 
rule of "horizontal equity," which holds that similarly situated 
taxpayers should be taxed in the same manner with respect to 
215 See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at 27-28; cf infra notes 376-79 and 
accompanying text. 
216 418 u.s. 1, 13-14 (1974). 
217 !d. at 10. 
218 There can be little question that other construction-related expense 
items, such as tools, materials, and wages paid construction workers, are to 
be treated as part of the cost of acquisition of a capital asset. The taxpayer 
does not dispute this. Of course, reasonable wages paid in the carrying on 
of a trade or business qualify as a deduction from gross income. 
§ 162(a)(1) .... But when wages are paid in connection with the 
construction or acquisition of a capital asset, they must be capitalized and 
are then entitled to be amortized over the life of the capital asset so 
acquired. 
/d. at 11, 13. These indirect costs as to tangibles in most cases now would be 
capitalized under section 263A. See infra note 279. 
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economically identical transactions.219 Under this judicial rule of tax 
parity, inside and outside transaction costs should be treated similarly 
in order not to provide a tax advantage to inside costs over identical 
outside costs of constructing or acquiring a tangible asset with future 
b f . 220 ene It. 
Justice Blackmun reaffirmed in INDOPC0221 the future benefits 
analysis which he propounded two decades earlier in Idaho Power.222 
He reiterated in INDOPCO that when an expenditure benefits future 
periods, it generally should be capitalized instead of being currently 
deducted or expensed so that it might reflect net income more 
accurately. In short, the "matching" notion is that the capitalized 
expenditure will be amortized or depreciated over the period 
benefited by such expenditure.223 This article discusses below when 
219 Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 14; see also Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 
398 (2001). 
The Court [in Idaho Power] concluded that requmng the taxpayer to 
capitalize its depreciation would maintain tax parity between it and another 
taxpayer who retained an independent contractor to construct the 
improvements and additions for it. In the latter case, the Court stated, the 
depreciation on the equipment used by the independent contractor would 
be part of the cost that the contractor charged on the project. The Court 
believed it unfair to allow a taxpayer to deduct the cost of constructing its 
facility if it has sufficient resources to do its own construction work, while 
requiring another taxpayer without such resources to capitalize its cost 
including the depreciation charged by the contractor. The Court expressed 
no opinion as to the fact that the taxpayer in the Idaho Power case had been 
regularly and routinely improving its facilities throughout most of its long 
existence, nor that these improvements had for the most part been made by 
its employees. 
ld. (citations and footnote omitted); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,171 (June 20, 
1977). 
[T]he capitalization of construction-related depreciation by the taxpayer 
who does its own construction work maintains tax parity with the taxpayer 
who has its construction work done by an independent contractor and who 
must capitalize the entire cost of the contractor's services, which would 
include depreciation allocable to the use of the contractor's equipment in 
the construction work. 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,171. 
220 See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 963 (4th Cir. 1981). For 
discussion of the idea that the rule of parity may yield to administrative convenience, 
see infra notes 540-41 and accompanying text. 
221 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
222 418 u.s. 1 (1974). 
223 Due to the vagaries of tax depreciation and amortization, the match between 
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this theoretically correct matching should yield either to a current 
deduction or amortization over some safe harbor period to produce 
minimal distortion of income.224 
Significantly, Idaho Power approvingly cited the Tax Court 
opmwn in Perlmutter v. Commissioner,225 which required 
capitalization226 of the portion of the salaries of the top executives of a 
the expenditure and the future benefit or income in fact is seldom very exact. 
Moreover, over the years, the varying "recovery periods" for real estate 
improvements under section 168 reflect at each turn political deals. The increase in 
the recovery period for real estate improvements from fifteen years to eighteen years 
in 1984 was a compromise instead of twenty years with the difference in revenues paid 
for by changes to installment reporting (section 453(i), taxing all depreciation 
recapture in the year of sale). Daniel Bernick, Real Estate Write-off Change 
Approved by Finance Amidst Disagreements Within Industry, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(April 9, 1984) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., Apr. 9, 1984). This 
favored factory owners over real estate developers who tend more to churn. /d.; see 
How the Options Industry and Realtors Escaped the Tax Bill's Axe, TAX NOTES 
TODAY (July 20, 1984) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 84 TNT 153-22). 
The increase in the recovery period in 1993 from 31.5 years to 39 years for 
nonresidential real estate improvements was to pay for the section 469(c)(7) real 
estate operator exception to passive activity losses (PALs). Unofficial Transcript of 
May 11 IRS Hearing on Passive Activity Losses, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 18, 1995) 
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 95 TNT 97-37) (statement of Toby 
Bradley, representing National Association of Realtors). A rare exception yielding 
more exact matching may occur where the income forecast method of depreciation is 
available under section 167(g), which seeks to match capital recovery deductions with 
the income stream which the capital generates. Another even rarer exception 
possibly producing still closer matching may occur under Associated Patentees v. 
Commissioner and its progeny. Associated Patentees, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 
979 (1945), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 3 (taxpayer paid as royalty for patent a percentage of 
income produced by it for fixed number of years; to clearly reflect income, taxpayer 
allowed to deduct as depreciation the amount paid each year under the formula). 
They permit an ordinary deduction of the entire amount paid during a tax year of, for 
instance, a theretofore contingent royalty payment tied to the taxpayer's profits or 
some other measure that correlates with his or her income for the period because 
such tack produces minimum distortion of income. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United 
States, 159 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (installment cost payments for year pertained 
to that year since measured by income over that year); Liquid Paper Corp. v. United 
States, 2 Cl. Ct. 284 (1983) (such royalty payments accurately reflect the annual cost 
of patent with minimum distortion of income); Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58. 
224 See discussion infra Part IV and notes 254-56 and accompanying text. 
225 44 T.C. 382, 404-05 (1965), affd., 373 F.2d 45 (lOth Cir. 1967). 
226 Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 286 (1967), 
distinguished Perlmutter on the grounds that 
the taxpayer conceded that some allocation of overhead was proper and 
that the sole dispute was as to the measure of the allocation. In any event, 
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real estate leasing corporation allocable to the three to five hours a 
week one top executive spent, and the five to seven hours a week the 
other spent in overseeing construction of a building for use in their 
rental business. One line of pre-section 263A authorities, epitomized 
by Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner,227 approved full absorption 
rules governing inventory accounting and requiring the capitalization 
of indirect costs of acquiring or constructing tangible assets228 in 
reliance upon Idaho Power.229 
In contrast to the Adolph Coors line of cases, the Tax Court in 
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissione/30 found that both full 
absorption and incremental accounting methods were equally 
permissible, in that both methods clearly reflected income under 
section 446 with which section 263 is "inextricably intertwined."231 
Consequently, Fort Howard Paper permitted the taxpayer to deduct 
in both of these cases, the taxpayer's very business was the construction of 
fixed assets, i.e., buildings, and its personnel was employed for that very 
purpose. This is a far cry from the situation involved herein, where a large 
manufacturing concern engages in self-construction activities not at the 
expense of normal operating time but as a fill-in for slack periods. 
Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. at 286 (citation omitted). 
227 519 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976). 
228 The "full absorption" cost method involves capitalizing direct costs of 
materials and labor plus an allocable portion of all overhead. The "prime 
cost" method involves capitalizing only direct materials and labor costs. 
The "incremental cost" method involves capitalizing direct labor and 
material costs plus that portion of overhead which can be directly identified 
with the self-construction project. Where construction ordinarily takes 
place only where regular facilities and personnel are not being fully utilized 
(i.e., during "slack" or "idle" time), there may be no overhead which can be 
directly identified with the project. 
Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. at 283 n.4. 
229 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-ll(c)(2)(ii) (2002). STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 
at 504-05 (Joint Comm. Print 1987), noted this conflict between two lines of pre-
section 263A cases. One line held that the Service is justified in requiring 
capitalization of overhead costs of construction, i.e., full absorption accounting under 
"clear reflection of income" and Idaho Power. Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 
519 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976). · 
230 49 T.C. at 283. 
231 /d. Fort Howard Paper's undergirding of capitalization versus expensing with 
the concept of clear reflection of income lies at the heart of the concept of minimum 
distortion of income and provided the conceptual underpinning for Cincinnati, New 
Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 569 (Ct. Cl. 1970) for 
its adoption of a minimum capitalization rule under the clear reflection of income 
standard. 
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currently the portion of its overhead expenses allocable to repair and 
maintenance personnel who during their spare time constructed, 
renovated, and repaired fixed assets used in its manufacturing 
operations.232 Fort Howard Paper was decided, however, prior to 
Idaho Power; and while employing a clear reflection of income 
analysis,233 it preceded that analysis with the background that the 
taxpayer had used the incremental method for thirty-five years and 
the Service had previously audited the taxpayer without objection to 
such method.234 
The reasoning of the Office of Chief Counsel in General Counsel 
Memorandum 38,788 ably considered the teaching of Idaho Power, 
Perlmutter, and Adolph Coors with respect to indirect costs and 
overhead regarding the construction or acquisition of tangibles. 235 It 
concluded that "[i]n each case the cost of doing the work or 
performing the contract included not only the direct costs of tools, 
supplies, materials and labor, but also all the indirect costs reasonably 
related or incidental to performance of the work or contract."236 
There is no sound policy-based reason looking solely at the origin 
of the claim and rule of tax parity doctrines to distinguish indirect 
costs and overhead incurred in creating or acquiring an intangible 
asset from such costs incurred in creating or acquiring a tangible 
asset.237 The possibility of a different result under a burden and 
232 The maJonty in Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 398 (2001) 
significantly pointed out that "[t]he Court expressed no opinion as to the fact that the 
taxpayer in the Idaho Power Co. case had been regularly and routinely improving its 
facilities throughout most of its long existence, nor that these improvements had for 
the most part been made by its employees." Id. 
233 Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. at 283-85. 
234 I d. at 282. 
235 Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,788 {Aug. 26, 1981). 
236 I d. at 29-3. 
237 David Lupi-Sher, Proposed IRS Capitalization Rules Raise Questions, 94 TAX 
NOTES 804, 807 (Feb. 18, 2002). According to law professor Martin McMahon, the 
"[i)nternal costs and external costs must be treated identically if they serve the same 
function." I d. McMahon further commented that 
"[i]n ignoring Idaho Power, the Eighth Circuit in Wells Fargo either totally 
misread settled law or was trying to create a distinction in the treatment of 
indirect costs of tangible assets on the one hand, and indirect costs of 
intangible assets and long-term benefits on the other hand. There is no 
sound basis for drawing such a distinction. Allowing a current deduction for 
internal costs that relate to the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset, 
whether tangible or intangible, or which produce an INDOPCO-like long-
term benefit, distorts the tax base and is contrary to the sound reasoning of 
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benefits of capitalization analysis is discussed below.238 
IV. BALANCING OF BURDENS AND BENEFITS OF CAPITALIZATION: 
ROUGH JUSTICE EXCEPTIONS TO FUTURE BENEFIT 
CAPITALIZATION 
A. Balancing of Burdens and Benefits of Capitalization: The 
Pragmatic Test 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner indicates that future benefits 
are a strong characteristic of a capital expenditure, but the case is not 
controlling insofar as an "incidental" future benefit may be currently 
deducted.239 Assistant Solicitor General Kent Jones, when arguing 
INCOPCO, advocated the use of a "pragmatic" test: "The test is a 
functional one of properly matching expenses with the years they 
benefit income, but it's a pragmatic test at the same time. It's not 
h d 240 pus e to extremes." 
The emerging standard, manifested in U.S. Freightways, suggests 
that expenses with future benefits should nevertheless be currently 
deducted where the burdens to the taxpayel41 of such capitalization 
!d. 
the Supreme Court in Idaho Power, as well as the deep theory behind 
Section 263A." 
238 See discussion infra Part VI. For the argument that burdens of capitalization 
can trump the rule of tax parity as well as future benefit see infra notes 576-77 and 
accompanying text. 
239 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1992). INDOPCO 
rejected the rule that an expenditure not creating or enhancing a separate asset was 
per se currently deductible in favor of a rule that an expenditure generating more 
than "incidental" future benefits should be capitalized in order to match the expense 
with such future benefits. The court capitalized the outside transaction costs (fees to 
investment bankers, attorneys, and accountants) paid by a corporation acquired in a 
friendly acquisition). 
240 United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, No. 90-1278, 1991 WL 636242, at *28 (Nov. 12, 1991); see also id. at 
*39. 
241 The emerging U.S. Freightways v. Commissioner standard would also assist 
the government in determining whether to contest the taxpayer's deduction of the 
expenditures in question. See John W. Lee et al., Capitalizing and Depreciating 
Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs: More-Trouble-Than-It's-Worth?, 17 VA. TAX 
REV. 161, 185-86 (1997) [hereinafter Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance] 
(citing the reasoning in General Counsel Memorandum 34,262 (Jan. 30, 1970)); 1993 
House Hearings, supra note 37 (the real concern with capitalization under INDOPCO 
should be avoiding litigation costs on both sides; I had in mind the pre-section 197 
morass as to amortizable purchased intangibles). See generally U.S. Freightways 
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outweigh "the gain in precision for the taxing authorities" of more 
exact matching from capitalization.242 The Seventh Circuit adopted 
just such an approach, agreeing with the Commissioner that 
the mere fact that certain expenditures recur does not negate 
the distorting effect of expensing that predictably occurred 
here- the interest-free government loan that comes from the 
deduction remains the same regardless of whether the ... 
expenses are unchanged throughout the corporate life of 
Freightways. 
But perfection is a lot to ask for, even in the 
administration of the tax laws, which we acknowledge 
endeavor "to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable 
period to which they are properly attributable, thereby 
resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax 
purposes." 
... [P]erfection in temporal matching comes at too high a 
price for these kinds of expenses. At some point the 
"administrative costs and conceptual rigor" of achieving a 
more perfect match become too great. Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 685 F.2d at 216. Here, there is a considerable 
administrative burden that Freightways and any similarly 
situated taxpayer will bear if it must always allocate one-year 
expenses to two tax years, year in and year out. It argues that 
the gain in precision for the taxing authorities is far 
outweighed by the administrative burden it will bear in 
performing this task. . . . The kind of change in the 
company's tax accounting system for which the Commissioner 
is arguing will impose an administrative burden regardless of 
the way its financial accounts are kept. 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001) 
242 U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1146 (arguing that the gain in precision for the 
taxing authorities from a more perfect matching of expense and income is outweighed 
by the administrative burden the taxpayer would bear in such matching); see Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 33,968 (Nov. 18, 1968) (advocating current deduction of writer's 
prepublication expenses, which, it reasoned, conceptually creates an intangible 
capitalizable under authorities such as Perlmutter, as an "administrative policy" based 
on the difficulty of allocating continuing, recurring overhead type expenses); Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 34,959 (July 2, 1972) (advocating a de minimis rule based on the clear 
reflection of income mandate of section 446); Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, 
at 679-80, 683 (cited by Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 
997 (1993) by Judge Tannenwald, one of the three judicial giants as to capitalization 
along with Justice Blackmun and Judge Posner). 
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We conclude that, for the particular kind of expenses at 
issue in this case -fixed, one-year items where the benefit will 
never extend beyond that term, that are ordinary, necessary, 
and recurring expenses of the business in question - the 
balance of factors under the statute and regulations cuts in 
favor of treating them as deductible expenses under I.R.C. § 
162(a).243 
323 
The Advance Notice commendably adopts a similar balancing test 
of whether the taxpayer's "administrative and record keeping costs 
associated with capitalization" outweigh "the potential distortion of 
income" from currently deducting such future benefit expenditures244 
as the basis for its rough justice rules. This test includes a twelve-
month limit and a de minimis rule in order "[t]o reduce the 
administrative and compliance costs associated with section 263(a)."245 
I have long advised just such a balancing test,246 which is now the 
conventional wisdom among many academics,247 former high tax 
243 U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1146-47 (citation omitted). 
244 The forthcoming notice relating to proposed rulemaking "will recognize that 
many expenditures that create or enhance intangible assets or benefits do not create 
the type of future benefits for which capitalization under section 263(a) is 
appropriate, particularly when the administrative and record keeping costs associated 
with capitalization are weighed against the potential distortion of income." Guidance 
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 
(Jan. 24, 2002); accord Susanne Pagano, New Rule Proposal to Reduce Uncertainty, 
Administrative Issues, Treasury Official Says, 14 BNA DAILY TAX REP., Jan. 22, 2002, 
at G-5 (Turgeon "said the proposal was an effort to balance competing tax policy 
goals of clear reflection of income and what is administrable."); see Brant Goldwyn, 
Treasury and IRS Seek to Issue Rules on Capitalization in 2002, 50 BNA DAILY TAX 
REP., Mar. 14, 2002, at G-9 ("Christine Turgeon, senior tax specialist in the Treasury 
Department's office of tax legislative counsel, said that the Treasury wants to balance 
the need for rules that clearly reflect income with the need to simplify tax 
administration and reduce the drag on IRS resources."). 
245 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. at 3462. 
246 We recommended to the Service such a balancing of burdens and benefits of 
capitalization approach in our response to Notice 96-27. See Lee et al., Rough Justice 
I, supra note 17, at 665; Lee et al., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1520. See 
generally, Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 180-82. 
Following the lead of Professor Alan Gunn, I have been advocating such a minimum 
distortion of income model for more than fifteen years. Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra 
note 10, at 13 & n.37. 
247 Although the courts and the IRS have rarely referred directly to 
administrative concerns, they should be considered relevant, perhaps 
determinative in many cases. For example, the reservations that some 
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administrators,248 courts on their own,249 and the Advance Notice. The 
courts have expressed about making significant future benefit a touchstone 
of capitalization likely reflect an unexpressed belief that this approach 
would extend capitalization to situations where the burden of separating 
capitalized costs from current costs would outweigh the benefits of greater 
accuracy in income measurement. 
Lokken, supra note 35, at 1363-65. 
[I]t may be harder to identify certain assets, assets of, say, short-term 
durability; and therefore, once we add administrative costs to the balance, 
we may be more justified in allowing expensing or a different treatment for 
short-term assets than for longer-lived assets. But that's why we have to 
think· about it - because of the high costs of identification rather than 
because of lower benefits to capitalization. We should care as much about 
getting it right for these short-term assets, capitalization is equally 
important. It's only a question of costs of identifying these things or getting 
them right that would make us have a different type of regime. 
Unofficial Transcript of Tax Simplification Conference, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 25, 
2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 17-37, <Jl<Jl 721-22) 
(statement of Professor David Weisbach); Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 48, 
54-55 (excellent analysis of political, administration, and theoretical factors; future 
benefit should not be allowed to prevail over the need for administrative feasibility 
and practicality) (Mr. Evans is currently in practice but was formerly an academic and 
before that served in the Treasury Department). 
248 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Gideon, Laurence Neal Woodworth Memorial Lecture 
(Nov. 6, 1998), reprinted in Kenneth W. Gideon, Tax Law Works Best When the Rules 
are Clear, 81 TAX NOTES 999, 1003 (Nov. 23, 1998), and in Kenneth W. Gideon, 
Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
101, 110 (1999). 
Any proposal to capitalize ought have to overcome a threshold showing that 
the increased revenue flow to the government from it is at least as great as 
the extra compliance costs imposed on the taxpayer. Note that the more 
intensive the special purpose record-keeping system required to implement 
a capitalization proposal, the more difficult it is to satisfy this criterion. 
ld. (former Chief Counsel and Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy); Unofficial 
Transcript of Tax Simplification Conference, supra note 247, <Jl<Jl 805-06 (comments of 
Jerry Cohen, former Chief Counsel); cf Harry L. Gutman, Reflections on the Process 
of Enacting Tax Law, Laurence Neal Woodworth Memorial Lecture, 26 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 183, 190 (2000) (proposing legislative rough justice solution of expenditure 
classes in a combination of a section 168 and 197 model which, although distorting 
"accurate periodic income measurement," is worthwhile where "the cost of measuring 
income accurately (even if we could) outweighs the benefits, in terms of compliance 
and other administrative costs, of a system that has struggled with, but has been 
unable, to determine, on an ad hoc basis, the appropriate tax treatment of these 
expenditures.") (former Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and 
Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel, who was present at the birth of both sections 195 
and 197). 
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Advance Notice's contemplated proposed safe harbors for current 
deduction of the costs of creating or acquiring intangibles produce less 
distortion of income than capitalization where no depreciation is 
available.250 This concept is also known as "perpetual 
capitalization."251 Even where available depreciation would more 
closely match the expense with future income, and if the distortion of 
income is minimal and the burden is heavy, a current deduction is in 
order as U.S. Freightways recognized.252 Such current deduction of 
future benefit expenditures may be viewed as rough justice or minimal 
distortion of income.253 
The rough justice balancing exceptions to future benefit 
capitalization manifest several patterns where a current deduction 
produces minimal distortion of income: (1) future benefits of not more 
than twelve months, i.e., overlapping two-tax years; (2) insubstantial 
costs or incidental future benefits; (3) short term or variable future 
benefits; ( 4) regularly recurring expenditures; (5) difficulty in 
allocating the expenditure between current and future benefits; (6) 
future benefits are speculative; or (7) capitalization and depreciation 
are more trouble than they are worth, as in income forecast 
depreciation for writer's prepublication costs.254 Often the rough 
justice exceptions rest on more than one of these factors. 
Additionally, where a capitalized expenditure is not depreciable, or is 
depreciable but only over a much longer period than its actual future 
benefit, a current deduction may produce less income distortion than 
capitalization with no or slow depreciation.255 Avoidance of both 
extremes and allowance of depreciation over some fixed period if the 
expenditure is substantial and not recurring over a relatively short 
period would be even better, as a policy matter, than a current 
deduction. 256 
249 U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1146, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
250 See infra notes 361-73 and accompanying text. 
251 See, e.g., Gideon, supra note 248 at 109 (noting that perpetual capitalization 
distorts the taxpayer's income); see also Martha Kessler, Parts of Coalition 
Capitalization Proposal May Be Overly Broad, Treasury Official Says, 205 BNA 
DAILY TAX REP., Oct. 25, 2001, at G-4 ("[M)any IRS agents have proposed 
adjustments to capitalize costs (often with no amortization) that taxpayers have 
historically deducted."). 
252 U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1146-47. 
253 See supra notes 220, 228, 243 and accompanying text. 
254 See Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 176-200. 
255 See infra notes 367-73 and accompanying text. 
256 See infra notes 383-87 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Twelve-Month Rule 
U.S. Freightwayi57 approved a current deduction under a not 
more than twelve-month life rule as to recurring costs of licenses and 
insurance, reasoning that the gain in precision for the taxing 
authorities from a more perfect matching of expense and income was 
outweighed by the administrative burden the taxpayer would bear in 
such matching. Similarly, the Advance Notice announced that the 
Treasury Department and the Service expect to propose a twelve-
month rule under which capitalization would not be required as to 
expenditures to create or acquire an intangible benefit unless its 
benefits "extend beyond the earlier of (i) twelve months after the first 
date on which the taxpayer realizes the rights or benefits attributable 
to the expenditure, or (ii) the end of the taxable year following the 
taxable year in which the expenditure is incurred."258 Earlier 
authorities had applied this rule to tangible property.259 The Office of 
Chief Counsel has acknowledged that this one-year life overlapping 
two tax years rule may result in some distortion of income, but some 
departure from a "strict reading of Section 263" is called for here,260 as 
it would result in a minimal distortion of income. The one-year rule 
"is a 'rule of reason' that is clearly reasonable under the circumstances 
involved."261 The Seventh Circuit in U.S. Freightways agreed with 
both points, as did the pre-INDOPCO Fourth Circuit panel opinion in 
NCNB Corp. v. Commissioner.262 
257 U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1146-47. 
258 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002); accord Lee et a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 
1522. 
259 Rev. Rul. 59-249, 1959-2 C.B. 55 (costs of tires and tubes on new equipment 
used in motor transportation currently deductible where used in tax year or average 
useful life is less than twelve months even though extends into next tax year). This 
Revenue Ruling was considered by Chief Counsel in General Counsel Memorandum 
33,370 (Nov. 10, 1966). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,618, at 2 n.3 (Jan. 23, 1981); 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,778 (Dec. 7, 1978). 
260 Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, at 25 (July 25, 1972). 
261 !d. 
262 [W]here an expenditure will take no more than a year to generate the 
matching income, it may nevertheless apply partly in the current year, partly 
in the next. Theoretically, the part attributable to the latter year should be 
capitalized. However, the tax treatment will then vary between taxpayers 
depending on the time of year when the expenditure is made. [One] who 
pays in January would usually have a tax advantage over [one] who pays 
later in the year. Since income distortion is unlikely to be great, as a 
recognition of greater simplicity and convenience for all, a slight deviation 
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C. The De Minimis Rule 
The Court of Claims (now Federal Circuit) in Cincinnati, New 
Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. United States 263 permitted current 
deduction of de minimis or insubstantial capital expenditures ($500) 
under a balancing tese64 much like that approved by U.S. Freightways 
and as applied in the Advance Notice.265 The Advance Notice 
announces that the proposed regulations are expected to provide "'de 
minimis rules,' under which certain types of expenditures less than a 
specified dollar amount are not required to be capitalized. "266 
Professor McMahon has "argued that there is no statutory foundation 
for a de minimis rule."267 The Treasury Department, however, has 
authority under the clear reflection of income mandate of section 446 
to permit a de minimis rule determined with a balancing of burdens 
and benefits standard,268 which the U.S. Freightways court effectively 
from completely accurate accounting principles is permitted and 
capitalization is not required. 
NCNB Corp. v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 942, 953 n.21 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter 
NCNB I], rev'd, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter NCNB II], overruled by 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). We have wondered whether 
INDOPCO's overturning of NCNB II revived NCNB I. See Lee eta!., Rough Justice 
I, supra note 17, at 636 n.8. 
263 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
264 Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for each 
item of property separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion of 
income is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so impracticable that it 
demands that nevertheless all items be accounted for individually, no matter 
what the trouble or the onus .... The burden on plaintiff, if the minimum 
rule is not to be followed for income tax purposes, would be heavy; at the 
same time, the clearer reflection of income would be exceedingly slight if 
there were any at all. 
Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 587. 
265 See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text; see also Goldwyn, supra note 
244 (Turgeon said de minimis rule "is a rule of administrative convenience and cannot 
necessarily be applied in other areas."). The case-law rule originated, however, in the 
context of acquisition costs of tangibles. 
266 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002); see also Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra 
note 241, at 193-94; Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 680; Lee eta!., Rough 
Justice II, supra note 25, at 1523-27. 
267 Lupi-Sher, supra note 237, at 807 (according to law professor Martin 
McMahon, "[i]f Congress had to create de minimis expensing of tangible assets, it's up 
to Congress, not the Treasury, to create de minimis expensing of intangible assets"). 
268 See Lee et a!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 180-82; 
Lee eta!., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 689 n.235, 708; Lee eta!., Rough Justice 
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confirmed by espousing a one-year rule under a burdens and benefits 
balancing test.269 Recent Revenue Procedure 2002-2i70 similarly 
based a safe harbor accounting method for tires on commercial 
vehicles on (1) the Commissioner's "broad authority to determine 
whether a method of accounting clearly reflects income," and (2) the 
administrative convenience of minimizing disputes over useful lives of 
original and replacement tires.271 
II, supra note 25, at 1523-27. Both sources cite General Counsel Memorandum 34,959 
(July 25, 1972), where relying on Cincinnati, Chief Counsel advocated a de minimis 
rule: 
We recognize that by regulations and longstanding ruling practice the 
Service has definitely limited the Commissioner's discretion in this area. 
However, we are unaware of any such limits that would prevent the exercise 
of the discretion we now propose. As we suggested in [General Counsel 
Memorandum] 34,547, pp. 9-12, we believe section 461 gives the 
Commissioner authority to direct the timing of deductions in a manner that 
will clearly reflect income. Although the exercise of this authority has 
generally been aimed at proscribing methods that fail to clearly reflect 
income, there is little doubt that it is broad enough to permit the recognition 
of additional methods that allow a clear reflection of income, even though 
such methods may appear to be a variance with a narrow interpretation of 
specific language of the Code. 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, at 13-14 (July 25, 1972); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784, 
at 45 (Mar. 28, 1968) (noting that "expenditures can not be currently deducted if they 
are expected to contribute more than incidentally to the realization of income in 
subsequent taxable years."). 
269 s ee supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text. 
270 Rev. Proc. 2002-27,2002-17 I.R.B. 802. 
271 As we suggested (Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 709-10; Lee et 
al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 182-86, 189; Rev. Proc. 2002-
27, 2002-17 I.R.B. 802), the rough justice Original Tire Capitalization Method 
(OTCM) for tires on business vehicles was based upon the Commissioner's section 
446(b) "broad authority to determine whether a method of accounting does not 
clearly reflect income." Rev. Proc. 2002-27, § 2.04. The procedure justified the result 
(a) capitalize original tires and depreciate over same MACRS recovery period as the 
vehicle and (b) replacement tires may be currently deducted, as an administrative 
rule, i.e., "to minimize disputes regarding the useful lives of original tires and 
replacement tires." Rev. Proc. 2002-27, § 2.06. In addition to administrative 
convenience, several safe harbor factors were probably present. See infra notes 321-
22 and accompanying text. Capitalization of the cost of the original tires and 
depreciation over the recovery period for the vehicle is similar to composite 
depreciation; separate deduction of the original tires is similar to component 
depreciation. Component depreciation is barred under MACRS. STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE "JOB 
CREATION AND WORKER ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2002, at 25 n.38 (Joint Comm. Print 
2002). 
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Incidentally, the suggested $5000 de m1mm1s amoune72 for 
intangibles is more or less equal to the 1940 $500 de minimis rule 
approved in Cincinnati when adjusted for current cost of living 
increases.273 Applying the $5000 de minimis amount to tangibles274 
would, however, overlap section 179 and, depending on how the de 
minimis rule was applied in the aggregate, likely bypass its ceiling 
restrictions. If a ceiling amount of de minimis expenses or threshold 
approach were taken, a handy model based on section 179 would be a 
$25,000 annual cap on expenditures each not exceeding $5000, or 
stretching, perhaps a $200,000 limit.275 This would, of course, 
effectively limit the benefits of this minimum expense rule to small-
income taxpayers. 
General Motors advocates, not as comments on the Advance 
Notice but instead as items that should be included in the 2002-03 
"guidance priority" list, the use of an elective nominal asset value 
current tax deduction rule to the extent assets (implicitly including 
tangibles) are expensed for financial accounting purposes.276 This 
approach would bypass any de minimis dollar amount such as $5000, 
as well as any aggregate limitations on de minimis deductions that 
might be proposed. The General Motors proposal would further 
obviate case law limitation of a de minimis rule based on Cincinnati 
where the amounts in the aggregate are insubstantial compared to 
gross and net income and depreciation.277 With respect to tangible 
assets, General Motors' book expensing rule would similarly bypass 
the ceilings under section 179 as to additional first year depreciation.278 
272 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3462, 3463 (Jan. 24, 2002). 
273 Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. V. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 572 
(Ct. Cl. 1970). The Consumer Price Index has increased 12.82 times from 1940 to 
2002. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Consumer Price Index Calculator, at 
http://woodrow.mpls. frb.fed.us/research/data/us/calc (last visited Dec. 12, 2002). 
274 See supra note 267 for the implication that a de minimis rule would not be 
applicable to so-called tangibles. 
275 Section 179 provides for elective expensing of the cost of depreciable property 
purchased for use in the active conduct of a trade or business up to $25,000 in 
aggregate (for tax years beginning on or after 2003 and $24,000 for tax years 
beginning in 2002). The deduction, however, is phased out dollar for dollar by the 
amount such expenditures exceed $200,000. 
276 General Motors Asks for Safe Harbor Guidance on 2002-03 Guidance Priority 
List, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 21, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 
2002 TNT 98-20). 
277 See Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 572. 
278 See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, this book expensing rule would conflict with section 263A 
with respect to the capitalization of indirect costs and as to production 
or acquisition of tangible property.279 It is unlikely that Congress 
would have intended these results. 
Public Choice analysis280 calls into question the financial 
expensing approach that General Motors proposes insofar as the 
General Motors method would extend a section 179 preference for 
extra depreciation to some taxpayers and the section 263A exceptions 
to other taxpayers. Public Choice would view the section 179 
deduction and the exceptions under section 263A as tax expenditures 
granted by Congress largely to small business taxpayers. Courts and 
administrators must effectuate strictly the terms of such agreements, 
but should not extend the tax preferences to classes of taxpayers not 
covered by the Congressional agreement according to the Public 
Choice idea of Devil's Obligation.281 
Commentators on the Advance Notice, as usual,282 often took 
positions reflecting their particular circumstances; for instance, some 
worried that a de minimis rule would act as a ceiling on the amount of 
future benefit expenditures that could be currently deducted.283 Other 
279 Section 263A provides for the capitalization and inclusion in inventory costs 
of certain direct and indirect costs of acquisition of property for resale or creation of 
property by larger taxpayers. See infra note 582. 
280 Public Choice theory views some legislation as a private contract between 
legislators seeking to retain their seats and private interests. See Lee et al., 
Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 206-07. 
281 Where the fact-finder (i.e., the Service in rulings and the courts in litigated 
cases) can determine that a particular tax provision is the product of private 
compromise and that it produces asymmetrical benefits, as is the case with respect to 
simplified expensing and uniform capitalization lives, the terms of the statutory 
contract should not be extended to other similar tax items. Rather, taxpayers are 
entitled to the preferences that Congress explicitly awards by relying on form even in 
cases where there is little or no economic substance apart from such tax preferences; 
this is the Devil's Obligation. See Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra 
note 241, at 207-08. I believe that this idea supports the Tax Court's statutory tax 
shelter rather than the generic tax shelter doctrine (as articulated in Rose v. 
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386 (1987), affd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 
1989)). For an excellent discussion of the generic tax shelter test, see Note, The Tax 
Court's Rose Test: More Thorns in the Sides of Taxpayers, 8 VA. TAX REV. 905 (1989). 
I also believe the notion of Congressionally intended subsidy underlies certain 
administrative practices. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112. This Revenue 
Ruling was considered by Chief Counsel in General Counsel Memorandum 38,117 
(Sept. 28, 1979). 
282 See Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 667-68 n.122. 
283 Though many of the costs associated with making certain types of loans 
may fall within the suggested threshold of $5,000, the ABA [American 
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commentators suggested a $10,000 ceiling,284 or that any ceiling take 
into account the taxpayer's size.285 On the other hand, some 
commentators suggested that there be no ceiling to the extent that 
expensing was permitted under a taxpayer's financial accounting 
method.286 Almost all commentators opposed any ceiling applied on 
Bankers Association] is concerned that the underlying basis for allowing a 
current deduction for loan origination costs has been overlooked. We 
support the added administrative convenience of knowing a threshold safe-
harbor may be available, provided such de minimis amount is applied to 
loan costs on a transactional basis. However, we continue to maintain that 
the historic tax treatment of loan origination costs as "ordinary and 
necessary" business expenses under IRC Section 162(a) must be preserved 
in future regulatory guidance. Therefore, it should be acknowledged in 
future guidance that "regular and recurring" loan costs that exceed any 
threshold amount are not subject to the general rule requiring 
capitalization. 
Mark R. Baran, Bankers Association Offers Suggestions for Rules on Capitalizing 
Costs of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 5, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT 
file, elec. cit. 2002 TNT 66-26, <Jl 8). 
284 Pamela J. Pecarich, A/CPA Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on 
Capitalizing Expenditures, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX 
lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 96-18, <Jl 24) (recommending that "the de minimis 
threshold dollar amount be increased to $10,000, and that the threshold be applied on 
a transaction-by-transaction basis."). 
285 Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., INDOPCO Submits Additional Comments on Proposed 
Capitalization Regs, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 25, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT 
file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 80-38, <Jl 5) ("We agree that the regulations should provide a 
de minimis exception of at least $5,000, and encourage the IRS and Treasury to 
provide a higher threshold amount for larger taxpayers."). Compare Fred Goldberg's 
comment with the following statement by Stephen Elkins: 
No matter how diligently a taxpayer seeks to comply perfectly with the tax 
laws, it may be impossible accurately to capture and to analyze costs 
incurred daily and in the ordinary course by the various operations of a 
large company. Such costs (i) may or may not create or enhance intangible 
assets with respect to which capitalization under Section 263(a) is 
appropriate, (ii) relate to transactions that may or may not be 
consummated, (iii) may or may not result in an assets right that lasts beyond 
the end of next year, (iv) may or may not be de minimis individually or in 
the aggregate, and, (v) may or may not be regular and recurring. 
Stephen Elkins, Writers Comment on Proposed Regs on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of 
Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 23, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, 
elec. cit., 2002 TNT 78-23, <Jl22). 
286 Scott Cahill, Organization [National Retail Federation] Seeks Clarification of 
Deductible Expenses, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 96-33). Conversely, many commentators opposed book 
conformity as a limitation on a current deduction but wanted its availability as a floor. 
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an aggregate basis.287 Allowing expensing of costs incurred in 
connection with intangibles that would otherwise be capitalized if 
incurred in connection with tangibles presumably would create 
economic inefficiencies between the costs of acquiring or enhancing 
tangibles and intangibles.288 The Service and the Treasury 
Department have thus requested comments on this problem: 
The IRS and Treasury Department request comments on how 
expenditures should be aggregated for purposes of applying 
the de minimis exception, whether the de minimis exception 
should allow a deduction for the threshold amount where the 
aggregate transaction costs exceed the threshold amount, and 
Financial, regulatory, and tax reporting have different objectives when 
measuring the recognition of income and expense and, as a result, 
frequently adopt differing standards. As a result, TEl recommends against 
prescribing a standard rule of capitalization whereby a taxpayer's income 
for tax purposes is determined by reference to financial or regulatory 
accounting methods. There may be limited circumstances, however, where, 
as a matter of administrative convenience, the taxpayer's financial or 
regulatory accounting method can serve as a reasonable proxy for an 
income tax accounting method (e.g., a de minimis expenditure rule for 
tangible or intangible assets otherwise subject to capitalization). 
Robert L. Ashby, TEl Suggests Changes to Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, 
TAX NOTES TODAY (May 15, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 
TNT 94-26, 'II 39); INDOPCO Submits Additional Comments on Proposed 
Capitalization Regs, TAX NOTES TODAY (April 25, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 80-38, 'II 31); Victor Gomperts, Organizations Comment 
on Possible Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 2, 
2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 115-52, 'II 8); Companies 
Suggest Changes to Proposed Regs on Capitalization of Intangible Assets, TAX NOTES 
TODAY (June 14, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 115-53, 
'11'11 6, 8); Charlotte M. Bahin, [American Community Bankers] Says Loan Origination 
Costs Should Be Deductible, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 8, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX 
lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 89-26, 'II 18); Mark R. Barkan, Bankers Association 
Offers Suggestions for Rules on Capitalizing Costs of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Apr. 5, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 66-26, 'II 15). 
287 PricewaterhouseCoopers Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on Intangible 
Asset Capitalization, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 30, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT 
file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 83-18); Bankers Association Offers Suggestions for Rules on 
Capitalizing Costs of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 5, 2002) (LEXIS, 
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 66-26); Thomas E. Wheeler, CTIA 
Suggests Changes to Proposed Guidance on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, 
TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 29, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 
TNT 61-23). 
288 Cf. supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
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whether there are certain expenditures for which the de 
minimis exception should not apply (e.g., commissions).289 
333 
The Tax Court decision in Alacare Home Health Services, Inc. v. 
Commissionel}() contains the seeds for an administrable approach to 
de minimis expenses in the aggregate. In that case, the taxpayer, a 
Medicare-certified home health care provider, expensed all capital 
items for which it paid less than $500 in compliance with guidelines in 
the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual.291 The Tax Court 
held that this method of accounting did not clearly reflect the 
taxpayer's income and distinguished Cincinnati on the grounds that 
the ratios of disputed items to various measures of the taxpayer's size 
were substantially larger than in Cincinnati. 292 The Tax Court also 
compared the disputed items to its gross receipts and to its operating 
expenses and found that the ratios were much higher than in 
Cincinnati.293 Alacare Home Health Services thus suggests that an 
aggregate ceiling be imposed on de minimis expenditures. Some 
possibilities are 15% of depreciation, 15% of assets on hand at the end 
of the year, some percentage of net profits, or a lower percentage of 
gross revenues. The Office of Chief Counsef94 similarly suggested a 
percentage of net or gross income ceiling or industry-wide guidelines. 
The Service, while recommending against requesting certiorari in 
Cincinnati, still took the position that "if in a case it is found that the 
taxpayer's 'minimum capitalization' rule for financial purposes is 
unreasonably high, so that use of that rule for tax purposes would 
produce a definite and substantial reduction of taxpayer's income, the 
289 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3462,3464 (Jan. 24, 200). See infra p. 360. 
290 2001 T.C.M. (CCH) 1794 (2001). 
291 /d. at 1795-96. 
292 For example, in Cincinnati, the taxpayer's disputed items were less than 
one percent of the taxpayer's net income in the 3 years at issue, see 
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d at 
571; in the instant case, the disputed items were 165 percent of petitioner's 
1995 taxable income and 83.5 percent of its 1996 taxable income. In 
Cincinnati, the taxpayer's disputed items were less than 2 percent of its total 
deduction for depreciation for the years in issue; in contrast, petitioner's 
disputed items were 288 percent and 189 percent of its total depreciation 
deduction for 1995 and 1996. 
/d. at 1798. 
293 The taxpayer's ratios of "de minimis" items to its gross receipts were ten to 
twenty-eight times larger than those in Cincinnati; the ratios of "de minimis" items to 
its operating expenses were fourteen to 112 times larger than those in Cincinnati. /d. 
294 Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, at 31-33 (July 25, 1972). 
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issue will be raised. "295 
D. Short- Term or Variable Benefit 
The Advance Notice makes no reference to a safe harbor for 
short-lived assets lasting more than twelve months; however, the 
notion that current deduction of short-lived and recurring assets 
produces minimal distortion of income had pre-INDOPCO case law 
support and is a key concept to defensibly currently deducting certain 
transactions costs. One such pre-INDOPCO case is Iowa-Des Moines 
National Bank v. Commissioner,296 which, in allowing a current 
deduction for purchased credit information, emphasized that such 
information was short-lived and subject to sudden change.297 These 
characteristics would preclude depreciation under the certainty 
requirement for intangibles. The Court of Claims applied similar 
reasoning in Southland Royalty Co. v. United States,298 in finding that 
capitalization without amortization resulted in both distortion of 
income and hardship to the taxpayer. Since the asset, an oil and gas 
survey, had an unpredictable and variable life, and therefore 
amortization was unavailable, a clear reflection of income required a 
current deduction of the survey costs. This suggests that Lychuk v. 
Commissioner was incorrect in requiring capitalization of regularly 
recurring origination costs of automobile loans that had an average 
duration of less than twenty-four months and were rather uncertain 
since made to high credit risk car buyers.299 Regularly recurring costs 
295 A.O.D. 1977-97 (July 15, 1977). 
296 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979). 
297 Any credit information is short-lived and subject to sudden change. 
Thus, credit information must be current to be valuable and the taxpayers 
soon had a history of who did or did not pay the credit card charges. This 
new information was far more useful to taxpayers than the information 
purchased with the payments in dispute here. The fact that there may be 
some ensuing benefit and future effect from the expenditure beyond the 
taxable year when paid is not controlling. Where the prospective benefit is 
very slight, capitalization is not easily supported. 
/d. at 436 (citation omitted). 
298 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
299 See 116 T.C. 374, 376 (2001) (holding that overhead expenses were currently 
deductible because they were indirectly related to acquisition of loans which the 
taxpayer then serviced, and hence provided only incidental future benefits; salaries to 
the extent allocable to the 60% of loan applications which the company rejected were 
currently deductible; 40% of salaries allocable to the loans that the company reviewed 
and accepted had to be capitalized). The average lives of accepted car loans were 17.5 
months and 19.5 months for the tax years at issue. /d. at 420 n.1 (Swift, J., concurring 
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of intangibles, such as those on at least a two- or three-year cycle, 
should be currently deductible. In the context of repairs to tangible 
assets, the Tax Court in Ingram Industries, Inc. v. Commissione/00 
permitted current deduction of insubstantial costs of inspecting tow 
boat engines recurring on a three-year cycle when the tow boats were 
still operable. This might suggest that the costs of making a repair on 
a three-year cycle should be currently deductible at least where they 
amount to less than a specified percentage of the value of a 
reconditioned item.301 
Similar to Southland Royalty's notion that current deductibility of 
survey costs, rather than amortization, is appropriate where an asset 
has an unpredictable and variable life,302 General Counsel 
Memorandum 33,784,303 in considering Revenue Ruling 68-561,304 
mostly to show that PNC Bancorp erred in its reasoning). 
300 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 532 (2000). 
301 [I]f the cost of a used towboat (approximately $2 million) is used, the 
cost-to-maintenance ratio would be 5 percent ($100,000 divided by $2 
million). If the cost of new engines is used ($1.5 million) the ratio would 
increase to almost 7 percent ($100,000 divided by $1.5 million). Finally, if 
the cost of a [sic] completely overhauled or rebuilt engines is used 
($600,000), the ratio would be almost 17 percent ($100,000 divided by 
600,000). Ultimately, the difference between the cost of the procedures to 
maintain ($100,000) and the cost of completely overhauled or rebuilt 
engines ($600,000) is more telling. Plus, there is also the extra cost of 
removal, installation, and refitting a new or rebuilt engine. 
Id. at 539 n.7. Compare id., with Vanalco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 
251 (1999), affd sub nom. Smith v. Commissioner, 300 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2002). In 
Vanalco, the parties stipulated that the recovery period for "repairs" made every 
three years in replacing bricks in walls of aluminum ore reduction cells was three 
years. The Tax Court required capitalization under the general plan of rehabilitation 
doctrine where the brick replacement costs amounted to 22% of the costs of a 
reconditioned cell. Id. at 256 n.8. The difference between the 17% of reconditioned 
value cost of the repair in Ingram Industries and the 22% cost in Vanalco does not 
seem material. The Ninth Circuit in affirming the Tax Court on this issue did not 
discuss the general plan of rehabilitation, notwithstanding doing so as to another 
issue. 
302 The useful life of the survey is very uncertain; as the trial judge found, 
the estimates in a reserve study are subject to change at any time and have 
to be updated every few years to take account of subsequent developments. 
In those circumstances, it is not compulsory to amortize such a recurring 
item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it appropriate to require 
capitalization without amortization; such a requirement would clearly 
distort Southland's income. 
582 F.2d at 618. See generally Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 680; Lee et 
a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1527-28. 
303 Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (Mar. 29, 1968) (explaining that promotional 
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reasoned that the difficulty in determining the usefui life of 
intangibles created by salaries paid to employees conducting 
promotions supported a current deduction.305 This reasoning is a 
critical component of the balancing of burdens and benefits analysis of 
inside transaction costs. 
E. Regularly Recurring 
The Service and the Treasury Department are also considering 
additional administrative relief, for example, by providing a "regular 
and recurring rule," under which transaction costs incurred in 
transactions that occur on a regular and recurring basis in the routine 
operation of a taxpayer's trade or business are not required to be 
capitalized.306 The Advance Notice raises another aspect of this issue: 
The IRS and Treasury Department are considering 
alternative approaches to minimize uncertainty and to ease 
the administrative burden of accounting for transaction costs. 
For example, the rules could allow a deduction for all 
employee compensation (including bonuses and commissions 
that are paid with respect to the transaction), be based on 
whether the transaction is regular or recurring, or follow the 
financial or regulatory accounting treatment of the 
transaction. The IRS and Treasury Department request 
comments on whether the recurring or nonrecurring nature of 
a transaction is an appropriate consideration in determining 
whether an expenditure to facilitate the transaction must be 
capitalized under section 263(a) and, if so, what criteria 
should be applied in distinguishing between recurring and 
nonrecurring transactions. In addition, the IRS and Treasury 
Department request comments on whether a taxpayer's 
treatment of transaction costs for financial or regulatory 
accounting purposes should be taken into account when 
payments produce less speculative future benefits than ordinary advertising because 
acquisition of new customers can be attributed directly to particular expenditures; 
depreciation allowed over the life of the constructed building). 
304 1968-2 C. B. 117 (determining that cash allowances made to construct all gas 
homes or to convert heating systems to gas result in future benefits through increased 
sales of gas as a result of obtaining new customers; salaries and advertising are less 
directly and significantly productive of future benefits). 
305 Cf infra notes 354-57 and accompanying text. 
306 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002). 
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developing simplifying assumptions.307 
Minimal distortion of income is produced by the current 
deduction of an expenditure with future benefits where the 
expenditure recurs regularly or annually in roughly equivalent 
amounts as illustrated by Judge Posner in Encyclopaedia Britannica v. 
Commissioner: 
We can think of a practical reason for allowing authors to 
deduct their expenses immediately, one applicable as well to 
publishers though not in the circumstances of the present 
case. If you are in the business of producing a series of assets 
that will yield income over a period of years - which is the 
situation of most authors and all publishers - identifying 
particular expenditures with particular books, a necessary 
step for proper capitalization because the useful lives of the 
books will not be the same, may be very difficult, since the 
expenditures of an author or publisher (more clearly the 
latter) tend to be joint among several books. Moreover, 
allocating these expenditures among the different books is 
not always necessary to produce the temporal matching of 
income and expenditures that the Code desiderates, because 
the taxable income of the author or publisher who is in a 
steady state (that is, whose output is neither increasing nor 
decreasing) will be at least approximately the same whether 
his costs are expensed or capitalized. Not the same on any 
given book - on each book expenses and receipts will be 
systematically mismatched- but the same on average. Under 
these conditions the benefits of capitalization are unlikely to 
exceed the accounting and other administrative costs entailed 
in capitalization.308 
Judge Posner noted a further distinction between recurring and 
nonrecurring expenses in Encyclopaedia Britannica. If one really 
takes seriously the concept of a capital expenditure as anything that 
yields income, actual or imputed, beyond the period in which the 
expenditure is made (conventionally one year),309 the result will be to 
force the capitalization of virtually every business expense. Judge 
307 !d. at 3464. 
308 Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1982). 
309 See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (lOth Cir. 1968). 
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Posner noted that this is a result courts naturally avoid.310 Such an 
approach would require capitalizing every salesman's salary since such 
selling activities create goodwill for the company and goodwill is an 
asset yielding income beyond the year in which the salary expense is 
incurred. Judge Posner remarked that the distinction between 
recurring and nonrecurring business expenses provides a very crude, 
but perhaps serviceable, demarcation between those capital 
expenditures that can be feasibly capitalized and those that cannot be. 
The Service frequently has used this recurring analysis in Private 
Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda.311 Moreover, U.S. 
Freightwayi12 approvingly cites Britannica for a regular and recurring 
exception to future benefit capitalization as well as its conceptual 
rigor point: 
Recurrent expenses are more likely to be ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. . . . Because they recur every 
year, there is less distorting effect on income from future tax 
year benefits over time. In every year, that is, while 
Freightways will be able to reap the tax advantage of 
deduction for some part of the following twelve months, it 
will have "lost" the deductions for the months covered by the 
prior year's licenses, for which it has already received the 
benefit. In a hypothetical last year of Freightways' corporate 
life, it would finally be entitled to only a prorated deduction 
for licenses (if any) that are acquired during that year, 
partially evening out the score with the first year of 
d d . 313 e uct10ns. 
As we pointed out in our article, 
310 ( • See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 2d Or. 
1973). 
311 See Lee et al., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1530-32. 
312 U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001). In 
U.S. Freightways, 46% of the expenditures for assets purchased in the current tax year 
benefited the taxpayer in the current year and 54% benefited the next tax year. The 
Commissioner proposed capitalization and permitted ratable deduction of the 
current year's expenditure between the current and next tax year. The Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that such expenditures benefit only the current and next tax years 
because "they recur with clockwork regularity" due to the strict twelve-month life of 
the annual permits, licenses, significant annual fees, and insurance premiums at issue. 
Thus, the expenditures lack the "permanence" necessary to constitute a "permanent 
improvement or betterment," the prerequisite for capitalization under section 263 or 
under section 162 as not "ordinary." !d. at 1144-45. 
313 !d. at 1145. 
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[r]ecurring payments alone may not justify an immediate 
deduction when the benefits obtained from the expenditures 
lack a similar recurring pattern. If a substantial useful life 
remains when the taxpayer next incurs the recurring expense, 
the recurring expense is not incidental. The objective of 
minimizing income distortion seeks to match expenses with 
the income they produce. Mismatching occurs when 
expenditures of a fairly constant amount produce benefits 
that are disproportionally realized in future years: immediate 
deductions understate income in early years when the 
benefits occur in later years. In these situations, the duration 
of the future benefits properly requires taxpayers to consider 
capitalizing the costs as directed by INDOPC0.314 
339 
Significantly, the Office of Chief Counsel has linked a de minimis 
rule with recurring items.315 It also reasoned that "[i]t is clearly within 
the Commissioner's discretion under section 446(b) to allow 
expensing of such items as long as income is clearly reflected under 
such method."316 Similarly, in advising an administrative rule to allow 
a current deduction of a writer's prepublication costs of a "continuing 
nature," the Office of Chief Counsel recommended that such 
deduction should only "be allowed for expenses of a recurring nature, 
such as rent, secretarial salaries or writing supplies. "317 The primary 
basis for the recommendation to allow a current deduction of a 
writer's recurring prepublication costs was the difficulty of allocation 
and the use of a "rather complex cost accounting system, based on 
careful records of time spent on various projects."318 
This reading of section 446319 and the Commissioner's broad 
discretion in determining whether the taxpayer's method of 
accounting for an item clearly reflects income reappears in Revenue 
Procedure 2002-27,320 which also involves recurring items. Revenue 
Procedure 2002-27 provides an optional safe harbor,321 the "Original 
314 Lee et a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1539-40. 
315 Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, at 26 (July 25, 1972) ("We believe that the Service 
is not inalterably bound to abide by a strict capitalization rule when dealing with 
minor, recurring-type small items."). 
316 !d. 
317 Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968, at 10 (Nov. 18, 1968). 
318 !d. at 8; see discussion infra Part IV.F. 
319 ( ) See I.R.C. § 446 b . 
320 2002-17 I.R.B. 802. 
ill h Taxpayers not so electing are to be taxed under the tax common law, whic 
requires capitalization of new and replacement truck tires with useful lives longer 
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Tire Capitalization Method," under which the original tires on certain 
business vehicles322 are capitalized and depreciated over the same 
recovery period and at the same rate as the "qualifying vehicle;" 
replacement tires are currently deductible. The revenue procedure 
justifies this two-part rule, pursuant to the Commissioner's broad 
authority to determine whether a method of tax accounting clearly 
reflects income/23 on the basis of administrative convenience - "[t]o 
minimize disputes regarding the useful lives of original tires and 
replacement tires for certain vehicles. "324 The two-part rule could, 
however, be justified upon the rough justice factors of regularly 
• 
325 1 h . bl 1' 326 d h recurnng, apparent y s ort or vana e term 1ves, an per aps 
insubstantial in amoune27 compared to the total value of truck, trailer, 
or tractor. The Service should issue a revenue ruling grounded in 
these principles and referring to Revenue Procedure 2002-27. The 
proposed regulations should, in turn, follow such Revenue Ruling. 
Commentators Evans and Gallagher advise against a steady state 
recurring rule due to the permanent deferral of tax,328 the same point 
329 • 330 
made by Professors Larry Lokken and earher by Cal Johnson. 
than one year as separate assets. Id. 'll 4.02; see also 2001 FSA LEXIS 26 (Jan. 30, 
2001) (stating that despite taxpayer's contention that "tires and tubes are rapidly 
consumable separate assets[, t ]he Service believes that its ongoing factual 
development will show that Taxpayer's tires and tubes last several years", and 
concluding that "[i]f the factual development indicates that the tires and tubes at issue 
have a useful life of more than one year, the cost of the tires and tubes must be 
capitalized and recovered through depreciation."). 
322 Light and heavy general-purpose trucks, tractor units for use over-the-road, 
trailers and trailer-mounted containers, etc. See Rev. Proc. 2002-27, <J[ 3.01; Rev. Proc. 
87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, <J[<J[ 00.242, 00.26, 00.27. 
323 See Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 187-88; 
Lee et a!., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 708-12. 
324 Rev. Proc. 2002-27, <J[ 2.06. Administrative convenience also supports the 
allowance in Revenue Procedure 2001-10, 2001-2 I.R.B. 272, for "small taxpayers" 
with average gross receipts of $1 million or less to use the cash method of tax 
accounting rather than the accrual method while maintaining inventories or supplies 
that are not incidental. 
325 d . See supra notes 308-17 an accompanymg text. 
326 See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text. 
m d . See supra notes 264, 266 an accompanymg text. 
328 Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 63. Judge Posner, however, pointed out 
that where a taxpayer's income is in a steady state, i.e., output is neither increasing 
nor decreasing, his taxable income will be approximately the same whether recurring 
expenses are capitalized or expensed. See supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
The burdens of capitalization in such circumstances outweigh the benefits, although 
technically some distortion of income occurs. 
329 Lokken, supra note 35, at 1363. 
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Specifically, Evans and Gallagher argue that recurring expenses make 
it "worthwhile to incur the expense of accurate precise accounting for 
the items correctly."331 Such permanent deferral is real, but the 
Seventh Circuit pointed out in U.S. Freightways that permanent 
deferral always arises with the current deduction of recurring 
expenses.332 The only difference between a twelve-month rule and a 
recurring rule is the duration of the deferral. The fundamental issue 
still is whether the administrative burdens of capitalization outweigh 
the benefits of conceptual rigor. While a steady state recurring might 
provide an incentive to the taxpayer to keep track of exact matching, 
review courts may be more likely to reverse capitalization. Thus, the 
administrative burden on the Service is increased, not decreased, by 
recurring expenses, as may be seen in the case of replacement truck 
tires.333 
Heather Malloy, Associate Chief Counsel, Income Tax and 
Accounting, has pointed out a perceived difficulty with a regular and 
recurring costs exception: "the Service's goal was to eliminate 
controversy, not to move the debate to a different issue."334 In other 
words, the Service should not move the question from whether a cost 
should be capitalized to whether the cost is regular and recurring. 
Andrew Keyso, in the same division, added that the Service has not 
been able to come up with a bright-iine rule.335 One solution would be 
to allow a current deduction when the recurrence cycle is up to three 
years/36 and particularly where it is annually recurring in the 
33
° Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1019, 1072-77 (1989) (criticizing "steady state fallacy"). 
331 Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 51. 
332 U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
333 See supra notes 321-24 and accompanying text. 
334 Jon Almeras, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Officials Talk Capitalization and 
Lease Stripping, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 13, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, 
elec. cit., 2002 TNT 92-21). 
335 See id. 
336 The Service in private rulings has permitted a current deduction for expenses 
recurring every two years. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996) (the 
current deduction by the taxpayer of the cost of minor repairs routinely performed by 
the taxpayer every one or two years "has not been raised by the agent in the present 
case"). In addition, the Service once suggested that a current deduction for expenses 
recurring every year in the aggregate but on a three-year cycle as to the particular 
item, as in annual dredging one-third of a harbor, was easier administratively than 
capitalization with subsequent depreciation over a three-year period. See Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 34,102 (Apr. 17. 1969) (whether such dredging benefited prior three 
years or future years "conjures visions in legalistic semantics"). This also suggests a 
342 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 22:273 
aggregate, and to capitalize with subsequent depreciation over the 
entire recurrence cycle when the cycle is more than three years.337 
Under the suggested approach, the short and variable lives of the 
high-risk auto loans in Lychue38 imply that capitalizing a small part of 
the loan review employees' compensation in proportion to the 
percentage of loans approved was incorrect on the facts, since the 
acquired automobile loans had an average duration of less than 
twenty-four months and were uncertain since the loans were made to 
high credit risk car buyers. Transaction costs and other indirect costs 
of acquiring or enhancing intangible assets, such as the Lychuk loans, 
should be currently deductible when the costs are regularly recurring 
over cycles of either twenty-four or thirty-six months. If the cycle is 
longer, then the costs could be treated as a deferred charge or 
intangible depreciable ratably over the cycle, as in Wolfsen Land & 
Clc C .. 339 att e o. v. ommzsswner. 
As an alternative to amortization over the recurrence period of 
three years or more, a "sliding scale" amortization schedule might be 
easier to administer. One approach would be a current deduction if 
the estimated useful life of the asset is two years or less; if the 
estimated useful life or the ACRS class life is three years, there should 
be 50%, 25%, and 25% deductions for tax years one, two, and three,340 
respectively; for four years, deductions of 50%, 30%, 15%, and 5%; 
and for five years or longer, deductions of 45%, 35%, 10%, 5%, and 
5% should be taken. Under this approach, there would be no legal 
question as to whether an expenditure was sufficiently regular and 
recurring as to be currently deductible. Instead, there would be a 
factual question as to the duration of the recurrence cycle or the year 
under the sliding scale in the case at hand. 
better rationale for the result in Ingram Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 532 (2000). See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
337 Lee et a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1543-56. I would not require the 
first expenditure in an: expected three-year cycle to be capitalized on the grounds that 
it is not yet recurring. Glenn Walberg points out that otherwise the taxpayer might be 
required to change the relevant tax accounting method if the taxpayer wished to 
deduct the costs of the first recurrence. E-mail from Glenn Walberg, Accounting 
Methods and Inventory, Ernst & Young, to John Lee, Professor of Law, College of 
William and Mary School of Law (August 20, 2002) (on file with author). 
m ( Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 376 2001); see supra note 299. 
339 72 T.C. 1 (1979). 
340 Service Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548 inspired this suggestion. See infra note 
445 and accompanying text. 
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F. Difficulty of Allocation Between Current and Future Benefits 
Difficulty of expenditure allocation between current and future 
tax years is one of the oldest and strongest rough justice factors 
supporting a current deduction. The current deduction of advertising 
expenses has rested for more than fifty years on this factor. 341 
Revenue Ruling 92-80 held that "[t]he INDOPCO decision does not 
affect the treatment of advertising costs under section 162(a) of the 
Code. These costs are generally deductible under that section even 
though advertising may have some future effect on business activities, 
as in the case of institutional or goodwill advertising. "342 The Staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation explains that considerations of 
administrative convenience343 underlie the current deductibility of 
341 The unusual treatment of expenditures for ordinary business advertising 
manifest in Rev. Rul. 92-80, supra, is longstanding. Its genesis is in efforts 
by taxpayers in the early years of income taxation to capitalize the costs of 
large-scale advertising campaigns and to amortize the capitalized amounts 
over a period of years, efforts that were consistently opposed by the 
Commissioner on the ground that allocating advertising expenditures 
between current expenses and capital outlays was not feasible. See, e.g., 
Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Commissioner [Dec. 1842], 5 B.T.A. 232, 237 
(1926). Although the courts did not entirely foreclose the propriety of 
capitalizing some advertising expenditures, taxpayers found it difficult to 
prove an appropriate allocation between current and long-term benefits. In 
time, this insistence on evidence hardened into a rule of law that 
capitalization is proper only if the taxpayer can establish "that the future 
benefits can be determined precisely and are not of indefinite duration." 
A. Finkenberg's Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner [Dec. 18,662], 17 T.C. 973, 982-
983 (1951); see also E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner [54-2 USTC 
«J1 9526], 214 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. 1954) (taxpayer must show "with 
reasonable certainty the benefits resulting in later years from the 
expenditure"), affg in part, and rev'g and remanding in part [Dec. 19,358] 19 
T.C. 481 (1952). See the discussion of advertising expenses in BITIKER & 
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, par. 20.4.5 
at 20-86 to 20-88 (2d ed. 1989). But see Durovic v. Commissioner [76-2 
USTC «JJ 9732], 542 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1976) (cost of free samples must be 
capitalized; amortization denied in absence of proof of limited life), affg. 
[Dec. 33,534] 65 T.C. 480 (1975). 
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 82 (1998) (relying on 
Northwestern Yeast, a 1926 excess profits case where the government opposed 
capitalization of advertising costs because it would reduce a corporation's excess 
profits tax, which was much greater than the corporate income tax at that time). See 
generally, Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 
VA. TAX REV. 347,422-36 (2000). 
342 1992-2 C.B. 57. 
343 The Service often uses "administrative" convenience or policy to refer to 
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advertising costs.344 The Tax Court in RJR Nabisco applied this 
analysis after INDOPCO to the costs of cigarette package designs.345 
The RJR Nabisco court declined to accept the Commissioner's 
distinction between the costs of developing advertising campaigns and 
the costs of executing such campaigns by, for instance, producing 
allowing, for example, a current deduction of costs that under strict application of 
precedent would be capitalized, on the grounds of difficulty of the taxpayer complying 
with the conceptually pure rule. See Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, 
supra note 241, at 182-86; Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 704-08. This is, 
of course, the main justification in general for the rough justice rules permitting a 
current deduction under a balancing of burdens and benefits of capitalization. See 
supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text; U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 
270 F.3d 1137, 1146 (7th Cir. 2001). 
344 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., IMPACT ON SMALL 
BUSINESS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 83 (Joint Comm. Print 1996). 
See generally Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 640. The tax revenue at 
issue as to deduction versus amortization of advertising costs is substantial. For 
instance, capitalizing and then amortizing 20% of advertising costs was estimated to 
increase tax revenues by $37.9 billion in 1987, Revenue Options Book Released but Is 
It a Best Seller?, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 29, 1987) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, 
elec. cit., 87 TNT 125-1), and $18 billion over five years in 1993, Alexander Polinsky, 
News Analysis: Amortizing Advertising Expenses- Not in the Foreseeable Future, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 27, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93 TNT 
199-2). The pressure group opposition to capitalization of advertising costs is even 
more substantial. Polinsky; supra; Barbara Kirchheimer, Proposal to Capitalize 
Advertising Expenses Draws Fire at W&M Revenue Hearing, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Sep. 5, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93 TNT 187-1). Hence, 
nothing legislative came to pass from staff proposals over the past decade to capitalize 
a portion (say 20%) of such costs which then would have been amortizable over four 
years or so. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTION OF 
MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE PROPOSALS SCHEDULED FOR A HEARING BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON 
WAYS AND MEANS ON SEPTEMBER 8, 21, AND 23, 1993 AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE 
ON WAYS AND MEANS ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1993, Proposal II.B.3 (Joint Comm. Print 
1993), reprinted in JCT Releases Description of Miscellaneous Revenue Items, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 20, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93 TNT 
194-50). 
345 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998). The 
litigated capitalization versus expensing costs in RJR Nabisco principally involved 
graphic design of cigarette packaging materials and in a relatively small amount 
involved package design, i.e., the physical construction of the package. Graphic 
design "is a combination of verbal information, styles of print, pictures or drawings, 
shapes, patterns, colors, spacing, and the like that make up an overall visual display" 
while package design "refers to the design of the physical construction of a package." 
Id. at 79. Graphic designs are developed for cigarette cartons, packages, messages 
temporarily applied to cartons or packages, tipping around the filter, cigarette papers, 
foils, and closure seals for soft packs. 
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television commercials on the basis of short-term benefits such as 
advertising campaigns and long-term benefits such as advertising 
executions because both types of benefits posed the same 
administrative difficulty of allocation between current and future tax 
years.346 The court explained that "at the time graphic designs or 
advertising campaigns are introduced, no one can determine how long 
the graphic designs, advertising campaigns, or elements of such 
designs will be used, including whether or not they will be used for 
more or less than a single year."347 Thus, capitalization would not be 
followed by amortization because it requires a length of useful life 
that can be "estimated with reasonable accuracy."348 Accordingly, a 
rough justice current deduction produces minimal distortion of 
income because the deduction causes less distortion than 
capitalization without amortization.349 RJR Nabisco found that 
successful advertising builds goodwill whether in the form of trade 
dress, created by graphic designs or long-term advertising 
campaigns.350 Therefore, the litigated costs were deductible as 
d • • ~I a verttsmg costs. 
Prior to INDOPCO, the Fourth Circuit in NCNB pz reached a 
similar conclusion with respect to the difficulty of allocation regarding 
expenditures in general. The Fourth Circuit, based upon financial 
accounting principles, reasoned that 
there is a residuum of current expenditures which will have 
some future benefit but which "cannot, as a practical matter, 
be associated with any other period" and allocation of which 
"either on the basis of association with revenue or among 
several accounting periods is considered to serve no useful 
purpose. These also are currently deductible. An example 
might be the salary of a high corporate officer whose time is 
not practically allocable between present operations and 
346 Id. 
347 /d. 
348 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2000). 
349 My notion that capitalization without depreciation produces more distortion 
than a current deduction has become conventional wisdom. See Hal I. Gann, 
Capitalization: Get Back to Where You Once Belonged, 149 U.S.C. ANN. TAX INST. 
(MAJOR TAX PLAN.) Cj['j[ 200, 205.3, at 2-21 (1997); Brett M. Alexander, Note, An 
Analysis ofiNDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1505, 1516-19 (1993). 
350 RJR Nabisco, Inc., 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 84. 
351 The Commissioner conceded that graphic design costs "fit the textbook 
definition of advertising." /d. at 80. 
352 NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.1981). 
346 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 22:273 
f . ,353 uture proJects. 
The Office of Chief Counsel, in Private Letter Rulings prior to 
INDOPCO, also recognized the difficulty of allocation to costs in 
contexts other than advertising. For instance, the Office of Chief 
Counsel's reasoning in General Counsel Memorandum 35,681354 - that 
salaries, rents, and mortgages incurred in originating a mortgage and 
not directly attributable to the acquisition of a mortgage should be 
currently deductible -turned on difficulty of allocation. Specifically, 
the Office of Chief Counsel stated, "[t]o determine which portion of 
otherwise current operating expenses benefits future periods would be 
impossible to do accurately."355 This difficulty of allocation analysis 
supports the results in several of the post-INDOPCO circuit court 
cases treating transaction costs, such as, PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. 
C .. 356 d H1f[ D & c c . • 357 ommtsswner an yye s rargo o. v. ommtsswner. 
Significantly, the Third Circuit in PNC Bancorp pointed out that the 
Service did not include the capitalized loan origination costs in the 
basis of each loan.358 
G. Speculative Future Benefits 
The Advance Notice discusses a . contemplated proposed 
requirement to capitalize amounts "paid to another person to induce 
353 /d. at 961-62 (footnotes omitted) (citing AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD STATEMENT NO.4: BASIC 
CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES ( 1970)). 
354 ( ) Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,417 Feb. 19,1974. 
35s Id. 
356 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000). 
ill ( ) 224 F.3d 874 8th Cir. 2000 , rev'g Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 
89 (1999). 
358 For example, if the loan origination costs were required to be capitalized, 
it would seem to follow that these costs would have to be included in the 
basis of each loan. Such inclusions would apparently be a departure from 
current practice .... However, the IRS conceded at oral argument that a 
requirement of capitalization of loan origination costs would probably mean 
that these complex basis adjustments would need to be made. The IRS's 
apparent failure to consider these and other tax ramifications of 
capitalization suggests that the IRS's borrowing of the line that the SFAS 91 
standards draw between current-year costs and deferred costs was not based 
on any independent tax analysis, but was simply a "bootstrapping" of the 
financial accounting standards into the tax arena. 
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 832-33 n.16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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that person to enter into, renew, or renegotiate an agreement that 
produces contract rights enforceable by the taxpayer, including 
payments for leases, covenants not to compete, licenses to use 
intangible property, customer contracts and supplier contracts."359 It 
notes, however, that "[t)his rule also would not require a taxpayer to 
capitalize a payment that does not create enforceable contract rights 
but, for example, merely creates an expectation that a customer or 
supplier will maintain its business relationship with the taxpayer."360 
Authorities before and after INDOPCO allowed a current deduction 
of costs yielding only speculative future benefits. 
Tax Court Judge Tannenwald, in exploring INDOPCO's 
incidental future benefit limitation in Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,361 took a speculative benefits tack. There, the 
taxpayer, a new high-tech company (SMS), maintained that warrants 
were included as an incentive to purchase $20 million and $30 million 
worth of workstations; the issuance of stock warrants - with exercise 
rights contingent upon the volume of future purchases - to a new 
major customer (CV) constituted currently deductible sales 
discounts.362 The Commissioner argued that under INDOPCO's "new 
look," the warrants should be capitalized as an investment made to 
develop a long-term relationship with a customer. Judge Tannenwald 
responded by pointing to the parties' stipulation that "the anticipated 
long-term benefits to SMS from the relationship with CV were 'softer' 
and were speculative, compared to the immediate benefits to SMS of 
359 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3461, 3463 (Jan. 24, 2002). 
360 Jd. (citing Van Iderstine Co. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1958)). · 
361 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1993). 
362 Revenue agents have argued that Sun Microsystems is merely a discount case. 
See Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 179. I believe that 
Judge Tannenwald, while indicating that such narrow analysis resolved the 
controversy in front of him, deliberately pointed to the precedent permitting current 
deduction of future benefit expenses to give meaning to "incidental" future benefit: 
Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1365 (lOth Cir. 1982) (author's 
expenses in connection with a book to be published in future held 
deductible); Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970) (fee in order to 
secure employment held deductible); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 
(INDOPCO does not preclude deduction of advertising expenses having a 
future benefit); Lee, "Doping out the Capitalization Rules after 
INDOPCO," 57 Tax Notes 669 (Nov. 2, 1992) .... 
Sun Microsystems, 66 T.C.M. 997. I like to speculate that Judge Tannenwald was 
implicitly approving a balancing test minimum distortion of income analysis as it was 
a major theme of my article that he cited. 
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the anticipated sales of computer workstations to CV under the 
363 Purchase Agreement." 
The Service followed Sun Microsystems' incidental/speculative 
benefit reasoning in Technical Advice Memorandum 96-45-002, 
extensively discussing deductibility of pre-opening costs incurred by a 
retailer opening new stores in the same field. 364 Indeed, the Service 
has long followed such a speculative benefit approach. The reasoning 
of the Office of Chief Counsel took the same tack for allowing current 
deduction of advertising costs in a sales campaign by public utilities to 
increase sales of gas or electricity through providing incentives to 
builders and owners to install equipment using substantial amounts of 
electricity or natural gas. 
[I]n the case of ordinary advertising it is generally recognized 
that there is only a hope that new customers will be secured 
by the expenditure, and there is no guarantee that new 
customers will be so obtained. Furthermore, the benefits that 
will result in later years from the expenditure cannot usually 
be ascertained with reasonable certainty. In light of these 
facts, the Service and the Courts have generally held that such 
advertising costs are deductible currently as ordinary and 
b . 365 necessary usmess expenses. 
Thus, the reasoning of the Office of Chief Counsel appeared to turn 
both on speculative benefits and on an inability to depreciate if 
capitalized. The former was clearly more important: 
On the other hand, however, where the acquisition of new 
customers can be attributed directly to particular 
expenditures, those expenditures must be capitalized since 
they have resulted in the acquisition of a benefit extending 
into subsequent years, i.e., the increased earning capacity to 
be generated from the new customers obtained.366 
Such capitalized costs would not have been depreciable unless the 
life of this intangible benefit could have been determined with 
certainty. A memo attached to General Counsel Memorandum 
33,784 reveals that the Associate Chief Counsel would have allowed a 
363 Sun Microsystems, 66 T.C.M. 997. 
364 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996). 
365 Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (March 29, 1968) (considering Revenue Ruling 68-
561, 1968-2 C.B. 117). 
366 ld. 
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current deduction for the salaries to the taxpayer's sales 
representatives conducting the campaign and the costs of the 
advertising campaign for a slew of broader reasons consonant with the 
modern rough justice factors. 367 The Office of Chief Counsel 
concurred in the result suggested by the Associate Chief Counsel,368 
but the published ruling considered in General Counsel Memorandum 
33,784, articulated as the basis for allowing a current deduction of the 
salaries paid to the taxpayer's representatives and advertising 
payments in the sales campaign that they were "less directly and 
significantly productive of intangible assets having a value extending 
beyond the taxable years in which they were paid or incurred."369 The 
incentives to the builders and owners were required to be 
capitalized.370 Interestingly, this analysis is similar to that later 
adopted by the Tax Court in Lychuk in allowing the current deduction 
of overhead costs associated with loan origination operations.371 The 
distinction between similar costs on the grounds of depreciability was 
also drawn in Revenue Ruling 94-38372 with respect to soil remediation 
costs, as well as in several landmark pre-INDOPCO decisions.373 
Ultimately, the availability or not of depreciation if the costs in 
question are capitalized is one of the rough justice distinctions 
between costs incurred in connection with the acquisition, creation, or 
367 Id. (salaries of representatives and advertising costs are not as closely 
connected to the acquisition of future benefits as the bonus payments and "could be 
said to be in payment for the services currently being rendered;" the connection with 
a future benefit of increased electricity consumption is tenuous; establishing a direct 
connection between the advertising expenses and increases in the future consumption 
of electricity would be inherently difficult; "capitalization of salary and advertising 
expenditures could logically be extended to other businesses and industries where 
traditionally an expense deduction has been allowed;" and another objection to 
capitalization of the salaries and advertising costs "is the difficult task of determining 
the useful life of the asset acquired." The suggestion of using "the useful life of the 
building involved" was rejected "[s]ince the salaries and advertising costs do not 
appear to be related to any particular building"). 
368 !d. 
369 Rev. Rul. 68-561, 1968-2 C.B. 117. 
370 Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (March 29, 1968) (Associate Chief Counsel 
Memorandum). 
371 See Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 392 (2001}. 
372 1994-1 C.B. 35; see also John W. Lee & W. Eugene Seago, Policy 
Entrepreneurship, Public Choice, and Symbolic Reform Analysis of Section 198, the 
Brownfields Tax Incentive: Carrot or Stick or Just Never Mind?, 26 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 613,702-03,716-17 (2002) (discussing this point). 
373 See, e.g., Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 
1978). 
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enhancement of tangible and intangible assets. 
H. Slow or No Depreciation is More Trouble than It Is Worth 
374 • 375 h d h Both Southland Royalty and Iowa-Des Momes el t at 
capitalization was not appropriate where depreciation was not 
available.376 Perhaps Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States, 
a business expansion decision, most extensively analyzes this notion.377 
I believe that this is also the better ground in Revenue Ruling 94-38378 
for currently deducting soil remediation costs.379 As shown in the 
preceding section, this was also one of the reasons for allowing the 
current deduction of the salesmen's salaries and the advertising costs 
of the promotions to use or convert to electric or gas heat. This 
reasoning, however, was not reflected in the final published ruling, for 
the Service historically has appeared reluctant explicitly to pursue this 
route. Avoidance of "perpetual capitalization,"380 or capitalization 
374 ld. 
3~ ( ) Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 8th Cir. 1979 . 
376 See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text. 
377 The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property 
interest. They produced nothing corporeal or salable. They are recurring. 
At the most they introduced a more efficient method of conducting an old 
business. The government suggests no way in which they could be 
amortized. The government's theoretical approach ignores the practicalities 
of the situation, and permits a distortion of taxpayer's financial situation. If 
an expenditure, concededly of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor 
amortized, the adoption of technological advances is discouraged. 
505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (lOth Cir. 1974). 
378 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
379 Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 197 n.140. 
Perhaps the strongest point of Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, was that 
rough justice administrable solutions are preferable to overreaching capitalization by 
the Service without allowing adequate capital recovery. See also Alexander, supra 
note 349, at 1516-17. Some but not all judges are tempted to award a current 
deduction as less income distorting. It is possible that this point was behind the 
compromise in Technical Advice Memorandum 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992) of 
providing amortization of capitalized toxic waste soil remediation costs over a 
surrogate of the life of the taxpayer's core business asset. See 1993 House Hearings, 
supra note 37, at 1689, 1702; Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, INDOPCO- Time for the 
Second Shoe to Drop, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 21, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 95 TNT 227-140). For interesting practitioner tips on how to 
convince a revenue agent of the theorem of less (or minimum) distortion of income, 
see Gann, supra note 349, at 2-21 to 2-26. 
380 See supra note 251. 
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without depreciation, has often convinced tribunals381 other than the 
Tax Court. In this regard, Wolfsen Land & Cattle382 is a welcome 
exception. Even where these exceptions are not applicable, several 
authorities hold that if depreciation is not available, capitalization is 
not appropriate because capitalization without depreciation would 
distort the taxpayer's income.383 Moreover, where depreciation is 
available, distortion of income would also result when the recovery 
period is much longer than the future benefit of the expenditure. This 
was the unacknowledged problem presented in Ingram Industries384 
and the aircraft engine inspection Technical Advice Memorandum.385 
In both instances, the recovery period for the capitalized expenditure 
was more than twice as long as the repair cycle. Thus, a current 
deduction or amortization over an arbitrary period would produce less 
distortion of income, or minimal distortion of income, than such ideal 
slow or no depreciation would cause.386 This "second best" approach 
is demanded by clear reflection of income as a rule of equity or rough 
381 See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text. 
382 Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner 72 T.C. 1 (1979); see infra notes 
396-403 and accompanying text. 
383 See Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978); 
Lee, et a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1549. In the repair versus improvement 
context, Revenue Ruling 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, reasoned alternatively that where 
amortization is not available, capitalization is not appropriate. 
384 Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 532 (2000). 
385 Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996); see Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft 
Maintenance, supra note 241, at 163-64, 213. 
386 Lee et a!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 214-16. 
Support for this approach is found in Wolfsen Land & Cattle. 
To permit a current deduction of such a large expenditure with a 
beneficial effect lasting on the average of 10 years would surely distort that 
years's [sic] income. Yet to deny even an amortization deduction for an 
expenditure with a specific demonstrable beneficial life on the grounds that 
its deductibility is contaminated by its relationship to an asset of indefinite 
life, i.e., the land, would similarly require an uneven reporting of income. 
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate expenses to the 
income which they helped earn, a reasonable solution to our conundrum is 
to hold that the expenses in issue should be written off over their useful life. 
In short we would subscribe independent status to those expenditures on 
the basis that they create a free-standing intangible asset with an 
amortizable 10-year life. 
Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13; see Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 
680. This approach was in effect followed in the repair versus improvement context in 
Technical Advice Memorandum 93-15-004 (Dec. 14, 1994). See also supra note 358. 
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• • 387 JUStice. 
I. Amortization Periods 
The Advance Notice announces that the Service and the Treasury 
Department "expect to provide safe harbor recovery periods and 
methods for certain capitalized expenditures that do not have readily 
ascertainable useful lives."388 Both the Service and the Treasury 
Department requested comments "regarding whether guidance 
should provide one uniform period or multiple recovery periods and 
. 389 
what the recovery periods. and methods should be." Case law has 
resolved, on occasion, the current deduction versus capitalization 
without depreciation dilemma by fashioning an amortization period 
for the expense, or even a deferred charge or freestanding amortizable 
intangible. The Service also has offered this golden mean, based upon 
its clear reflection of income authority, as the resolution of intractable 
capitalization issues.390 
More than two decades ago, NCNB l 91 showed that the ideal 
answer to many of the future benefit expenses controversies, 
particularly where the issue was posed as a choice between the income 
distorting extremes of current deduction or perpetual capitalization, 
was depreciation of an intangible over some period. Many courts 
once permitted current deduction of business expansion costs creating 
intangibles benefiting future years under the now discredited 
definitional separate, saleable asset doctrine. Courts adopted this 
approach in order to prevent distortion of income where amortization 
of the capitalized amounts would not be allowed by the Service392 on 
the grounds that the life of the resulting intangible could not be 
387 See infra notes 403-04 and accompanying text. 
388 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3461, 3464 (Jan. 24, 2002). 
389 /d. 
390 See infra notes 405-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of writer's 
prepublication costs and package design safe harbor amortization. 
391 NCNB I, 651 F.2d 942,947,962-63 (4th Cir. 1981). 
392 Rejecting a scheme under which "an expenditure, concededly of 
temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized," the court allowed 
the current-expense deduction. "The government suggests no way in which 
they could be amortized." It was, in short, an attempted overreaching by 
the tax collector. If he failed, he had less basis for protest than if he had 
confined his demands to those which were properly Caesar's. 
/d. at 959-60 (quoting Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 
1192 (lOth Cir. 1974)). 
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"estimated with reasonable accuracy."393 The NCNB I panel reasoned 
that a court's flexibility in avoiding distortion of income as to business 
expansion costs instead should lie in a Cohan-like394 approximation of 
the amounts of the benefit allocable to current and future tax years.395 
The conceptually correct approach, however, would have been to 
estimate the useful life of the capitalized expenditure; or if that life is 
sufficiently short or variable, or the amount is insubstantial, the court 
should determine that a current deduction would produce minimal 
distortion of income. 
The Tax Court in Wolfsen Land & Cattle,3% faced with a similar 
dilemma, came up with the innovative and more conceptually correct 
solution of treating the expenditure itself as a "deferred charge" in 
financial accounting terms397 or freestanding intangible amortizable 
over the period benefited. In this case, the taxpayer operated a ranch 
with an irrigation system that prevented the ranch from being a bog of 
little or no worth.398 It could have maintained the system by annual 
draglining the ditches, or it could "dragline periodically when and 
where necessary to prevent dysfunction."399 As it worked out, the 
ditches could be ignored for about nine years and continue to function 
even though gradually clogging up, then in the tenth year the clogging 
would have "gone far enough to affect drastically the ditch's hydraulic 
capacity."400 The cost of draglining the ditch was about the same for 
its original creation, for each year in annual maintenance, or for 
draglining in the tenth year.401 Not surprisingly, the taxpayer chose to 
dragline the ditch only when it clogged up to the extent that it could 
not be used. The Tax Court characterized the issue as a current 
deduction or "perpetual capitalization."402 Reasoning that both 
alternatives would distort the taxpayer's income, the Wolfsen Land & 
393 Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2000). 
394 ( Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 2d Cir. 1930). 
395 NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 947, 962. Of course, the panel decision was overly 
influenced by financial accounting notions. See id. at 952-53. Tax accounting does not 
allocate to each year the actual use of a capitalized intangible (except perhaps in 
income forecast depreciation), but rather estimates the period of benefit and then 
depreciates under the straightline method. See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at 
38-41, 58-62. 
396 72 T.C. 1 (1979). 
397 NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948-50. 
398 Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 6. 
399 Id. at 11. 
400 Id. at 12. 
401 /d. 
402 See Gideon, supra note 248, at 109. 
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Cattle court concluded that: 
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate 
expenses to the income which they helped earn, a reasonable 
solution to our conundrum is to hold that the expenses in 
issue should be written off over their useful life. In short we 
would subscribe independent status to those expenditures on 
the basis that they create a free-standing intangible asset with 
an amortizable 10-year life.403 
I would add that if the period benefited is short or highly variable, 
so that amortization is difficult or impossible, and the expenditure is 
at least "steady-state" recurring, then the cost treated as a separate 
asset should be expensed in its entirety in the year made.404 
Ironically, the Service has often offered the ideal of amortization 
over some fixed period of expenditures creating intangibles too late in 
the process, and that offer has been successfully rejected by taxpayer 
groups in favor of a current deduction. Perhaps the best known 
example is package design costs. In this instance, the Service first 
took the tack of capitalizing and denying any deduction due to lack of 
a life that could be estimated with reasonable certainty.405 
Amortization over a fixed period, instead of the ali-or-nothing current 
deduction or "perpetual capitalization,"406 was apparently offered too 
late to the industry by the Service.407 Resting on "administrative 
convenience" to "minimize disputes,"408 the Service offered 
403 Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13. 
404 See Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 617 (Ct. Cl. 1978); 
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 436, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); 
Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982). 
405 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-005 (Nov. 26, 1985) (costs of a new product 
package design must be capitalized since they create "intangible assets with useful 
lives in excess of the taxable year in which such costs were incurred"). The design at 
issue was a unique cardboard base hosting an extending container for marketing 
women's hosiery, which enjoys wide customer recognition. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 
39,483 {Mar. 5, 1986) {the "L'Eggs" GCM). Revenue Ruling 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85, 
required package design costs incurred after 1986 to be capitalized and denied 
depreciation under Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-3 because a useful life could not be 
ascertained. 
406 See Gideon, supra note 248, at 109. 
407 Instead, the result was the current deduction taxpayer victory in RJR Nabisco, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998). See supra notes 346-51 and 
accompanying text. 
408 See Rev. Proc. 90-63, 1990-2 C.B. 664, <j[ 3.05; Rev. Proc. 89-17, 1989-1 C.B. 
827, <j[ 3.02; cf Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,074 (Nov. 11, 1974) ("In view of the lack of any 
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amortization procedures for package design costs. The Service 
permitted sixty-month amortization on a design-by-design basis or 
forty-eight-month amortization on a pool-of-cost basis, as set forth in 
a series of Revenue Procedures referred to by commentators as 
"administrative grace."409 The most widely discussed of these was 
Revenue Procedure 90-63,410 and the most recent is Revenue 
Procedure 98-39.411 Such safe harbor amortization became the 
preferred model for Chief Counsel's tax treatment of recurring costs 
benefiting a number of years. For instance, Associate Chief Counsel 
Glenn Carrington pointed to Revenue Procedure 90-63 as a model for 
amortization over five to ten years to resolve capitalization issues. 
"Asked whether IRS believes it has regulatory authority to 
'arbitrarily' require capitalization over a fixed period, such as five 
years or [ten] years, Carrington responded, 'It would be arbitrary, but 
we've done arbitrary - reasonably arbitrary - things in the past."'412 
The rest of the story is RJR Nabisco,413 where, ironically, the Service's 
lawyers argued for capitalization without providing for such 
• • • 414 p d' bl 415 h d . d compromise amortizatiOn. re rcta y, t e court grante mstea 
a current deduction due to the difficulty of allocating the expenditure 
between current and future benefits.416 
Exactly the same thing happened with writers' prepublication 
demonstrable legislative purpose or legal reason, we think it appropriate to consider 
questions of administrative convenience."). 
409 Gann & Strowd, supra note 379. 
410 1990-2 C.B. 664. 
411 1998-1 C.B. 1320. 
412 IRS Environmental Cleanup Guidance May Be Out by July, Official Says, 1993 
DAILY TAX REP., May 11, 1993, at G-8. Carrington said that Chief Counsel's office 
was considering a five-year amortization period for all clean-up costs but was doubtful 
that the industry would sign on to such an approach. See also J. Andrew Horner, 
Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs; Carrington Uncertain of Outcome, 
TAX NOTES TODAY (May 12, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93 
TNT 102-10); F.R. Nagle, IRS's Carrington Says Asbestos Abatement TAM Under 
Reconsideration, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 9, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, 
elec. cit., 93 TNT 31-2) (Carrington said that one suggestion in the Service to aid firms 
with asbestos remediation was to allow amortization over seven or ten years). 
413 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998). 
414 See Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Filling the Void: Can the IRS Restructuring Bring 
Purpose and Meaning to the Random World of Tax Litigation?, 77 TAXES 179, 185 
(Mar. 1999) (former Chief Counsel, Commissioner, and Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Policy). 
415 See Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 677. 
416 See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text. In theory, the Service does 
not follow RJR Nabisco. See 2001 FSA LEXIS 158 (Aug.15, 2001). 
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costs. Service Notice 88-62 attempted to resolve the issue of 
deductibility of writers' prepublication costs by allowing a current 
deduction of a writer's prepublication costs over a three-year period 
on the sliding-scale basis of 50%/25%/25%.417 In the early stages of 
development of the three-year safe harbor adopted in Service Notice 
88-62, the Service considered allowing (1) current deduction of a fixed 
amount of a writer's prepublication expenses (such as $5,000-$10,000) 
to be deducted annually, and (2) amortization of expenses above that 
level ratably over the next three years.418 Probably tasting blood in the 
water, the Writers Coalition, a special interest group, opposed 
compromise as still requiring allocations and decisions as to whether 
income forecast recovery would be more favorable and argued that 
the floor was too low for any writer with an office.419 
The acquisition cost doctrine is compatible with the timing-
minimal distortion of income doctrine only so long as the expenditure 
does not produce benefits for a shorter period than the asset to the 
basis of which it is added. If, however, the expenditure's benefits last 
for a shorter period than the useful life of the capital asset acquired, 
capitalization of the expenditure and its addition to the basis of the 
asset acquired produces distortion of income through depreciation or 
amortization over a longer period than that benefited by the 
expenditure, or at worst, by no amortization at all. In summary, the 
free-standing asset model entails a two-step analysis: (1) look at 
whether current deduction of an expenditure will distort the 
taxpayer's income because the expenditure provides future benefits 
and is neither sufficiently insubstantial nor recurring frequently 
enough to be nondistorting if currently deducted; if this is the case, 
then (2) estimate the period benefited by the expenditure (i.e., the 
useful life), and amortize the expenditure as a free-standing asset over 
h . d 420 t e peno . 
417 I.R.S. Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548. 
418 See Letter from Writers Coalition, New York, to Don Chapoton, Assistant 
Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury (Oct. 5, 1987), reprinted in Writers 
Object to Proposed Section 263A Compromise, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 8, 1987) 
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 87 TNT 196-9). 
419 Id. The coalition represented almost fifty groups. Id. At this time there were 
61,000 free-lance writers, 20,000 photographers, and the later-formed Artists for Tax 
Equity of forty-five groups led by the 3500 member Graphic Artists Guild. See Anne 
Constable, Write-Off- or Tax Shelter; Artists Try to Erase Part of the New Tax Law, 
TIME, Apr. 18, 1988, at 57; Judith Michaelson, "The Boston Tea Party of the Arts;" 
Visual and Free-lance Artists Claim New Tax Law Unfairly Limits Deductions, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1988, at 6-1. 
420 See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at 12-15. For suggestions as to safe 
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J. Conclusion 
In essence, the rough justice rules advocated are simplified tax 
accounting methods. This strongly suggests, as a broad tax policy 
matter, that they be limited to the same class of taxpayers to whom 
such simplified methods traditionally have been granted in order to · 
reduce transaction and tax costs, as well as provide a tax subsidy. The 
statutory limitations on use of the cash method of income tax 
accounting under section 448 constitute a Congressional highlighting 
of the classes of taxpayers for whom it believes the burdens of more 
complex rules outweigh the clearer reflection of income. Even closer 
conceptually are the limitations on expensing small amounts of 
depreciable assets under section 179. The Joint Committee Staff has 
pointed out that small businesses are granted many exceptions from 
the normal tax accounting rules, amounting to tax preferences, in 
order "to serve the dual purpose of easing the administrative burdens 
of, and providing a tax subsidy to, small businesses. "421 
Should expensing and amortization safe harbors also be limited to 
small income taxpayers? Approaching the question solely from a 
taxpayer's cost/benefits analysis perspective, I would answer yes.422 
Apart from a general populist perspective in my more recent work,423 I 
have long advocated a two-track regulatory system with simpler rules 
424 
whenever greater numbers of smaller taxpayers are affected. 
Elaborate, more theoretically correct rules may be in order for those 
who can handle them.425 Arguably, that is the case for more 
theoretically correct, but frightfully complex provisions, like section 
263A. Congress appears to have recognized this in its small business 
harbors here, see text following supra note 340. 
421 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., IMPACT ON SMALL 
BUSINESS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 74 (Joint Comm. Print 1996). 
!d. 
The perceived difficulty of some of the tax accounting methods from which 
small businesses are granted exceptions are a result of the need to measure 
income under the present-law income tax. These methods generally 
attempt to match income and expense by requiring capitalization of costs 
that benefit future periods and providing when and how these capitalized 
costs are taken into account. 
422 See Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 732-38. 
423 See Lee, Business Tax Entities, supra note 60, at 962-79. 
424 John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured Discretionary Justice 
under Section 355, 44 TAX NOTES 1029, 1031 n.18 (Aug. 28, 1989) [hereinafter Lee, 
Art of Regulation Drafting]. 
425 !d. at 1031. 
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• 426 d b 11 . 1 f . . 427 exceptiOns an , a ove a , time va ue o money provisions. 
Nevertheless, the rough justice proposals should apply to large 
income taxpayers for both a practical reason and a statutory 
interpretation reason. The practical reason is the inefficiency of 
devoting such a high percentage of the Service's enforcement 
resources to transaction costs issues.428 Capitalization and expensing 
are currently significant audit issues only at the big, usually public, C 
corporation level.429 Concentrating audit resources on these issues 
when large corporations are abusing corporate tax shelters is 
analytically equivalent to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic as it 
began to tilt while the band kept on playing.430 
The second reason is that, theoretically, an interpretative 
regulation can rise not higher than the statute and its case-law glosses. 
Unlike Congress, the authorities have tended not to draw distinctions 
between large and small taxpayers431 and, indeed, as a corollary of the 
audit patterns, most of the cases with INDOPCO issues to date have 
involved large taxpayers. For example, in U.S. Freightways, the 
taxpayer had a fleet of 14,766 trucks and growing in 1993; the twelve-
426 See I.R.C. §§ 263A(b)(2)(B); 453A(b)(1), (b)(2)(B). 
427 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1274(c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(C); 1274A; 7872(c)(2), (d). 
428 See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002); supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
429 Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 654-63. I note, however, that the 
SB/SE as well as LMSB divisions of the Service are issuing directives as to the 
Advance Notice. See, e.g., Memorandum from Larry R. Langdon, Commissioner, 
Large and Mid-Size Business Division, and Joseph G. Kehoe, Commissioner, Small 
Business/Self-Employed Division, to LMSB and SB/SE Employees (Feb. 26, 2002), 
reprinted in Internal Guidance for Applying Proposed Rules on Capitalizing Cost of 
Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 28, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, 
elec. cit., 2002 TNT 40-12); Memorandum from Larry R. Langdon, Commissioner, 
Large and Mid-Size Business Division, and Joseph G. Kehoe, Commissioner, Small 
Business/Self-Employed Division, to LMSB and SB/SE Employees (Apr. 26, 2002), 
reprinted in IRS Memo Provides Guidance for Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 
9, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 90-8). 
430 The media has widely reported the drop in the tax audit rate for large firms, 
growth in the use of tax shelters by such firms as audit scrutiny faded, and the decline 
in reported taxable income while book earnings soared. See supra notes 124-26 and 
accompanying text. 
431 A rare exception proving the point is the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Murnaghan in NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285, 296 (4th Cir. 1982) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) 
("Other taxpayers must capitalize and not deduct all at once expenditures having 
extended lives or applications. The taxpayer here, and others, preeminently banks, 
who will benefit from the decision of the en bane majority, can by no means merit 
description as 'economically deprived.' The benefit heaped upon them further 
contributes to the deserved description of our income tax system as a disgrace."). 
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month licenses and permits were more than $5 million a year.432 
Incidentally, the rough justice proposals should explicitly be made 
inapplicable to tax shelters.433 
V. POST-IN DO PCO APPELLATE DECISIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS, 
AND THE ADVANCE NOTICE 
A. Introduction 
1. Advance Notice 
The Advance Notice contemplates that the proposed regulations 
will require capitalization of transaction costs that "facilitate" a capital 
transaction while permitting a current deduction of costs that do not 
so facilitate.434 This contemplated rule appears to be derived from 
A.E. Staley.435 Additionally, "this rule would not require capitalization 
of employee compensation (except for bonuses and commissions that 
are paid with respect to the transaction), fixed overhead (e.g., rent, 
utilities and depreciation), or costs that do not exceed a specified 
dollar amount, such as $5000. "436 
This regular salary rule is expressly based on Wells Fargo.437 The 
general fixed overhead rule appears to be based upon Lychuk.438 The 
Advance Notice further contemplates that outside transaction costs 
432 U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001). 
433 See Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 733-34; Rev. Proc. 2001-10, 
2001-2 I.R.B. 272 (making elective simplified accounting method inapplicable to tax 
shelters). 
434 See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3463 (Jan. 24, 2002) (capitalization of amount in excess of the safe 
harbor amount "paid to facilitate the acquisition, production, or installation of 
tangible property that is owned by a person other than the taxpayer" resulting in 
intangible future benefits to the taxpayer); id. at 3464 (capitalization required of 
"transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer's acquisition, creation, or enhancement 
of intangible assets," but is not required of "post-acquisition integration costs or 
severance payments made to employees as a result of an acquisition transaction 
because such costs do not facilitate the acquisition."). 
435 A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'g and 
remanding 105 T.C. 166 (1995). 
436 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. at 3464. 
437 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev'g in part 
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89 (1999); see Guidance Regarding 
Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. at 3464. 
438 Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 376 (2001); see supra note 434 and 
accompanying text. 
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such as loan origination costs (credit history and property appraisal to 
facilitate a loan) not in excess of a de minimis amount would not have 
to be capitalized and that "the taxpayer also would not be required to 
capitalize the amount of salaries paid to employees or overhead costs 
of the taxpayer's loan origination department."439 The latter rule 
appears to be based on PNC Bancorp.440 In short, a "practical" line 
can be drawn between inside and outside transaction costs on the 
basis of difficulty in allocation to the particular asset benefited. 
In this context, the Advance Notice stated, "IRS and Treasury 
Department are considering alternative approaches to minimize 
uncertainty and to ease the administrative burden of accounting for 
transaction costs. For example, the rules could allow a deduction for 
all employee compensation (including bonuses and commissions that 
are paid with respect to the transaction) .... "441 
Whether the cost is an outside or inside commission, generally, 
there should be little difficulty in allocating it to the transaction for 
which the commission was paid. A current deduction of inside 
commissions, therefore, should turn on whether the transaction is de 
minimis, yields short-term benefits, or is recurring and insubstantial. 
Otherwise, a current deduction for such commissions ultimately must 
rest on the administrative difficulties of the Service in policing 
unprincipled deductions. This rationale, standing alone, is 
unconvincing. 
On the other hand, if the commission is more like a bonus that is 
not tied to specific transactions,442 then the difficulty of allocation 
439 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. at 3464. The implication is that such outside costs would be required to be 
capitalized if in excess of the threshold dollar amount. The Advance Notice expressly 
provides that amounts paid for portfolios of loans or the amounts loaned to borrowers 
would have to be capitalized. Id. at 3462. In most cases, inside transaction costs 
would be more difficult to allocate than such outside transaction costs. 
440 See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g 110 
T.C. 349 (1998) (permitting a current deduction of the loan reviewers' salaries). The 
Third Circuit had decided National Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 
F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990). In INDOPCO, Justice Blackmun affirmed National Starch on 
much the same reasoning as the Third Circuit. 
441 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. 
Reg. at 3464. 
442 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) favors 
deducting inside bonuses, and in any event where the "bonus or commission is paid to 
the employee for overall performance above a set floor of acquisition or other 
activity." Letter from Pamela J. Pecarich, Tax Accounting Technical Resource Panel, 
AICPA, to Pamela F. Olson, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department 
of the Treasury, and Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service 
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factor could apply. The Advance Notice implies that the 
contemplated revisions probably would provide that outside 
transaction costs in excess of a de minimis amount must be 
capitalized.443 Picking up on this, the AICP A argues correctly that 
requiring capitalization of outside transaction costs while allowing a 
deduction for comparable inside transaction costs creates a tax 
disparity favoring "taxpayers that can support in-house legal and 
financial resources. Accordingly, to· minimize the disparity in 
(May 14, 2002) [hereinafter AICPA Comment], reprinted in A/CPA Suggests Changes 
to Proposed Regs on Capitalizing Expenditures, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002) 
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 96-18). This makes sense. The 
next step is external costs that are difficult to allocate to particular tangibles because 
the taxpayer's accounting system does not capture them. See Letter from Stephen 
Elkins and Craig Jones, Tax Team, American Chemistry Council (ACC), to the 
Internal Revenue Service (Mar. 25, 2002), reprinted in Writers Comment on Proposed 
Regs on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 23, 2002) 
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 78-23). Others want to go 
further. ACC argued that an inside bonus on a deal that closes includes 
compensation for deals that fell through. !d.; see also Organization Seeks Clarification 
of Deductible Expenses, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 96-33). The INDOPCO Coalition argues that employee 
compensation in any form should be deductible. See Letter from Fred T. Goldberg, 
Jr., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Harry L. Gutman, KPMG LLP, and 
Nick Giordano, Ernst & Young LLP, on behalf of INDOPCO Coalition, to Mark 
Weinberger, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury, Charles 
Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, and B. John Williams, Chief 
Counsel, Internal Revenue Service (Apr. 8, 2002), reprinted in INDOPCO Submits 
Additional Comments on Proposed Capitalization Regs, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 25, 
2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 80-38); accord 
Memorandum from Abraham N. M. Shashy, Jr., KPMG LLP, on behalf of Cellular 
Telecommunications & Internet Association, to Mark Weinberger, Assistant 
Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury, Charles Rossotti, Commissioner, 
Internal Revenue Service, and B. John Williams, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue 
Service (Mar. 20, 2002), reprinted in CTIA Suggests Changes to Proposed Guidance on 
Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 29, 2002) 
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 61-23). 
443 The IRS and Treasury Department expect to propose a rule that requires 
a taxpayer to capitalize certain transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer's 
acquisition, creation, or enhancement of intangible assets or benefits .... 
[T]his rule would not require capitalization of ... costs that do not exceed a 
specified dollar amount, such as $5,000. 
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
3464. Implicitly, outside transaction costs would have to be capitalized. Inside 
transaction costs would be excepted from capitalization because the above transaction 
costs "rule would not require capitalization of employee compensation (except for 
bonuses and commissions that are paid with respect to the transaction), [or] fixed 
overhead (e.g., rent, utilities and depreciation) .... " Id. 
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treatment resulting from this proposed rule, the AICP A recommends 
that the de minimis threshold dollar amount be increased to $10,000, 
and that the threshold be applied on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis."444 A number of commentators agreed on both points. For 
instance, America's Community Bankers forthrightly argued that as a 
matter of tax parity, outside transaction costs should be deductible as 
well so that larger firms would not competitively injure smaller firms 
without inside counsel.445 This would nicely sidestep INDOPCO in 
many cases, but appears to lack a policy basis beyond a bootstrapping 
rule of tax parity. 
444 AICP A Comment, supra note 442, <J[ 24. 
445 We also believe that expenses for legal fees paid to an outside attorney, 
or outside law or consulting firm for routine legal or administrative work on 
a recurring basis should be deductible, not capitalized. For example, fees 
paid to attorneys who routinely conduct settlements for a bank or who 
perform other routine duties such as reviewing documents and other regular 
tasks should be deductible. Smaller community banks are less likely to have 
large legal or management staffs and may have to rely on outside sources 
for these services. They will be placed at a competitive disadvantage if they 
cannot deduct costs for routine services provided by outside firms while 
competitors who have larger in-house staff performing the same functions 
can take a deduction. 
Letter from Charlotte M. Bahin, Director of Regulatory Affairs and Senior 
Regulatory Counsel, America's Community Bankers, to the Internal Revenue Service 
<j[ 14 (Apr. 18, 2002), reprinted in ACB Says Loan Origination Costs Should Be 
Deductible, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 8, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. 
cit., 2002 TNT 89-26); cf Letter from Joseph Barry Schimmel, Cohen Chase Hoffman 
& Schimmel P.A., Miami, to the Internal Revenue Service <J[ 24 (Mar. 11, 2002), 
reprinted in Attorney Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on Rules on Capitalizing 
Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 27, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT 
file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 59-20). 
[W]ith regard to the capitalization of legal fees paid to outside attorneys (or 
to other fees paid to outside consultants), the rule should state the purpose 
of differentiating between outside attorneys and consultants versus in-house 
attorneys and other employees. Such a rule does provide some 
administrative convenience, but at the cost of substantial potential 
unfairness. Larger organizations are more likely to be able to provide 
service "in-house," and thus to avoid capitalization. Attorneys and other 
professionals kept "on retainer" may, for practical (non-tax) purposes be 
in-house counsel (and may be unable to allocate their fees between 
acquisitions and other transactions), yet their fees would be treated 
differently than that of "in-house" counsel. 
Letter from Joseph Barry Schimmel, Cohen Chase Hoffman & Schimmel P.A., 
Miami, to the Internal Revenue Service <j[ 24 (Mar. 11, 2002), reprinted in Attorney 
Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, 
supra. 
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2. Case Law and Customary Expenses 
In response to the Commissioner's and the Tax Court's broad 
reliance on INDOPCO and future benefits in capitalizing everyday 
recurring costs in the taxpayer's business or costs incurred in 
connection with a nondepreciable intangible, a series of circuit court 
decisions have allowed a current deduction for such costs by either 
ignoring or taking an excessively narrow approach to the origin of the 
claim doctrine and to the creation of a separate asset where dealing 
with "customary" expenses. The Seventh Circuit in A.E. Staley,446 the 
Third Circuit in PNC Bancorp,447 and the Eighth Circuit in Wells 
Fargo 448 each reversed the Service's and Tax Court's future benefit 
capitalization of expenditures customarily449 deducted by taxpayers 
and allowed them a current deduction. Unfortunately, Wells Fargo 
and A.E. Staley failed to consider explicitly (1) a burdens and benefits 
balancing test as to distortion of income arising from lack of 
depreciation;450 (2) the possible character distortion aspect of incurring 
a cost incident to a restructuring of the target corporation taxpayer 
which is treated as an ordinary deduction while the target taxpayer 
realizes income associated with, but not recognized in, the 
restructuring; or (3) administrative costs to the taxpayer and the 
government in enforcement of capitalization with conceptual vigor. 
In short, the reasoning in all three circuit court opinions distorted 
or at least eroded the acquisition cost and origin of the claim doctrines 
and the rule of tax parity.451 At the same time, all or part of the results 
reached in each could have been supported on some more functional 
test theory that would balance the burdens and benefits of 
capitalization.452 Pursuing such a course would have been far better 
446 A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'g 105 
T.C. 166 (1995). 
447 PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g 110 
T.C. 349 (1998); see supra note 440. 
448 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev'g 
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89 (1999). 
449 In PNC Bancorp, the transaction costs arose from the taxpayer's customary 
business activities; in Wells Fargo, from customary salary and insubstantial activities; 
and in A. E. Staley, from activities customary in industry. 
450 The Wells Fargo court also did not consider application of such a balancing 
test taking into account both insubstantiality of costs .and the difficulty of costs' 
allocation arising either in identifying them or identifying the particular asset to which 
they are to be allocated and the recovery period or lack thereof. 
451 See supra Part III. 
452 See supra Part VI. 
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than the definitional approaches actually taken by each appellate 
decision which have wreaked havoc with the traditional doctrines 
applicable to acquisition of tangible assets and have failed explicitly to 
follow a policy of minimal distortion of income.453 Ironically, that 
policy probably influenced in a nontransparent fashion the outcome of 
these appellate decisions.454 Hopefully, the proposed capitalization/ 
expensing intangibles regulations will avoid the same mistake by (1) 
explicitly stating as the basis for their transactional cost rules a 
balancing of taxpayer and government burdens and benefits of the 
capitalization standard, and (2) fitting the various rules into such a 
balancing paradigm. 
B. Facilitating the Acquisition of a Capital Asset 
In A.E. Staley, the Seventh Circuit claimed that the Supreme 
Court in INDOPCO "was merely reaffirming settled law that costs 
incurred to facilitate a capital transaction are capital costs."455 The 
453 See supra Part IV. 
454 [Professor] Lokken believes that the courts are paying more attention to 
the potential administrative burdens of capitalization than they are willing 
to admit. In his view, that explains the Eighth Circuit's refusal to require 
capitalization of bank officer's salaries allocable to the acquisition in Wells 
Fargo, a decision that Lokken called wrong . 
. . . [In that case, t]he Eighth Circuit got hung up on the word "ordinary," 
which is the initial inquiry that determines whether the expenditure is any 
kind of business cost for which the law permits recovery, not the touchstone 
of immediate deduction. 
Lee A. Sheppard, NYU/T A Tax Conference - Participants Consider INDOPCO, 
Alternative Minimum Tax, 90 TAX NOTES 992, 993 (Feb. 19, 2001); see also Lokken, 
supra note 35, at 1363-65. 
455 A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1997). 
Field Service Advisory, 1993 WL 1470162 (1993), took much the same tack. "Since 
items are deductible under Lincoln Savings if certain conditions are met, we should 
not cite INDOPCO to support capitalization of an item which would have been 
deductible under these conditions before the case was handed down." !d. (citation 
omitted); accord Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-1 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19; 
Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-2 C.B. 9; I.R.S. Notice 96-7, 1996-1 C.B. 359. See generally Lee 
A. Sheppard, News Analysis- What Part of "Capitalize" Don't You Understand?, 88 
TAX NOTES 1435 (Sept. 18, 2000). The Service's former Associate Chief Counsel 
(Domestic), Stuart Brown, once candidly admitted, however, that the Service had not 
known prior to INDOPCO what that law was. Brown Lists Factors that Could Be 
Used to See if Cleanup Costs Must Be Capitalized, DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 10, 1993, at 
G-11. An excellent discussion from the Treasury Department's viewpoint is 
presented in Transcript of Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two, supra 
note 34, lj[<J[ 498-506 (comments of Joseph Mikrut, Treasury) ("Our plan was to take 
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Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court's capitalization of the costs of 
unsuccessfully defending against a hostile takeover because the 
taxpayer's purpose for incurring such costs was defending its business 
rather than "facilitating a capital transaction." 
In fact, A. E. Staley relied on precedents that generally did not use 
the term "facilitate a capital transaction."456 Instead, these precedents 
mostly used the broader term "in connection with" a capital 
transaction.457 Justice Blackmun in INDOPCO did, however, cite an 
article, which he read as concluding that "expenses incurred to 
facilitate transfer of business ownership do not satisfy the 'carrying on 
[a] trade or business' requirement of § 162(a)."458 That article 
those issues off the table to do some safe harbors, to provide some rough justice, to 
try to develop new types of guidance that take issues away for an entire industry"). In 
fact, rejection of the separate asset test did affect a sea change in the understanding of 
capitalization, but the inquiry should have shifted to a balancing standard. 
Examination was not cautious and g~vernment litigators failed to argue for a 
balancing standard. See id. «Jl«Jl 522-23 (comments of Mark Mullett, with Verizon 
Communications); accord id. «JJ 526 (comments of Pamela Olson, Treasury) ("I find 
often in audit situation that the INDOPCO issue seems to come up because it's 
something that the agents understand."). The understandability factor may underlie 
an LMSB agent's vehement opposition to the Advance Notice. IRS Agent Criticizes 
Proposed Guidance on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Mar. 29, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 61-22). 
"Facilitate" might be more relevant to future benefit capitalization than to 
distortion of character capitalization. On the other hand, the ultimate basis for the 
origin of the claim test is avoidance of distortion of income (more character than 
timing). See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. Therefore, it probably 
should be subject to the same balancing of burdens and benefits. 
456 INDOPCO's reference in a footnote to an article using the facilitating 
terminology could be viewed as an exception to this statement. See infra note 458 and 
accompanying text. 
457 [A]n expenditure that would ordinarily be a deductible expense must 
nonetheless be capitalized if it is incurred in connection with the acquisition of a 
capital asset. The function of these rules is to achieve an accurate measure of net 
income for the year by matching outlays with the revenues attributable to them 
and recognizing both during the same taxable year. When an outlay is connected 
to the acquisition of an asset with an extended life, it would understate current 
net income to deduct the outlay immediately. To the purchaser, such outlays are 
part of the cost of acquisition of the asset, and the asset will contribute to 
revenues over an extended period. 
Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); see also Fishing Tackle 
Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 638, 645 (1957) (expenses incurred by taxpayer 
"in connection with increasing its capitalization" constituted capital expenditures). 
458 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 90 n.8 (1992) (citing Brian R. 
Greenstein, The Deductibility of Takeover Costs After National Starch, 69 TAXES 48, 
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contrasted defense of a business with facilitation of a takeover,459 as 
did A.E. Staley. Justice Blackmun, however, surely cited the article 
for the point that costs of facilitating a transfer of ownership are not 
related to carrying on a trade or business in order to dismiss the 
government's argument that capitalization of transaction costs of a 
target's acquisition was necessary to prevent character and timing 
distortions of income.460 
In reality, once a target corporation is "put in play," it generally is 
acquired by one corporation or another.461 Thus, the purpose of 
49 (1991)). 
459 See Greenstein, supra note 458. 
460 Assistant Solicitor General Kent Jones in arguing INDOPCO relied upon 
Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1936), for the 
proposition that 
the Second Circuit emphasized that reorganization expenses don't provide 
any current benefit to the corporation. They do not assist in the production 
of current income, they do not- they are not incurred in the ordinary course 
of producing income, certainly none of the expenses incurred by Indopco 
have anything to do with generating income for the corporation in 1978, the 
year they were incurred. 
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
No. 90-1278, 1991 WL 636242, at *33-34 (Nov. 12, 1991) (oral argument by Kent L. 
Jones on behalf of the respondent). Other authorities and commentators more 
clearly articulate a distortion of income basis for capitalization of expenses incurred in 
connection with a nonrecognition or other tax preferenced transaction. See Missouri 
Pacific Corp. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 296, 308-11 (1984); Lee & Murphy, supra note 
3, at 521-26, 545; Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or 
Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443, 492-95 (1974); Calvin H. 
Johnson, Capitalization After the Government's Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX 
NOTES 1323 (1994); Paul J. Green, Authors' Prepublication Expenses: The Second 
Circuit's Response to the Capitalization Versus Deduction Question: Hadley v. 
Commissioner, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 673, 703 (1988); Lee et al., Rough Justice II, supra 
note 25, at 1521 & n.147. 
461 Because of the arbitageur activity, the perception that a corporation is 
"in play" tends to become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Once arbitragers buy 
up the stock of a corporation, the willingness of the corporation 
shareholders to sell is established, and the management's ability to resist an 
acquisition is effectively reduced. The certain knowledge that the 
arbitragers own working control of the target company's stock in turn 
makes sure that the potential acquirer's bidding for the corporation stock 
will surely be successful. 
Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 
lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989) (statement of Nicholas Brady, Secretary, Department 
of the Treasury). The "rest of the story" is that junk bond issuers, viz., allegedly 
Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., fed tips about the upcoming 
targets to arbitrageurs, viz., allegedly Ivan Boesky, etc. See In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. 
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defending the target is inseparable from the board of directors' duty 
to obtain the best ultimate price for the target's shareholders in the 
auction for control.462 Such efforts clearly result in a capital 
expenditure, if not a dividend to shareholders.463 More fundamentally 
erroneous is A.E. Staley's looking at the taxpayer's purpose for the 
expenditure. This is revealed by the A. E. Staley court's statement that 
"[t]he purpose of the expenditures was not to facilitate a change in 
corporate structure, but to prevent such change."464 Contrary to this 
focus on taxpayer purpose, many progeny of Woodward flatly state 
that the taxpayer's intent or purpose for the transaction is not 
relevant,465 which is correct since Woodward specifically rejected a 
primary purpose test466 just as Gilmore had.467 Moreover, the pre-
INDOPCO case law following Idaho Power468 capitalized indirect 
costs incurred in connection with acquisition of tangible assets.469 
Notwithstanding all of this, the "facilitate the transaction" notion 
will surely prevail. For instance, the Tax Court in Lychuk, in 
providing the most recent detailed analysis of the origin of the claim 
doctrine, pointed out that the Supreme Court in Woodward "held that 
the central inquiry was whether the expenditure originated in 'the 
Lit., 125 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In Re The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 
Inc., 995 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir.1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-01-025 (Jan. 17.1995). 
462 See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, Toward an Auction Market for Corporate 
Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 68 
(1989) (discussing changes in the law of tender offers toward the model that "once a 
bona fide offer is made for a corporation, its directors should react in a way that 
maximizes the return to shareholders, generally through an auction for the 
corporation's shares."); Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: 
Bridging the Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989 (1993). 
463 Calvin H. Johnson, The Expenditures Incurred by the Target Corporation in an 
Acquisitive Reorganization are Dividends to the Shareholders: (Psst, Don't Tell the 
Supreme Court), 53 TAX NOTES 463 (Oct. 28, 1991). But see 1993 FSA LEXIS 191 
(June 16, 1993) (Service should not raise whether expenses incurred by a publicly-
held target corporation in being acquired are constructive distributions to the target 
shareholders). 
464 A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(describing reasoning of dissenting judge below, with which the Seventh Circuit 
agreed). 
465 See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 935 (3d 
Cir. 1976); Keller St. Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Frederick Weisman Co. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 563 (1991); Am. Stores Co. v. 
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 458 (2000). 
466 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970). 
467 United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). 
468 Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974). 
469 6 See supra notes 225-3 and accompanying text. 
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process of acquisition. "'470 Lychuk's "process of acquisition" is not 
necessarily limited to the A.E. Staley notion of facilitating the 
acquisition; rather, Lychuk focuses more on the distinction between 
direct and indirect costs.471 Nevertheless, subsequent Tax Court 
decisions have followed A.E. Staley's "facilitate" formulation 
explicitly.472 The Advance Notice consistently uses the "facilitate" 
concept.473 It appears to be a bad idea whose time has come. 
C. Costs Incurred in Connection with Acquisition of Loans Do Not 
"Create" Loans 
The Advance Notice requests comments about whether a 
"separate and distinct asset test" could "be used to identify other costs 
that should be capitalized under section 263(a) and the 
administrability of such principles. "474 Simply put, the rule requiring 
the capitalization of costs that "create or enhance a separate asset" is 
not administrable. For instance, the Third Circuit in PNC Bancorp, 
adopting a "technical argument not articulated before,"475 excluded 
from the term "create or enhance a separate and distinct asset," the 
taxpayer bank's recurring origination costs associated with, and 
related to, the creation of loans.476 The Third Circuit's approach 
conflicts with rules as to the creation, acquisition, or enhancement of 
tangible assets and thus renders the separate asset test 
inadministrable.477 PNC Bancorp, reasoning that the loan origination 
470 Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 390 (2001) (quoting Woodward, 397 
U.S. at 577). 
471 See discussion infra Part V.E. 
472 See, e.g., Stark v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181 (1999); Am. Stores 
Co. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 458, 470 (2000) ("[W]e must determine whether the 
costs incurred in defending the State of California's antitrust litigation are better 
viewed as costs associated with defending a business or as costs associated with 
facilitating a capital transaction") (citing Woodward, 397 U.S. 572). 
473 The Advance Notice uses "facilitate" in Part B.7, Amounts Paid in 
Connection with Tangible Property Owned by Another, and especially in Part C, 
Transaction Costs. See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of 
Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461, 3463-64 (Jan. 24, 2002). 
474 !d. at 3464. 
475 Barton Massey, PNC Bancorp Heightens Need for Broad Capitalization 
Guidance, 88 TAX NOTES 160 (July 10, 2000) (paraphrasing Henry Ruempler of Ernst 
& Young). 
476 See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(expenses were merely associated with originating the loans, they did not become part 
of the balance of the loan). 
477 See Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 404 (1965), affd, 373 F.2d 45 
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costs were incurred in the day-to-day maintenance of the taxpayer 
bank's business, allowed a current deduction of those costs.478 This 
holding has been adopted in part in the Advance Notice.479 
The Tax Court below held that a corporation that acquired the 
interests of two banks must capitalize loan origination costs which the 
banks incurred when making loans, because the loans had lives 
extending beyond the year in which the expenditures were incurred.480 
(lOth Cir. 1967) (salaries of officers capitalized to basis of building constructed by 
corporate taxpayer). 
478 PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 828. Some of these costs, such as recording a 
security interest, traditionally would have been viewed as acquisition costs and 
capitalized. Hopefully, the proposed regulations will change this result. See infra 
notes 479-80. 
479 s The IR and Treasury Department expect to propose a rule that 
requires a taxpayer to capitalize certain transaction costs that facilitate the 
taxpayer's acquisition, creation, or enhancement of intangible assets or 
benefits described above .... In addition, this rule would require a taxpayer 
to capitalize transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer's acquisition, 
creation, restructuring, or reorganization of a business entity, an applicable 
asset acquisition within the meaning of section 1060(c), or a transaction 
involving the acquisition of capital, including a stock issuance, borrowing, or 
recapitalization. However, this rule would not require capitalization of 
employee compensation (except for bonuses and commissions that are paid 
with respect to the transaction), fixed overhead (e.g., rent, utilities and 
depreciation), or costs that do not exceed a specified dollar amount, such as 
$5,000. The IRS and Treasury Department request comments on how 
expenditures should be aggregated for purposes of applying the de minimis 
exception, whether the de minimis exception should allow a deduction for 
the threshold amount where the aggregate transaction costs exceed the 
threshold amount, and whether there are certain expenditures for which the 
de minimis exception should not apply (e.g., commissions). 
Conversely, a taxpayer that originates a loan to a borrower in the course 
of its lending business would not be required to capitalize amounts paid to 
secure a credit history and property appraisal to facilitate the loan where 
the total amount paid with respect to that loan does not exceed the 
threshold dollar amount. The taxpayer also would not be required to 
capitalize the amount of salaries paid to employees or overhead costs of the 
taxpayer's loan origination department. 
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
3464 (emphasis added). 
480 PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349, 364 (1998), rev'd, 212 F.3d 
822 (3d Cir. 2000). Unlike Lychuk, there was no evidence as to the specific lives of 
the loans. Id. at 364 n.14. The costs went far beyond the inside salaries and overhead 
which together with de minimis outside costs are all that the Advance Notice 
indicated can be currently deducted. 
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The Tax Court rejected PNC's arguments that the loan origination 
costs were currently deductible because they were (1) recurring, (2) an 
integral part of daily banking operations, and (3) provide only short-
term benefits,481 holding that a current deduction is allowable only if 
h d. d . 482 t e expen 1tures o not create a separate property mterest. 
Actually, they appeared to be more like a purchased intangible, which 
in a tax year beginning after 1993483 would have been amortizable over 
fifteen years by the purchaser, even though previously deducted by 
the seller, and probably not subject to recapture484 (although it should 
be).485 As to whether the costs were an integral part of'the banks' 
business, the Tax Court was satisfied that the costs the banks deferred 
for purposes of SF AS 91 were "only those directly related to the 
creation of the loans. They do not include costs associated with loans 
The costs at issue include amounts paid to record security interests and 
amounts paid to third parties for property reports, credit reports, and 
appraisals. In the case of FNBP, the costs at issue also include an allocable 
portion of the salaries and fringe benefits paid to employees for evaluating 
the borrower's financial condition, evaluating guaranties, collateral and 
other security arrangements, negotiating loan terms, preparing and 
processing loan documents, and closing the loan transaction. 
/d. at 364. 
481 /d. at 364-65. The Tax Court admitted that 
[w]hile the specific information available when a loan is made may become 
outdated in a relatively short period of time, the quality of the decision to 
make a loan (and thereby acquire an asset) is predicated on such 
information. The soundness of the decision to make a loan is assimilated 
into the quality and value of the loan. Thus, the direct costs of the decision-
making process should be assimilated into the asset that was acquired. 
/d. at 370. Under a minimum distortion of income analysis the credit information 
costs should have been treated as a separate asset and thus so short lived as to be 
currently deductible. See supra note 404 and accompanying text. Additionally, the 
record did not contain a breakdown of recording costs, which conceptually should be 
added to the cost of the individual loans, and credit costs, which suggests a difficulty 
in allocation. PNC Bancorp, 110 T.C. at 369 n.21. Such cost allocation was not done 
with respect to each loan, anyway. See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 
822, 832-33 n.16 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g 110 T.C. 349 (1998). 
482 PNC Bancorp, 110 T.C. at 364-65. 
483 The effective date of section 197 is August 10, 1993. Omnibus Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, § 13,261(g), 107 Stat. 312, 540. 
484 The tax benefit rule does not apply to intangibles created and expensed by the 
taxpayer. Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84. 
485 Compare section 198(e) with Justice O'Connor's reference in Hillsboro 
National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 386 n.20 (1983), to statutory recapture 
as a codified tax benefit rule. 
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that were not completed, nor do they include costs incurred after the 
closing of a loan. "486 
The Third Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, believed "that the 
Tax Court took too broad a reading of what Lincoln Savings meant by 
'separate and distinct assets,' as well as an overbroad reading of what 
can be said to 'create' such assets."487 The taxpayer argued that 
[ w ]hile purporting to apply the Lincoln Savings language, 
both the Tax Court and the government effectively have 
transformed that language, by subtle but significant degrees, 
from a test based on whether a cost "creates" a separate and 
distinct asset, into a much more sweeping test that would 
mandate capitalization of costs incurred "in connection with" 
or "with respect to" the acquisition of an asset.488 
486 PNC Bancorp, 110 T:C. at 369. 
The costs at issue are directly connected to the creation of loans, which 
constitute separate and distinct assets that are the banks' primary source of 
income. Revenues, in the form of interest payments, are received over the 
life of the individual loans. In order to accurately measure the banks' net 
income, the direct costs of originating the loans must be capitalized and 
amortized over the life of the loans. 
I d. at 372. 
487 PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g 
110 T.C. 349 (1998). 
On the "separate and distinct" issue, the Third Circuit elaborated that unlike 
PNC Bancorp, in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 
(1971), "the Secondary Reserve fund was an asset that existed quite apart from 
Lincoln's main daily business[,] ... [was] separate from FLSIC's other revenues, and 
was distinctly earmarked as Lincoln's property." PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830. 
As for the "create" issue, 
the Tax Court proceeded from the clearly accurate premise that the 
expenses in question were associated with the loans, incurred in connection 
with the acquisition of the loans or "directly related to the creation of the 
loans" to the faulty conclusion that these expenses themselves created the 
loans. We conclude that the term "create" does not stretch this far. In 
Lincoln Savings, it was the payments themselves that formed the corpus of 
the Secondary Reserve; therefore, it naturally follows that these payments 
"created" the reserve fund. In PNC's case, however, the expenses are 
merely costs associated with the origination of the loans; the expenses 
themselves do not become part of the balance of the loan. 
I d. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
488 Appellant's Reply Brief at 4, PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 
822 (No. 95-16002) (quoted in PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830). 
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The Third Circuit "decline[d] to follow the Tax Court's broad 
interpretation, for to do so would be to expand the type of costs that 
must be capitalized so as to drastically limit what might be considered 
as 'ordinary and necessary' expenses."489 
The Third Circuit overlooked, however, the "in connection with" 
approach of Woodward,490 Hilton,491 and their progeny as well as the 
rule of parity and clear reflection of income approach of Idaho 
Power.492 It relied upon cases addressing the expansion of bank credit 
cards as supporting its "finding that Lincoln Savings does not compel 
a conclusion that FNPC's and UFB's costs should be capitalized."493 
In fact, each of these bank credit card cases used a no separate asset 
analysis and was heavily relied upon by NCNB II in its adoption of the 
no separate asset test.494 The Supreme Court in INDOPCO 
specifically rejected both this test and NCNB 11,495 which it saw as 
conflicting with National Starch.496 Indeed, the Court granted 
certiorari to resolve just this conflict.497 Nevertheless, most of the 
489 PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830. 
490 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572,574 (1970). 
491 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 582-84 (1970). 
492 Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 15 & n.lO (1974). 
493 PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Iowa Des Moines, anticipating the 
"future benefit" concerns later stated in INDOPCO, emphasized the "short 
useful life" of credit information as a reason for deductibility. Iowa Des 
Moines, 592 F.2d at 436. The Iowa court stated that the prospective future 
benefit that could accrue beyond the taxable year as a result of credit 
screening was "very slight," and thus capitalization was "not easily 
supported." !d. In National Starch, the decision that the Supreme Court 
affirmed in INDOPCO, we found that these credit card cases contained the 
seed of the "future benefit" analysis, citing these cases as evidence that 
several Courts of Appeals "look[ed] to whether an ensuing benefit was 
created to determine whether the expense was ordinary and necessary," 
National Starch, 918 F.2d at 431, and that these courts found that future 
benefit was not substantial in situations similar to the case at bar. See id. 
(citing Iowa Des Moines and Colorado Springs). We conclude that the 
credit card cases not only continue to have vitality after INDOPCO, but in 
fact anticipated some of the concerns addressed by INDOPCO. 
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 833-34. 
494 See NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285, 290-91, 293-94 (4th Cir. 1982), overruled by 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
495 See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83 & n.3, 86-87. 
4
% !d. at 83 & n.3, 86-87 (discussing taxpayer as overreading Commissioner v. 
Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971)). 
497 !d. at 83 & n.3. 
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bank credit card cases, along with the circuit court cases decided after 
INDOPCO, could have been justified on the basis of rough justice 
exceptions under a balancing of burdens and benefits of 
capitalization.498 PNC Bancorp was on somewhat more sound ground 
in concluding that "the Tax Court erred in its interpretation of the 
'future benefit' analysis by relying on the fact that the loan itself was 
usually of several years' duration and by reasoning that the loan 
origination costs were, thus, essentially directed at future benefit."499 I 
have long argued that where the· benefits of an expenditure are 
shorter than the life of the asset in connection with which it is 
incurred, the expenditure should be treated as a freestanding 
amortizable asset.500 The Third Circuit, however, concluded that no 
distortion of income arose "because of the regularity of these 
expenses. "501 
The fact that the costs were incurred in the day-to-day operation 
of the bank's business was the driving force behind the Third Circuit's 
decision in PNC Bancorp.502 The court relied upon Welch v. 
498 See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192 
(lOth Cir. 1974) (no depreciation); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 
592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979) (short term, recurring, and difficulty of allocation); 
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973) (regularly 
recurring). 
499 PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 834 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis in original). 
/d. 
[W]e must remember that the "future benefit" analysis adopted in 
INDOPCO is not meant as a talismanic, bright-line test. See A.E. Staley 
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 1997) 
("[T]he Court did not purport to be creating a talismanic test that an 
expenditure must be capitalized if it creates some future benefit."). Rather, 
the INDOPCO analysis demonstrates the contextual, case-by-case approach 
to determining whether an expenditure better fits under the "ordinary and 
necessary" language of section 162(a) or the "permanent improvements or 
betterments" language of § 263(a). We conclude that the loan origination 
expenses incurred by UFB and FNPC have the characteristics of the former, 
rather than the latter, statutory language. 
500 0 Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 1 , at 27-28. 
501 PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 835. 
502 /d. at 828. 
[T]he loan marketing activities at issue here lie at the very core of the 
banks' recurring, routine day-to-day business. The Commissioner has not 
been able to articulate a principled reason why these normal costs of doing 
business must be capitalized, while other ordinary banking costs need not 
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l .503 d 504 • 505 He vermg an Deputy v. du Pont for "ordmary" as customary. 
Some published rulings do hint at an ordinary course of business 
justification for current deduction of expenditures with future 
benefit.506 Such an exception might seem to flow from the Supreme 
Court's classic, but perhaps dated, definition in Welch and duPont of 
"ordinary" as "normal, usual, or customary" in a taxpayer's trade or 
business. Justice Stewart, in Commissioner v. Tellier507 stated much 
later, however, that "the principal function of the term 'ordinary' in 
section 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between 
those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the 
nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be 
amortized over the useful life of the asset."508 Judge Ruwe of the Tax 
Court combined both the Tellier and the duPont definitions in PNC 
509 Bancorp. To some extent, PNC Bancorp as well as Wells Fargo 
reflect Judge Posner's insight in Encyclopaedia Britannica that the 
[appellate] "courts naturally shy away from" capitalizing every 
expenditure yielding future benefits, because that would require 
capitalization of virtually all business expenses.510 In the words of 
Judge Posner, "[i]t would require capitalizing every salesman's salary, 
since his selling activities create goodwill for the company and 
goodwill is an asset yielding income beyond the year in which the 
salary expense is incurred. The administrative costs of conceptual 
. ,511 
ngor are too great. 
PNC Bancorp provides a particularly transparent instance of 
be. Instead, the Commissioner relies on the line drawn by SF AS 91, a 
standard whose rationale we conclude is far removed from the concerns of 
the tax system .... We remain unconvinced that the line drawn by the 
F ASB in SF AS 91 has any relevance here for tax purposes. 
/d. at 834. 
503 290 u.s. 111, 113-15 (1933). 
504 308 u.s. 488, 495-96 (1940). 
505 PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 828. 
506 See Rev. Rul. 73-463, 1973-2 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-2 C.B. 9. 
507 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
508 !d. at 689-90. 
509 See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349, 362-63 (1998); see also 
Cheryl A. Cunagin, Note, The Double Standard Under Section 162: Why the 
Employee Business Deduction Is No Longer for Employees, 82 KY. L.J. 771, 775-76 
(1994) (discussing the lack of a clear standard of what is "ordinary" and what is 
"necessary" in various cases). 
510 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
511 ld. Although not cited in Encyclopaedia Britannica, preceding it Professor 
Boris Bittker had used virtually the same reasoning and example. See infra note 584. 
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shying away from capitalizing virtually all business expenses. In this 
case, the Third Circuit focused on the loan origination costs such as 
appraisals and credit checks as being incurred in the "normal method 
of doing business. "512 Of course, in the case of tangibles, the direct 
and indirect costs of creating and acquiring assets must be capitalized, 
even if this is the taxpayer's normal method of doing business.513 The 
Third Circuit, in questioning the rationale for the Commissioner's 
insistence upon capitalization of these costs,514 parallels the anti-
stealth tax movement in Congress. This movement opposes 
administrative changes that raise the effective tax rate of a market 
segment of taxpayers515 that Congress cannot then reverse without 
512 We cannot conclude that in performing credit checks, appraisals, and 
other tasks intended to assess the profitability of a ioan, the banks "stepped 
out of [their] normal method of doing business" so as to render the 
expenditures at issue capital in nature. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982). As we stated in National 
Starch, an important determination is whether given expenditures "relate to 
the corporation's operations and betterment into the indefinite future," 
indicating the need for capitalization, or are instead geared toward "income 
production or other current needs," suggesting deductibility. National 
Starch & Chern. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 433 (3d Cir.1990), 
affd, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 112 S.Ct. 1039, 117 
L.Ed.2d 226 (1992). The facts before us demonstrate that loan operations 
are the primary method of income production for the subject banks. We 
have no doubt that the expenses incurred in loan origination were normal 
and routine "in the particular business" of banking. See Deputy v. du Pont, 
308 U.S. at 496, 60 S.Ct. 363. 
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 829 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in 
original). PNC overlooked that the loan operations generated loans yielding income 
over a number of years. A taxpayer's direct costs in acquiring or creating tangible 
assets must be capitalized under Idaho Power or section 263A even if such 
acquisition/construction is normal and routine and the everyday source of its income. 
Thus, another rationale must be found if the PNC loan origination costs are to be 
currently deductible. 
513 Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 389-92 (2001), sets forth the 
precedents quite nicely. See supra notes 227-29, 235-36 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of full absorption accounting. 
514 PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 824. The court's partial answer to this question was 
that INDOPCO "may well have been viewed by the IRS as a green light to seek 
capitalization of costs that had previously been considered deductible in a number of 
businesses and industries." Id. 
515 See, e.g., Stealth Tax Prevention Act, S. 276, 107th Cong. (2001) (referred to 
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs as of Feb. 7, 2001). 
Congress passes a law. We want to tax at a certain level and a certain group 
of people. A lot of times those laws have been in place for a long period of 
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meeting the "pay-as-you-go" budget rules.516 The Tax Court in effect 
rejected the taxpayer's argument in PNC Bancorp. Specifically, the 
taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that it should be permitted to take 
current deductions for its loan origination costs in view of (1) 
Congress's legislation concerning the income taxation of banks and 
capitalization without addressing the deductibility of loan origination 
costs, and (2) a long-standing industry practice of currently deducting 
such costs.517 
In the end, the Third Circuit's opinion in PNC Bancorp rested on 
the costs being incurred in the banks' normal method of doing 
business.518 Its result cannot be justified, however, on traditional 
acquisition cost or origin of the claim doctrines. While the current 
deduction of internal costs might be justified on the grounds of 
time. Congressional intent was followed for a long period of time. And 
then there is somebody sitting in some bureaucracy - in this case, the 
Treasury Department - that says, oh, no, that is not what Congress 
intended; this is what they intended. Then he changes it. We don't have a 
process for reviewing that. This legislation will give a process for that 
review. But we will not find ourselves in a position of having to correct 
something that is contrary to congressional intent, but also with the idiotic 
situation that we somehow have to come up with revenue to offset a change 
of policy that we never intended in the first place. 
144 CONG. REc. S4419 (1998) (remarks of Senate Finance Chairman, Sen. Charles E. 
Grassley, R-Ia.); accord 147 CONG. REC. S1132 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2001) (statement of 
Sen. Burns); see also Transcript of Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two, 
supra note 34, 'll'll 515-16 (Ken Gideon stated that capitalizing under INDOPCO 
traditionally deducted expenses raises taxes "just as surely as if you had passed an 
explicit tax increase," generating a bad reaction). 
516 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset 
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 503-04 & n.6 
(1998) ("the 'pay-as-you-go' provision ("PA YGO") enacted in the Budget 
Enforcement Act of 1990 ... requires advocates for new tax expenditures to pay for 
them in one of three ways: raising taxes, reducing current tax subsidies, or reducing 
spending for existing entitlement programs.") (footnote omitted) (citing the Budget 
Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994))). This forces Congress to pay for remedial reforms 
of inadministrable rules obtained by judicial victories even if taxpayers generally have 
been reporting differently than those new rules so that there would be no revenue loss 
in the real world or further erosion of the actual tax base as contrasted with the 
theoretical tax base. See Goldberg, supra note 414, at 183, 186; accord 144 CONG. 
REC. S4419 (1998) (remarks of Senate Finance Chairman, Sen. Charles E Grassley, 
R-Ia.). 
517 PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349, 374-75 (1998), rev'd, 212 
F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000). 
518 PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 829 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g 
110 T.C. 349 (1998). 
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difficulty of allocation or administrability, the outside costs cannot be 
so justified.519 The Third Circuit's strained definition of "create" 
would seemingly apply to the creation of tangible · and intangible 
assets, thereby permitting a purchaser of rental real estate to deduct 
currently the recording costs of the acquisition. This should not be the 
case since such costs clearly constitute acquisition costs.520 
The appellate courts shy away from capitalization even more, 
albeit less transparently, where depreciation is not available at all, as 
in A.E. Stale/21 and Wells Fargo.522 The ideal answer to taxation of 
transaction costs would be amortization over a fixed period, say sixty 
months.523 Nevertheless, Congress's opposition to depreciation of 
transaction costs of tax-free reorganizations manifested in section 
19i24 should be noted.525 Such a practical rough justice solution would 
519 See discussion infra Part VI.E. 
52
° Cf Oriole Homes Corp. v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 1531 (S.D. Fla. 1989) 
(impact fees required for the approval and recordation of plats for subdivisions 
constitute capital expenditures); Von-Lusk v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 207 (1995) 
(costs of obtaining permits, zoning variances and negotiating permit fees constitute 
indirect costs that a taxpayer can capitalize under section 263A). 
521 See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'g 
and remanding 105 T.C. 166 (1995). 
522 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev'g 
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89 (1999). 
523 Cf I.R.C. § 248 (providing for sixty-month amortization of costs of organizing 
a corporation, which would otherwise be conceptually nondeductible since property is 
received tax-free by a corporation upon its incorporation. See Lee & Murphy, supra 
note 3, at 524). 
524 See I.R.C. § 197(e)(8). 
525 The transparent origin of this provision was a desire to backstop INDOPCO. 
See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., FISCAL YEAR 
1994 BUDGET RECONCILIATION RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS 
AND MEANS 332-33 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter WAYS & MEANS REPORT]; 
Technical Memorandum from Calvin H. Johnson, Professor of Law, University of 
Texas, to Fred J. Goldberg, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of 
Treasury (July 8, 1992), reprinted in Texas Law Professor Suggests Modifications to 
Amortization Proposal, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 23, 1992) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit., 92 TNT 150-72). A nontransparent reason, however, may have 
been covert opposition to mergers in general. See Staff Recommendations to Revise 
Subchapter C: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Mgmt., Senate 
Comm. on Fin., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 121-22 (1986) (colloquy between Sen. Danforth, 
R-Mo., and Assistant Secretary Ron Pearlman). On the other hand, Congress 
expressly stated that "no inference is intended regarding the proper treatment of 
professional fees or transactions costs in other circumstances under present law." 
WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra, at 333. 
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probably be too late at this point.526 The appellate courts 
predictabll27 have rejected capitalization in favor of a current 
deduction where no depreciation is available, as in A.E. Staley and 
Wells Fargo. It is thus an easy, but false, step to reach the same result 
where depreciation is available as in PNC Bancorp.528 
D. Customary Executive Salaries 
In Wells Fargo, the Eighth Circuit held that officers' salaries of an 
acquired subsidiary paid during the year of acquisition, as well as legal 
and investigatory expenses incurred before the acquisition, are 
deductible. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Tax Court below 
had mistakenly interpreted INDOPC0.529 Therefore, in Wells Fargo, 
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the officers' salaries were 
"incidental"530 to the future benefit and were common or frequently 
526 See supra notes 515-25 and accompanying text. 
527 See Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 677 n.72 ("unjust rules, 
capitalization without adequate amortization, will cause some (but not all) courts to 
seek other solutions promoting uncertainty"). Further, Moss v. Commissioner, 831 
F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987), "is another example of judicial overreaction to the Service's 
income distorting adjustment [requiring depreciation over thirty years of costs that 
would be repeated in three years]." !d. at 677. 
528 The same progression occurred where precedents permitting current 
deduction of recurring short-term benefit costs for which no deduction was permitted 
under the start-up cost doctrine was improperly extended to long-lived costs. See 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recurring costs of advertising, 
etc., are properly deductible, but the cost of a computer program used for five years 
and costing a substantial amount should be capitalized and amortized over that period 
rather than currently deducted under the majority's separate, saleable asset test); 
NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (permitting current deduction of an 
expenditure for a branch banking permit with indefinite life); Lee, Start-Up Costs, 
supra note 10, at 25. 
529 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev'g in part 
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89, 100 (1999). 
530 The Tax Court below had held that the costs were "incurred ... before and 
incidentally with its acquisition." Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89, 100 
(1999). The Tax Court surely meant at the same time or in connection with. A 
common formulation of the origin of the claim doctrine speaks of costs "incident" to a 
capital transaction. See, e.g., Estate of Baier v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 117, 120 (3d 
Cir. 1976) ("We are satisfied that the 'origin of the claim test' applies to expenses 
incident to the disposition of property, as well as to the acquisition of property."); 
Brown v. United States, 75-1 U.S.T.C. 'li 9123 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (fees incurred 
incident to the sale of stock are capitalized under the origin of the claim doctrine), 
rev'd, 526 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1975); Brown v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 286, 288 
(E.D. Mich. 1970) ("origin and character of the claims, incident to which legal 
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occurring expenses. Noting that the transaction costs in INDOPCO 
were directly related to the acquisition of the taxpayer in a friendly 
takeover, the Wells Fargo court held that the salaries before it were at 
best indirectly related to the acquisition and hence were deductible.531 
In so holding, it misread the origin of the claim doctrine, or at least 
the acquisition cost doctrine of Idaho Power,532 as applying only to 
costs directly related to an acquisition. The Wells Fargo court also 
misread a series of Technical Advice Memoranda and a Private Letter 
Ruling533 involving severance payments,534 bonus payments to equal 
taxes triggered on stock options triggered by going private,535 and 
payments upon cancellation of stock options and stock appreciation 
rights paid incident to a reorganization,536 as holding "that payments 
made by an employer are deductible when they are made to 
employees, are compensatory in nature, and directly related to the 
employment relationship (and only indirectly related to the capital 
transaction, which provides the long term benefit)."537 The Eighth 
Circuit does not mention that most of these authorities carefully noted 
that the disputed compensation was not for services incident to the 
reorganization itself and was for past services.538 The issue in all of 
these authorities was whether the "origin-of-the-claim" was (a) the 
triggering reorganization, or (b) the pre-transaction compensatory 
expenses were incurred"); Rev. Rul. 67-125, 1967-1 C.B. 31 {"legal fees incurred for 
services performed in drafting a corporate merger agreement are to be capitalized as 
incident to the reorganization since the effect of a merger is to change the capital 
structure of the surviving corporation."). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit court twisted 
this unfortunate choice of words into INDOPCO's "incidental ·future benefit," 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 {1992), which does not have to be 
capitalized. "Thus, the Court did not create a new test requiring capitalization 
whenever an expenditure is incidentally connected with some future benefit." Wells 
Fargo, 224 F.3d at 885 {footnote omitted). 
531 Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 886. 
532 Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 {1974). 
533 See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 886. 
534 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-26-001 (Mar. 18, 1993) (severance pay was not intended as 
compensation for services rendered to effectuate merger); Tech. Adv. Mem 97-21-002 
(Jan. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem 97-31-001 (Jan. 31, 1997) {based on years of service 
with target; none of service payments made for service attributable to the merger). 
535 Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-27-005 {Mar. 15, 1995) (compensation for past services). 
536 Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-40-003 (June 30, 1995) (options constituted 
compensatory obligations from prior years). 
537 Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 887. 
538 I am assuming that the court read carefully the cited authorities. Possibly, the 
briefs slanted discussion of these authorities and the court did not go beyond the 
briefs. 
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obligation. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit overlooked that each of 
these authorities cited Revenue Ruling 73-580,539 which held that the 
portion of compensation paid by a corporation to its employees 
attributable to services performed in connection with corporate 
acquisitions must be capitalized. An early Field Service Advice 
(FSA), however, spoke of "salaries of the executives involved in the 
leveraged buyout were deducted [by the taxpayer] because these. were 
either fixed or computed using a fixed formula regardless of the 
nature of their work."540 The FSA, however, applied the origin of the 
claim test to capitalize expenses incident to the corporate 
• 541 
restructunng. 
The Advance Notice follows Wells Fargo with respect to regular 
compensation of employees who are performing services in 
connection with a capital transaction, but distinguishes regular 
compensation, as Wells Fargo did, from commissions or bonuses paid 
to such employees in connection with a capital transaction.542 While 
the landmark decision in Acer Realty Co. v. Commissioner543 involved 
special compensation to corporate officers that was tied to a specific 
construction project that they oversaw, this was not the case in 
Perlmutter,544 a Tax Court decision that the Supreme Court relied 
upon in Idaho Power.545 The Tax Court in Perlmutter required 
capitalization of the portion of the top executives' salaries of a real 
estate leasing corporation allocable to the three to five hours a week 
one top executive spent, and the five to seven hours a week the other 
spent, overseeing construction of a building for use in their rental 
539 1973-2 C.B. 86. 
540 1993 FSA LEXIS 7, *54 (Sept. 20, 1993); accord 1997 FSA LEXIS 119, *5 
· (Dec. 15, 1997) (citing Revenue Ruling 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86). 
/d. 
You should also inquire into whether the options might have been paid for 
services rendered or to be rendered by the officers in connection with the 
acquisition, rather than in connection with the ordinary course of the 
taxpayer's business. If this were to be the case, the expenses should be 
capitalized. 
541 ( See 1993 FSA LEXIS 7 Sept. 20, 1993). 
542 See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3464 (Jan. 24, 2002); cf Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d 874, rev'g in part 
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89, 100 (1999). 
543 132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942). 
544 See Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 404 (1965), affd, 373 F.2d 45 
(lOth Cir. 1967). 
545 See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13 (1974); supra note 225 
and accompanying text. 
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b . 546 usmess. 
The Wells Fargo approach does have support in some pre-
INDOPCO decisions that adopted rough justice balancing approach 
reasoning. For instance, Southland Royalty, a pre-INDOPCO 
decision, took an approach analogous to Wells Fargo's "customary" 
tack.547 In that case, the then Court of Claims (now the Court of 
Federal Claims), noting that the reserve survey was not used to 
determine whether oil drilling was feasible prior to acquiring the 
mineral interest,548 allowed the deductions because they were 
"functionally part of, and indistinguishable from, expenditures for 
ordinary management planning."549 If the company had obtained the 
mineral interest, the survey cost would have constituted part of the 
cost of such interest under the acquisition cost doctrine. At the same 
time, the decision turned on the fact that the lives of the surveys were 
short and indeterminable with the result that amortization was not 
available.550 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Iowa-Des Moines 
reasoned that "had taxpayers directly acquired credit information, 
capitalization of the expense, including employee wages, would not 
have been required. Credit screening is a necessary and ordinary part 
of the banking business; it is not a capital expenditure. "551 The Eighth 
Circuit further noted that "[a]lthough the Government contends that 
the law is not certain that such expenditures need not be capitalized, 
we note that it has not appealed from the adverse judgment of the Tax 
Court regarding expenditures incurred when employees of the 
taxpayers accumulated additional credit information. "552 
Nevertheless, these decisions are inconsistent with the reasoning of 
the full absorption cases resting on clear reflection of income mandate 
of section 446.553 Moreover, both Southland Royalty and Iowa-Des 
546 See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d 874; Perlmutter, 44 T.C. 382. Fon Howard Paper 
Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 286 (1967), distinguished Perlmutter on the grounds 
that the parties stipulated to an allocation. See supra note 226. 
547 See Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 616 (Ct. Cl. 1978) 
(surveys of the kind at issue, while providing some future benefits (three to four 
years), were used in current operations "to make income projections, develop short-
and long-term budgets, arrange financing, and prepare reports to shareholders and 
regulatory authorities."). 
548 See id. at 617 n.20. 
549 /d. at 617. 
550 See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
551 Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 
1979) (footnote omitted). 
552 /d. at 436 n.5. 
553 See I.R.C. § 446(b); Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1280 (lOth 
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Moines also employed a balancing of burdens and benefits of 
capitalization standard, and they were strongly moved by the notion 
that capitalization without depreciation distorted the taxpayer's 
• 554 
mcome. 
U.S. Freightways implicitly agreed with Judge Posner's 
observation that courts shy away from the conceptual rigor of future 
benefit capitalization where "the result will be to force the 
capitalization of virtually every business expense"555 and expressly 
adopted his conclusion that "the 'administrative costs [of) conceptual 
rigor' ... become too great."556 These cases must be rationalized557 on 
the balancing approach inherent in Posner's observation which U.S. 
D • h k 1" • 558 rrezg tways rna es even more exp tctt. 
E. Overhead Expenses 
The Lychuk court concluded that "in connection with" meant 
"directly related"559 and that the overhead costs did not originate in 
the process of acquisition of the loans.560 The Tax Court distinguished 
Perlmutter on the grounds that it preceded Woodward,561 but 
overlooked that in Idaho Power, the Supreme Court relied on 
Perlmuttei62 in requiring capitalization of inside indirect acquisitions 
incurred in connection with the acquisition of a tangible asset. The 
Lychuk court determined, in contrast, that the costs of salaries of 
employees who spent almost all their time on the acquisition of 
installment obligations had to be capitalized to the extent allocable to 
successful acquisitions, which was 38%.563 The Lychuk majority cited 
Idaho Power, Woodward, and a number of circuit decisions564 that 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976). 
554 See supra notes 374-77 and accompanying text. 
555 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc: v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
556 U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137, 1146 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217). 
557 See discussion infra Part VI. 
558 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
559 Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 386 (2001). 
560 !d. at 392. 
56! Id. at 392-93 (citing Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 403-05 (1965), 
affd, 373 F.2d 45 (lOth Cir. 1967); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970)). 
562 See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13 (1974). 
563 See Lychuk, 116 T.C. at 386 n.9. 
564 Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., supra 418 U.S. at 13; see Woodward 
v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. at 575 ("It has long been recognized, as a general 
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"reflect a longstanding, firmly established body of law under which 
expenditures incurred 'in connection with' the acquisition of a capital 
asset are considered capital expenditures includable in the acquired 
asset's tax basis. "565 
Further, while the reasoning of the Lychuk court with respect to 
the salaries paid to the taxpayer's loan origination department 
employees is more consonant with Idaho Power on its facts, the 
capitalization result is inconsistent with a balancing of the burdens 
and benefits of capitalization analysis due to the short life (with an 
average of around eighteen months) of the loans recurrently created. 
Additionally, current deduction of both overhead and of the loan 
officers' salaries can be justified under a balancing of burdens and 
benefits of capitalization due to difficulty of allocation to individual 
loans since time spent on each loan under consideration probably 
varies greatly and time sheets apparently were not kept detailing the 
time spent on each loan. 
matter, that costs incurred in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset 
are to be treated as capital expenditures"); see also Johnsen v. 
Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir.. 1986) ("costs incurred in 
connection with the acquisition or construction of a capital asset are capital 
expenditures"), revg. on other grounds 83 T.C. 103 (1984); Ellis Banking 
Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 1379 ("an expenditure that would 
ordinarily be a deductible expense must nonetheless be capitalized if it is 
incurred in connection with the acquisition of a capital asset"); cf. A.E. 
Staley Manufacturing Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 489 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (costs are capital expenditures if they are "associated with" 
facilitating a capital transaction), rev'g. on other grounds and remanding 
105 T.C. 166 (1995); Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Association v. United States, 
731 F.2d 1181, 1184 (5th Cir. 1984) ("expenditures incurred in the 
acquisition of a capital asset must generally be capitalized"); Commissioner 
v. Wiesler, 161 F.2d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1947) ("well settled rule that 
expenditures incurred as an incident to the acquisition or sale of property 
are not ordinary and necessary business expenses, but are capital 
expenditures which must be added to the cost of the property"), affg. 6 T.C. 
1148 (1946). 
Lychuk, 116 T.C. at 389. PNC Bancorp v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000), 
is criticized (see supra notes 477, 493 and accompanying text) for holding that 
employee salaries incurred in connection with the acquisition of capital assets (credit 
checks, etc., as to loans) do not come within the definition of acquiring a capital asset 
See supra notes 475-76 and accompanying text. 
565 Lychuk, 116 T.C. at 388-89. 
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VI. BALANCING BURDENS AND BENEFITS: PROPOSING A 
RESOLUTION TO THE TRANSACTION COSTS CASES 
A. Introduction 
The circuit opm10ns in PNC Bancorp,566 Wells Fargo,561 and 
Lychuk568 conflict with the origin of the claim doctrine and Idaho 
Power's569 approach to both tax parity and the matching of expenses 
with future benefit.570 A burdens and benefits of capitalization 
balancing standard, on the other hand, can explain these decisions. 
When the burdens of capitalization are heavy to both the taxpayer571 
572 
and the government, and the revenue advantage to the government 
is slight,573 then the balance of factors under the Code and the 
566 PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d 822 (permitting the current deduction of the salary of 
loan origination employees). 
567 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000) (permitting 
the current deduction of target corporation officers investigating the acquiring 
company), affg in part and rev'g in part Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89 
(1999). 
568 Lychuk, 116 T.C. 374 (permitting current deduction of overhead of the loan 
origination department). 
569 Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974). 
570 See discussion supra Part V. 
571 0 See supra note 241 and accompanymg text. 
572 See Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 185-86. 
When you have this much controversy about something that it is a 
fundamental business activity and when you've got an income measurement 
problem so fundamental you have to ask yourself whether have [sic) you 
have your rules right. INDOPCO after all is not an issue that anybody can 
think of as a tax shelter, a tax abuse. I think the answer is if we're having 
this much controversy, maybe we don't. We probably do need, either 
legislation or a super regulation project. But we ought to be able to do a lot 
better than we're doing on an issue that is as core as this one to our tax 
system. 
Even if you want to have a special set of tax rules such as MACRS, as we 
have always had, recognizing that there will be boundary drawing issues and 
recognizing that those boundary drawing issues will cause some to believe 
that the system has been unjust, I suggest to you that MACRS, even with its 
issues and 197 are a lot better place than the world we are jumping off into 
with infinite INDOPCO litigation. 
Transcript on Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two, supra note 34, <JI<JI 519, 
546 (comments of Ken Gideon). 
573 See Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 181-82 & 
n.79 (citing Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th 
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Regulations cuts in favor of a current deduction under section 162.574 
Unlike the origin of the claim doctrine and the tax parity rule as 
articulated in Idaho Power, such balancing could produce different 
results between internal and external costs575 because external costs 
usually can be clearly identified and allocated. Two commentators in 
particular acknowledge that such different results between inside and 
outside costs create "significant concerns of allocative efficiency (and 
perhaps fairness)" but, in spite of this risk, they "believe that the 
benefits of reducing the administrative and compliance costs of these 
rules will exceed the costs of making the system more nonuniform."576 
Given the relationship between the government's allocation of 
compliance resources at the LMSB level and the corporate tax shelter 
577 h problem, I w oleheartedly agree. 
Note that the Advance Notice's "overhead" rule is supported by 
the Tax Court's holding with respect to overhead expenses in Lychuk 
as well as the single earlier decision applying a "facilitate a particular 
capital transaction" rule.578 Currently, deduction of overhead costs is 
inconsistent, however, with the full absorption line of cases 
exemplified by Adolph Coors.579 These cases, like Idaho Power, 
demonstrate a concern for the clear reflection of income with respect 
to direct and indirect costs, including overhead, of constructing 
tangibles or acquiring them for resale. For instance, in PNC Bancorp, 
the Third Circuit addressed the anti-distortion of income concern of 
Idaho Power with a rough justice approach insofar as the court stated 
that "[t]here need be no concern about a distortion of income because 
Cir. 1979); Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 424 
F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970)). 
574 See supra notes 241-49 and accompanying text; I.R.C. § 162(a). 
575 Christine M. Turgeon, a senior tax law specialist in Treasury's Office of 
Tax Policy ... said the administration questions whether it makes sense to 
capitalize external employee compensation costs - external Counsel, for 
example - but not internal costs. The government recognizes it may be 
more burdensome to taxpayers to allocate those [internal] costs, she said, 
adding that simplifying these rules is under consideration. 
Amy Hamilton, Treasury Official Assesses INDOPCO Coalition Proposal, 93 TAX 
NOTES 745, 747 (Nov. 5, 2001). 
576 Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 55. See Transcript of Conference on Tax 
Legislative Process, Day Two, supra note 34, <JI<JI 569-79 (comments of Joseph Mirkut) 
for an excellent counter argument. 
577 See supra notes 117-33, 17 4-81 and accompanying text. 
578 Munson v. McGuiness, 283 F.2d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 1960). 
579 Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); see supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. 
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of the regularity of these expenses."58° Currently deducting overhead 
costs incurred in connection with an intangible ironically is less 
inconsistent with section 263A, the uniform capitalization rules whose 
Thrust . . . was to require various producers of tangible 
property already capitalizing direct and some indirect costs to 
more comprehensively capitalize other indirect costs. 
Congress meant to exempt from the new uniform 
capitalization rules those taxpayers, or expenditures, that 
were already exempted under prior law from the general 
. 1" . I ssJ capita 1zat10n ru es. 
Further confirmation may be seen in the Congressional intention 
to exclude the costs of creating intangibles from section 263A.582 The 
Treasury Proposals forming the basis for section 263A had excepted 
(without explanation) from the Uniform Capitalization Rules 
marketing, selling, and advertising expenses, and research and 
development costs unrelated to particular production activities.583 In 
this context, the Joint Committee Staff had read case law such as 
Lincoln Savings as adopting "a rule of reason approach to applying 
section 263, tacitly acknowledging the impracticality of requiring that 
580 PNC Bancorp, Inc., v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2000). The 
Seventh Circuit in U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137, 1146-47 
(7th Cir. 2001), provides a much more sophisticated analysis of recurring. See supra 
text accompanying note 243. 
581 134 CONG. REC. 9160 (1988) (extension of remarks of Rep. Thomas J. 
Downey, D-N.Y, member of House Ways & Means Committee). 
582 The Senate Finance Committee Report stated that the new provision was not 
intended to modify · 
present-law principles governing the determination of whether an 
expenditure results in a separate and distinct asset that has a useful life 
substantially beyond the taxable year. See Treas. Reg. sec. 1.263(a)-1, (a)-2; 
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan, 403 U.S. 345 (1971). Thus, if 
the costs of producing an intangible item such as goodwill are deductible 
under current law, such costs will continue to be deductible under ... 
[section 263A]. The uniform capitalization rules merely will prescribe which 
costs associated with an asset required to be capitalized must be included in 
its basis or otherwise capitalized. 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 99-313, at 141 & n.38 (1986) (footnote 
combined with text). 
583 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
207 (1984); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE 
CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY 203 (1985). 
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every cost with some conceivable future benefit be capitalized. "584 
This concept is the ultimate foundation for the Seventh Circuit's 
adopting in U.S. Freightways a balancing of burdens and benefits test 
for determining whether to expense or capitalize a cost producing 
future benefits.585 The remainder of this article applies various rough 
justice balancing factors586 to the facts of the cases discussed above.587 
B. Lack of Depreciation 
A rough justice basis for the result in both A.E. Staley and Wells 
Fargo could be the unavailability of depreciation if the costs are 
capitalized to the nondepreciable corporate structure. A major 
difficulty with this analysis, although it certainly has the appeal of 
avoiding "perpetual capitalization," is that logically it should apply to 
inside and outside transaction costs. Under the rationale of the 
unavailability of depreciation, the outside transaction costs in 
INDOPCO would be currently deductible or, better still, depreciable 
over sixty months. Abrogating either INDOPCO or section 197 in 
interpretative regulations is not advisable. Therefore, the "facilitate 
the transaction" gloss of A.E. Staley should be followed, as the 
Advance Notice contemplates. 
584 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: 
AcCOUNTING ISSUES 50 (Joint Comm. Print 1985). Note the close parallel to the 
Bittker formulation: 
This emphasis on the long-run consequences of the taxpayer's accounting 
practice acknowledges that a rule of reason is essential. If every cost 
contributing to the profits of future periods were to be disallowed, it would 
be necessary to divide almost every salary and advertising expense between 
its immediate impact on the customer and its contribution to the company's 
long-lived goodwill. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court has said that "the 
presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not 
controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect 
beyond the taxable year." ... [E]venthe most routine repairs often have a 
long-term impact but are, nevertheless, classified as deductible expenses 
rather than as nondeductible capital expenditures. 
1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 'II 20.4.1, at 20-68 (2d ed. 1989) (quoting Commissioner v. 
Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 354 (1971)). 
585 U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001), 
literally based its approach on Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 
212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982), but the latter expressed just the same thought, probably also 
influenced by Bittker. See supra note 584. 
586 See supra Part IV. 
587 See supra Part V. 
388 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 22:273 
C. Insubstantial Expenditure 
A rough justice rule that would apply to Wells Fargo, but not to 
A.E Staley or, in all likelihood, to PNC Bancorp, is the current 
deduction of insubstantial costs notwithstanding future benefit. 
Indeed, a concurring opinion in Wells Fargo thought the record 
inadequate to show substantiality.588 Moreover, the Tax Court 
majority in Lychuk distinguished Wells Fargo on just that ground.589 
The result in Wells Fargo is probably correct on the theory that the 
expenditure was not substantial, but incorrect on the theory that the 
salaries were deductible because they would be paid anyway as is 
customary. The reality, however, is that the Service apparently cannot 
administer a facts and circumstances substantiality test.590 For 
instance, Revenue Ruling 2001-4591 turns current deduction of certain 
cyclical aircraft maintenance costs on undefined factors such as 
"significant portion," "substantial structural part," "major 
component," or "material upgrade or addition," which are not 
administrable in the field. 592 Further, an insubstantiality approach 
588 [The Tax Court's) finding does not address whether some officers at any 
particular period of time devoted substantial work to the acquisition or 
whether the officers during the period of time in question only incidentally 
worked on the acquisition while doing regular banking duties. 
In order to determine whether an allocation of officers' salaries to an 
acquisition-transaction such as made here qualifies as a deduction from 
income or should be capitalized, the taxing authorities should require the 
taxpayer to show officers' time devoted to the acquisition as compared to 
time spent on regular work during a particular and relevant time period. 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874, 890 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bright, J., 
concurring) (the Service capitalized only $150,000 of the nine executives' and seventy-
three other officers' salaries). 
589 Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 404-05 (2001). 
590 See infra note 592 and accompanying text. 
591 2001-31.R.B. 295. 
592 Some of the terminology used in the ruling (i.e. "significant portion," 
"substantial structural part," "major component," or "material upgrade or 
addition") is undefined. Pending clarification of these terms, this document 
is intended to provide guidance to examiners on the efficient use of time 
and resources in the examination of this issue. Based on the ruling, the 
commitment of staffing to examine airframes, which underwent the first or 
second HMV, is usually not an effective utilization of those resources. 
At the beginning of an examination, you should contact the Air 
Transportation Technical Advisor group and obtain a listing of the 
taxpayer's fleet composition. . . . This list can be shared with the taxpayer 
and used to confirm the type and age of their fleet. From this, you will 
2002] Transaction Costs 389 
does not address PNC Bancorp or Lychuk: 
D. Recurring Expenditures with Short- Term Future Benefit 
The Lychuk court, although it correctly rejected the reasoning of 
PNC Bancorp, was incorrect on the facts before the court. While the 
reasoning of Lychuk with respect to the salaries paid to its loan 
origination department employees is more consonant with PNC 
Bancorp than with Idaho Power on the facts, the capitalization of 40% 
of the employees' salaries is inconsistent with a balancing of the 
burdens and benefits of capitalization analysis.593 The costs were (1) 
recurring, (2) difficult to allocate to particular loans,594 (3) almost 
insubstantial insofar as only 38% of the loan applications were 
accepted, with the result that 62% of these costs and all the overhead 
was held currently deductible, and ( 4) most significantly, the accepted 
loans had an average life of less than two years since they were made 
to high credit risk car buyers.595 Under a balancing test, the rest of the 
salaries (and the overhead) should have been currently deducted. 
This answer, however, will not cover loans of longer length, such as 
residential mortgages with an average duration of seven years, or the 
average duration before the homeowner moves or refinances.596 
In PNC Bancorp, the Third Circuit did not mention the length of 
the loans. I will assume, for purposes of this analysis, that the length 
quickly see if the taxpayer has an aging fleet that would be subject to a third 
HMV or a newer one that would not be subject to it. If they have few 
aircraft subject to a third HMV, you should not spend significant resources 
on this issue. 
2001 FSA LEXIS 195 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
593 Iowa-Des Moines applied a balancing test in allowing a current deduction for 
purchased credit information which it emphasized was short lived and subject to 
sudden change, thereby precluding depreciation under the certainty requirement for 
intangibles. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433,436 (8th Cir. 
1979) ("Where the prospective benefit is very slight, capitalization is not easily 
supported."). 
594 See supra note 358 and accompanying text. 
595 The average lives of accepted car loans were 17.5 months and 19.5 months for 
the tax years at issue. Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374,420 n.1 (2001) (Swift, J., 
concurring mostly to show PNC Bancorp erred in its reasoning). 
596 Scott Burns, It's Balanced Budget Deja Vu All Over Again, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Jan. 7, 1996, at H-1; Mortgages in 1990s: Faster, Cheaper, More Flexible, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 1989, at 6F ("The 30-year fixed mortgage is a bit 
outmoded, says John E. Hemschoot, director of home-mortgage standards for Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (Freddie Mac). That's because few borrowers buy a 
house and live in it for a lifetime; the average stay is seven years."). 
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of the loans was seven years. The short-term recurring factors will not 
produce an ordinary deduction in this case. Another rough justice 
factor should be used rather than PNC Bancorp's definitional, result-
oriented test, a "technical argument not articulated before,"597 as to 
the meaning of "create or enhance a separate and distinct asset. "598 
That factor is the difficulty of allocation of the costs to each loan. 
E. The Difficulty of Allocation 
The difficulty in allocating overhead or officers' salaries .to 
particular assets, particularly to recurring costs as in PNC Bancorp 
and Lychuk, justifies a rough justice current deduction as a matter of 
administrative policy.599 Conventional wisdom presumes that 
capitalization or expensing in the taxpayer's book accounting lessens 
the taxpayer's burden of compliance sufficiently enough to require 
capitalization.600 PNC Bancorp reveals this logical fallacy: The 
capitalized book cost was not allocated to each loan as conceptual 
rigor would require; rather, an aggregate amount was amortized over 
a predetermined period.601 If we are just going to guess, then a guess 
guided by tax principles is preferable to a guess based on accounting 
concepts, which have "vastly different objectives."602 
There is a significant difference in administrability at the taxpayer 
level between outside and inside transaction costs, since outside 
transaction costs often are separately itemized while internal costs 
often are not separately accounted for. 603 A broader rationale would 
take into account the difficulty of allocating costs to individual loans. 
Interestingly, when the Office of Chief Counsel characterized loan 
origination fees as acquisition costs of mortgage servicing contracts, its 
conclusion did not turn on the difficulty of allocating the costs, but 
rather on the speculative nature of such assets. 604 
597 See Massey, supra note 475 and accompanying text. 
598 See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2000); 
supra note 476 and accompanying text. 
599 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968 (Nov. 18, 1968). 
600 Lokken, supra note 35, at 1365; Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 51. 
601 PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 825 n.3, 432-33 n.16. 
602 Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979) (not 
surprisingly written by Justice Blackmun); accord PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 832. 
603 See supra note 575. 
604 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,681 (Feb. 19, 1974). 
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F. Conclusion: How Should the Regulations Be Structured? 
Hopefully, the proposed regulations on intangible expenditures 
will explicitly state the policy of minimal distortion of income as the 
basis for, and apply a burdens and benefits balancing standard to, 
their transaction costs rules.605 Most likely, it is now too late to 
provide a framework for the trier of fact or taxpayer actually to apply 
a case-by-case balancing test with the appropriate factors and method 
of allocation.606 The proposed regulations will probably take the form 
of either specific rules or even a list of capitalizable expenditures with 
unlisted costs being deductible607 for deducting and capitalizing 
specified expenses that create or enhance tangible assets.608 Even so, 
these rules should specifically apply a balancing test both in the 
605 [A]n expenditure should not be capitalized in any case where the 
resulting enhancement of accuracy in the measurement of income is 
outweighed by the burden of separating capital from current items. If the 
expenditure directly creates or enhances a separate and distinct asset, this 
burden is seldom great, and capitalization should usually be required. If no 
separate or distinct asset is created or enhanced, or if the expenditure 
indirectly relates only to such an asset, compliance and administrative 
burdens should be considered explicitly. The Service might consider these 
burdens in formulating objective rules governing particular types of 
expenditures, rather than requiring case-by-case determinations, but the 
objective rules should be justified by evaluating and explaining the burdens 
involved with the costs affected by each rule. 
Lokken, supra note 35, at 1369. 
606 Treasury Regulation 1.355-2(d) comes to mind. See Lee, Art of Regulation 
Drafting, supra note 424, at 1032, 1039-41. I am proud that my scholarship played a 
role in those regulations. Id: at 1032 n.30. Mark L. Yecies once told me that he 
drafted the 1977 proposed revised version with a copy of my "Rafferty" article in 
front of him. Besides the new balancing approach of bail out potential appearing in 
both the regulations and my article, this is indirectly confirmed by General Counsel 
Memorandum 36,387 (Aug. 25, 1975) and General Counsel Memorandum 36,069 
(Nov. 5, 1974). Even more transparent is my contribution to the "related function" 
rule of section 1.355-2( d)(2)(iv)(C), since the absence of an "impairment of equity" 
factor was my only criticism of the 1977 version (not then knowing of my role). See 
John Lee, Proposed Regs. Under 355 Overhaul Device Test and Single-Business 
Divisions, 46 J. TAX'N 194 (1977). 
607 Sheryl Stratton, Federal Bar Association - Tax Accounting Guidance Will 
Address New Jobs Law, Intangibles, 94 TAX NOTES 1434 (Mar. 18, 2002) ("There will 
be a list for what should be capitalized, and if an item is not on the list, capitalization 
is not appropriate, [Heather] Maloy[, Service associate chief counsel (Income Tax & 
Accounting)] said."). 
608 It would be possible, however, to provide a balancing test with the rough 
justice rules as safe harbors. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2), (d)(5) (as amended in 
1992). 
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preamble and in the body of the proposed regulations introducing the 
. 1 609 transactiOn cost ru es. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A decade ago, it was foreseeable from the ISP and GAO studies 
of the most common business audit issues that capitalization would 
become the biggest tax audit issue.610 It was also foreseeable from the 
Service's experience with purchased intangibles leading up to section 
197 that the litigation costs to both taxpayers and the government 
would be substantial.611 Based on the courts' experience with start-up 
costs prior to section 195 as well as the general plan of rehabilitation 
doctrine, it was also foreseeable that if auditors and litigators pushed 
for capitalization resulting in perpetual capitalization or too slow 
depreciation, some circuit opinions would permit a current 
deduction.612 This approach has had unintended consequences, and 
has generated conflicts with prior decisions. It was somewhat more 
surprising that (1) the audit levels dropped so precipitously613 and (2) 
corporate tax shelters would become either the largest614 or second 
largest tax issue.615 With all these developments, the ideal regulations 
embodying the principles of "structured discretionary justice"616 and 
609 Cf § 1.355-2(d)(1). 
610 See 1993 House Hearings, supra note 37, at 1687-88. 
611 Id. 
612 See supra note 527 and accompanying text. 
613 See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text. 
614 • See supra note 132 and infra note 615 and accompanymg text. 
615 [W]e identified four important areas of systematic non-compliance. 
They are misuse of devices such as trusts and passthroughs to hide or 
improperly reduce income; use of complex and abusive corporate tax 
shelters to reduce taxes improperly; failure to file and pay large 
accumulations of employment taxes; and erroneous refund claims. 
However, there is one common element in all four. These schemes are 
organized and actively promoted. 
Abusive corporate tax shelters are the second major compliance 
problem. 
CHARLES 0. ROSSOTfi, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PROGRESS REPORT 
(2001), reprinted in IRS Releases December 2001 Progress Report, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Mar. 4, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 42-6, Cj[<[ 129, 
136). 
616 See Lee et a!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 200-02; 
Lee et a!., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 688-89. 
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transparent "negotiated regulation"617 are no longer feasible. The 
administrative costs to the Service are too great. 
·The answer now is a principled withdrawal by the Service and the 
Treasury Department from capitalizing costs that were traditionally 
deductible and that Congress obviously wanted to remain deductible. 
Nevertheless, Congress bet on the wrong horse: the no separate asset 
rule.618 As a guiding principle, the Service and the Treasury 
Department should ask, with respect to self-created intangibles, 
whether the burdens of capitalizing to the taxpayer (and to the Service 
from the taxpayer currently deducting future benefit costs) outweigh 
the· benefits. The Advance Notice takes some giant steps toward this 
goal. The proposed regulations should explicitly base the 
contemplated transaction costs rules on a burdens and benefits 
analysis. When these and other capitalization regulations are made 
final so that they become the revenue baseline, Congress should 
revisit the area and codify or modify these regulations as it sees fit. 
617 See Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 238-40. 
618 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
